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ABSTRACT
"Metaphysical Pluralism" is an analysis of the condi¬
tions and causes for the multiplicity of metaphysical sys¬
tems. It argues for the viability of metaphysical plura¬
lism — the view that there is more than one plausible meta¬
physical system, and that there can be good reasons for
these various views. Without arguing a specific theory
of metaphysics, this thesis defends the ability of metaphy¬
sical knowledge to remain critical and rational in the face
of the sceptical claim of relativism.
Chapter One and the Appendix discuss the more general
issues of conceptual pluralism as found in the social sciences.
Ideas of autonomy and relativism from Wittgenstein and Winch
are criticized, and it is concluded that there is no a_ priori
guarantee that conceptual schemes are free from internal
confusions, have determinate boundaries or exist in a fully
developed and formal way. These conclusions are then
applied to specific issues in the philosophical arguments
of metaphysical systems. Chapter Two and Three do this.
The historical conditions which develop into pluralism are
described in Chapter Rour as a permanent feature of the
human condition and of knowledge as such. Chapter Rive
then explains how ultimate pluralism does not destroy the
rationality or the purpose of a metaphysical framework, al¬
though any form of absolute, context free knowledge is de¬
nied. Pluralism is interpreted and defended as a mid¬
point between relativism and absolutism, emphasizing both
the constitutive character of conceptual schemes and the
larger context of motives and values.
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The true method of philosophical construction is
to frame a scheme of ideas, the best one can, and
unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of
experience in terms of that scheme. The importance
of philosophy lies in its sustained effort to make




It is criticism that, recognizing no position as
final, and refusing to "bind itself "by the shallow
shibboleths of any sect or school, creates that
serene philosophic temper which loves truth for
its own sake, and loves it not the less because
it knows it to be unattainable.
Oscar Wilde
That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical
researches is as little to be expected as that we,
to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give
up breathing altogether. There will, therefore,
always be metaphysics in the world; nay, everyone,
especially every reflective man, will have it and,
for want of a recognized standard, will shape it
for himself after his own pattern. What has
hitherto been called metaphysics cannot satisfy






In recent years most authors writing about metaphysics
begin with an apology. It seems that the traditional philo¬
sophical goal of a comprehensive view of reality has, in
recent times, fallen short of academic respectablity. Meta¬
physics is often scorned as mere armchair speculation, soft-
thinking, a more poetic than scientific discipline. In an
age dominated by claims of objectivity and quantified analy¬
sis, an age that finds security in specialization, there is
suspicion and insecurity in traditional wisdom; we find the
modern temper eschewing speculative and systematic metaphysic
I think, however, that there is more implicit trust in
the comprehensive view than many philosophers will openly
admit. Although we would be surprised to find a philosophy
that fit every aspect of reality, we nonetheless criticize
a position as soon as we discover anything in it which des¬
troys its prospects for doing just that. This general form
of argument is a call for metaphysics.
In the following pages I attempt neither an apology for
nor a criticism of metaphysics. I neither reject the idea
of metaphysical knowledge nor argue a specific theory of
metaphysics. Rather, I wish to explain an important his¬
torical observation; I wish to analyse and describe the con¬
ditions and causes of the existence of a multiplicity of
metaphysical systems. My plea is for an appreciation of
past and ongoing philosophical practices. If correct, my
analysis will conclude a legitimate viability for the plura-
lism of metaphysical systems — a position which neither
denies rationality "by an argument of relativism nor assumes
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Philosophy is a dialogue. It exists in the individual,
in his search for justified "belief and commitment; it exists
"between individuals, in argument and criticism; and philo¬
sophy as dialogue exists in the community, in an academic
tradition and cultural existence. Philosophy as dialogue
with itself is thus seen in history — in schools of thought,
through the language and literature of philosophy. But
philosophy is also more than communication; philosophy
transcends its dialogue and addresses questions of the com¬
prehensiveness and ultimate truth of reality. The style
and form of philosophy may exist as dialogue "but its content
is "best described as the search for truth.
A traditional discipline within philosophy is meta¬
physics; and in metaphysics the philosopher's arguments and
conclusions go beyond the dialogue which expresses them.
The beliefs of metaphysics are meant to be universal and
eternal; the ultimate nature of reality, being as such, is
the proper study of metaphysics.
Philosophy has a profound goal in its search for truth.
Traditional and academic metaphysics is written in the mode
of having reached this goal. Each philosopher writes his
view of the world as The One and Only True metaphysics.
What the history of philosophy shows us however is a con¬
tinual disagreement among philosophers about the fulfilment
of their goal. More significant than the question of
whether any one metaphysical system is actually true is the
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fact of the continuation of the dialogue of philosophy in
its search. This fact is emphasized when I describe philo¬
sophy as dialogue.
Although disagreement does not prove a metaphysics is
false, it is an indication of needed criticism. In his
Discourse Descartes observes that "philosophy ... has
been studied for many centuries by the most outstanding
minds without having produced anything that is not in dis¬
pute and consequently, doubtful". Similarly, Hume in his
Treatise remarks about philosophy that "there is nothing
(in it) which is not subject to debate, and in which men
of learning are not of contrary opinions. Disputes are
multiplied as if everything was uncertain." The failure
which the history of philosophy continually points to is
not that any one philosophical system is true or false but
rather that philosophers have failed to agree on which is
tine or false.
When describing the pluralism of philosophical systems
we find throughout history we are inclined to say that every¬
one has his own opinion, as if the picture of metaphysics
were subjective, personal and autobiographical only. Doubt
is not directed at the truth of the position for it is often
argued "That may be true for him but not for me." With
this response the arguments at hand are often dismissed,
views are not refuted or defended; a relativism is then
accepted. Diversity is seen as a matter of the lack of
agreement and thus criticism of diversity is not a question
of truth itself. Criticism is rather a question of the
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relation of the philosopher with other philosophers and
the philosophical community. The dialogue of philosophy
is thus seen to "be a more significant part of the context
of its practitioners than part of its goal. It is at
least in this community that the dialogue must "begin. And
today, of course, the debate continues. It is in this de¬
bate that metaphysical systems exist; a phenomenOlogical
description of this existence will constitute my analysis
of an argument for the viability of pluralism for metaphy¬
sical systems.
Not only the validity but the plausibility of an argu¬
ment's conclusion depends on the content of the premisses.
The nature of the terms and concepts in my thesis become
more specific as they are developed in analysis and argu¬
ment. I will thus refer to my account of pluralism in
metaphysics as my "thesis-argument".
Pluralism.
By 'pluralism' I refer to the existence of the multi¬
plicity of different metaphysical systems. By the 'via¬
bility of pluralism' I mean the realization that the
failings of a system —that alternatives exist, and that
all philosophers do not accept a common conceptual system —
does not destroy its value as philosophical inquiry. Plura¬
lism does not prove to be a rejection of the metaphysical
argument or the metaphysical ambition of philosophy in
general. Viability thus refers to the reasonableness,
the pragmatic rationality inherent in each of the various
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metaphysical systems, how each is argued, compared and
criticized.
The following paper then is a defence of the rationality
of pluralism for metaphysical systems. I argue against the
view that underneath the prima facie pluralism lies some
One Framework of true metaphysical knowledge. Although the
historical existence of pluralism may account for an interest
in this subject, especially in cross-cultural studies, social
anthropology and comparative religions, it is an important
tenet of my thesis-argument that a more pervasive sense of
reason maintains pluralism. It is no accident that there
is more than one metaphysical system. Indeed, the exis¬
tence of pluralism is as important to philosophy as the
existence of more than one novel or poem is to the body of
English Literature.
Framework reconstruction.
By 'metaphysics' I refer to metaphysical systems or
frameworks. The motive and goal of a rational and critical
vision of the whole of human experience and of what is 'really
real' is expressed by metaphysics. The works of Plato, Aris¬
totle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz repre¬
sent traditional metaphysical constructions of this vision.
By metaphysics then, I mean those self-conscious intellec¬
tual activities and products, articulated and formalized in
language, as found in the history of academic philosophy.
I do not wish to include the 'metaphysics' one might des¬
cribe as 'implicit' in the behaviour of a primitive people.
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For example: it is often thought that different metaphy¬
sics exist behind or are hidden within the rituals and
practices concerning death for the ancient Egyptian, Chinese
and American Indians. We might understand death in such
varying cultures as the slowing down of time, time standing
still, and, by death, time being transcended. What one
finds in the burial sites of these different peoples suggests
these three philosophical notions of time and death. The
question then is whether or not such distinctions constitute
a basic metaphysics. I think not. Although I do not deny
distinct world-like-views characterizing behaviour and its
products, there need not exist in this context any such meta¬
physics. For a metaphysics must make universal claims, a
conscious construction of principles and categories applic¬
able to all or to the highest genera of entities as such.
These principles and categories are not premisses or pre¬
suppositions of ordinary language, local structures of
meaning (e.g. the way American Indians bury their dead), nor
do they report its deep structure. Analysis of the local
principles of a language-game or area of experience must be
distinguished from the reflective totalization which gives
rise to metaphysical principles. An 'implicit metaphysics1
then is only the application of principles in one's immed¬
iate situation, where local frameworks are used in practice.
As such, metaphysical claims are not made.
My discussion in the first chapter on understanding,
pluralism and the relativity thesis in the social sciences
will show that even anthropologists have difficulties 'reading
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off' the so called implicit metaphysics in the "behaviour
of an alien culture. I will show that there is more than
one possible interpretation of a given set of practices.
Between behaviour and its description, and thus between
behaviour and implicit metaphysics, there is a necessary
interpretation. And interpretation is more than'repre¬
sentation; it is also creation. Only when articulated in
traditional and academic structures, the metaphysical frame¬
works my thesis will be dealing with, can a metaphysics be
maintained in a critical and thereby plausible way. And
it is only by this critical approach of reason that meta¬
physics can exist. This then is to suggest that arguments
and their conclusions cannot be distinctly separated.
Above I stated that metaphysics is that philosophical
motive and goal of a rational and critical vision of the
whole of human experience and of what is 'really real.'
As a metaphysical system, this vision is expressed in human
activity, participation in the 'dialogue' of traditional
and academic philosophy discussed above; it concerns con¬
temporary problems and contemporary methods, and it takes
place in a tradition or history of interests and philoso¬
phic literature. Within this perspective of past and
present philosophy, any metaphysical system will be an ac¬
tion in and a reaction to its context. Part of the whole
of human experience that is to be accounted for includes
the struggles, failures and gained wisdom of past metaphy¬
sics. We see the activity of metaphysics in its background,
and we see the construction of a metaphysical system as a
"re-construction" of problems and answers challenging and
inspiring the philosopher. Metaphysics is thus presupposed
and created at once. It will "be the issues of questioning,
criticizing and the reconstruction of metaphysical frame¬
works that the following discussion will deal with. My
arguments are based on the conditions of human finitude.
Pluralism and choice.
When I speak of 'pluralism' I have in mind that we
find ourselves presented with rival structures of meaning,
and have no rules for choosing among them. In our modern
world we are confronted with various schemes of values and
patterns of acting. Our tradition includes competing
scientific theories and philosophies, with their many onto¬
logies and epistemologies. All of these can be considered
as kinds of rules which guide our action, thought and
speech. Our problem is that we have too many sets of rules
they conflict with one another. Sometimes they are out¬
right rivals, as with competing scientific theories; some¬
times the relations are more complex, as with science and
religion. It would be convenient if we could appeal to a
higher set of rules to settle such conflicts, but we find
disagreement on the higher level as well. We want the
rules that produce The True picture of the world, or The
Right way to act, but there is no agreement on how to find
them. It is a common enough opinion today that we will
never find them, that pluralism will always be with us, and
thus an epistemological and moral relativism prevails. On
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this point, Karl Popper remarks that "the main philosophical
malady of our time is an intellectual and moral relativism,
the latter "being at least in part "based on the former."
Rationality is present with pluralism.
Despite pluralism, we like to take our own view serious¬
ly. We like to tell ourselves to be rational, and this
often means to follow the rules instead of our whims. But
how can we "be rational when we have to choose the rules them¬
selves? The obvious answer is to claim we pick our rules
arbitrarily for no reason. If that sounds too anarchic,
we can say that we are determined by some larger process to
have the rules we do. Neither arbitrary choice nor brute
receptivity allows room for any real self-criticism, and both
make us fundamentally irrational as there would be no reason
for the rules. Both are also clearly false to our experience.
We do manage to reduce plurality of possible rules to some
kind of unity in our lives without feeling either totally
determined or totally arbitrary. As we find ourselves in
the world, our point of view does have meaning: we are
committed to certain beliefs, critically and tentatively
hold some while rejecting others. The continuity and de¬
velopment in this complex of beliefs gives our point of view
its sense of reason. There seems to be some sort of ration¬
ality to our choices.
When I speak of 'rationality' I mean it in the sense
Plato insisted on: some non-arbitrary and self-critical
1
Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies 5th
edition, vol. 2, Addendum One (NewYork: Harper and Row,
1966), p. 369.
9.
method of settling questions about values and rules, a
method whose results are not determined by what we happen
to want at the moment. Plato was afraid of arbitrary
choice; as far as he could see, it led in the end to per-
2
sonal and social violence. Among many other things, the
Republic is a treatise on the method for finding rules.
Since then, philosophers have suggested many such methods.
If we have a non-arbitrary method, it makes sense to
expect it will give us unique and necessary results. If
it did not, we would need still another method to decide
among the many results. It is a natural transition to
think of rationality as involving a certain guaranteed con¬
tent which includes The Set of Rules. Thus rationality
should eliminate pluralism.
Yet history keeps telling us that both pluralism and
rationality exist. Despite all the 'rational' methods,
we still face a pluralism of sets of rules. Neither
theories of pluralism nor those of rationality seem accurate
pictures if taken by themselves.
This tension in history is part of the larger problem
of finding a balance between creativity and discipline, a
problem which has been with us since Plato banished the
poets and resounds again in Nietzche's call for us to take
the responsibility of creating ourselves. As a problem,
pluralism and rationality is especially important with poli¬
tical and moral issues. In this study, I have chosen to
deal with the plurality of metaphysical frameworks. Some¬
what removed from (if not more basic than) social debate in
2
One philosopher who holds quite the contrary is Paul
Peyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory
of Knowledge (London: New Left Books, 19757^
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politics, religion and morality, my choice seemed to me
more easily surveyable than the complex practical and social
version of the problem. However, to help appreciate the
more general problem as well as pay attention to the in¬
tellectual background in which the pluralism of metaphysics
exists, I begin this study with a brief exposition or recent
history of relativism in the social sciences. But my
specific arguments will be restricted to metaphysics, an
important area in its own right; and will concern the
perennial question of the status of metaphysics.
The notion of frameworks.
I have cast my discussion in terms of the metaphor of
a 'framework1. We speak of the framework of a house, or
of a narrative. A clay sculpture may have a framework in¬
side it, while my books on the wall have one outside and
around them. These make us think of a framework as some¬
thing relatively rigid and fixed, giving other kinds of
things their position or stability. A ridge of mountains
against the sky, or the skeleton of a building can be called
frameworks. They surround us, and create the space that
shape our paths. The grid of streets in our city and.the
grid of colour words in our language are frameworks that
lay out where we can go and what we can say.
In this study I will be 'concentrating on metaphysical
frameworks, the most general conceptual unification of ex¬
perience. But no matter what kind of frameworks we speak
of, the metaphor itself suggests two lines of questioning.
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The pattern of city streets or of rooms in a building con¬
strains me to walk in certain ways. Is this true as well
for cultural and intellectual frameworks? Do these encom¬
pass and define me? Can I get outside my framework in
order to be aware of it, criticize and, if necessary, change
it? Can I get outside of all frameworks? On the other
hand, I can rearrange the bricks and boards of my'bookshelf.
Looked at this way, frameworks seem to be tools I shape at
will. Can I choose and change them arbitrarily? What
criteria, if any, do I use? In the end, these two lines
of questioning do not really conflict. Although the one
worries about our being imprisoned and the other worries
about our sovereign freedom, both concern the same activity.
Both lines of questioning converge on the issue of our abil¬
ity to criticize and reconstruct our frameworks. It is
this issue which will occupy my present study on metaphysics.
Plurality and criticism are with us.
The exact nature of the frameworks I will be consider¬
ing will be explained in the second chapter; they corres¬
pond to a classic metaphysical system or to lists of ontic
commitments. But before going into detail, there is an
important methodological point to be made. I will not be
dealing with these frameworks as they might be revealed to
some detached Martian anthropologist. I will be concerned
with multiple frameworks presented to an individual or a
community an a_ problem to be dealt with. We can and do
find ourselves faced with a plurality of frameworks and
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have reasons to want to choose among them. By posing the
problem in terms of a multiplicity of frameworks which is
already presented to us, we can "bypass the problem of whether
we can ever adequately understand another's framework. How¬
ever, if different frameworks cannot really be compared then
they never really conflict either. Each defines' its own
self-enclosed world. If we picture frameworks in this way,
we will indeed be forced to choose between The One All In¬
clusive Framework and a pluralism of self-enclosed worlds
with no rational decision possible among them. In general,
I think such an approach envisions frameworks as more ab¬
stract, fixed and formal in character than they are, and
fails to appreciate the wider context within which they exist.
I will be concerned, then, with conflicting frameworks
seen as_ conflicting. This is how metaphysics appears to
exist throughout the history of philosophy. I will argue
that this appearance is accurate; the conflict is not a
cover for The One Framework, nor does it involve self-legis¬
lating wholes which never really touch each other. In a
way, this amounts to a defence of philosophy's usual state
of disarray filled with competing theories and ongoing de-
bateso
Over the past decade, the philosophy of science has
witnessed increasing discussion of issues related to my
topic. Although this study does not contribute to it, I
feel that this study does extend into meta-philosophy the
issues raised by the philosophy of science: the realiza¬
tion that prevalent modes of thought are not historical
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enough, and that 'reason' need not have the timelessness
of a formal deductive system. To say that reason is his¬
torical and pluralistic need not destroy rationality nor
give up the question of framework choice. I will use the
notion of 'reason' in an evaluative, critical and practical
manner. For the judgment of rationality is one Way in
which we think about people, their actions and their beliefs.
Specifically, 'rationality' pertains to the ways in which we
come to hold our beliefs. Gordon Eeddiford describes ra¬
tionality as pertaining also to our attitudes to the evidence
for holding beliefs and to the procedures we adopt in main¬
taining or rejecting beliefs. "Thus to ascribe rationality",
Eeddiford says, "is to comment on our success or failure in
continuing to subject them to scrutiny, in attempting to
maintain consistency particularly when we express our beliefs
in action." ^
Eationality in general pertains to knowledge, where
knowledge is systematic interpretation of experience. And
if knowledge is not arbitrary imposition of meaning on things
but rather the appearance of things in meaningful contexts,
rationality pertains to man's objective and sharable ex¬
periences. Although there is no conceptual scheme or langu¬
age common to all men, it does not follow that all contexts
of meaning are expressions of isolated subjectivities. And
so my defence of pluralism does not amount to a relative
subjectivism; rather, the legitimacy of pluralism lies in
the fact that only in the conditions of subjectivity — par-
5
Gordon Eeddiford, "Eationality and Understanding",
Philosophy 50 (1975), pp. 19-35; p. 23.
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ticular frameworks, linguistic practices, etc. — does the
possibility of knowledge exist. Only in such contexts do
experiences of objectivity become intelligible. It will
be with this above sense of critical reason that I argue
for the viability of metaphysical pluralism.
Thesis outline.
In the above Introduction I discussed metaphysics and
the pluralism of metaphysical systems. The following terms
were also explained: 'framework reconstruction', 'viability
of pluralism', 'rationality ' and 'thesis-argument'. My
study begins by emphasizing that pluralism and rationality
are both present in our dealings with metaphysical frame¬
works .
In the first chapter, Relativity and Understanding, I
discuss the more general background of conceptual pluralism
as found in the social sciences. Ideas of relativism, con¬
ceptual autonomy and the One Framework (or a universal
science of man) are discussed as well as problems of cross-
cultural criticism. At the end of my thesis the Appendix
further develops this area of conceptual autonomy and re¬
lativism. Specifically, I argue that Jthe existence ofj an
ongoing linguistic practice may contain inconsistencies
and contradictions; ordinary language or a religious mode
of discourse, for instance, may be criticized. I also
argue that this criticism is possible because conceptual
schemes do not exist in a purely formal sense, that a common
ground of intelligible rule-following pertains to all frame-
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works, and that the "boundaries and extent of conceptual
schemes are not a priori defined. From these arguments it
follows that internal criticism or detailed revision of a
conceptual scheme is possible as well as more general evalua¬
tions by external criticism.
Although metaphysical pluralism is less urgent and
more academic than cultural pluralism, the problem and issues
of the critical understanding of alternative frameworks are
similar. The discussion in the first chapter then leads,
in the next, to a specification of the structure of metaphy¬
sical frameworks.
After offering a structural analysis of metaphysical
frameworks, Chapter Two, Metaphysical Frameworks continues
with several illustrations of conflicting frameworks from
the history of philosophy. Frameworks are also character¬
ized in a less formal sense, as relating data from ordinary
language and local frameworks, reinterpreting this data and
thus offering a more comprehensive view of the world. Meta¬
physical frameworks are ultimate in this comprehensive sense
and yet, it is argued, they exist in a larger though non-
conceptual context as well. Chapter Three, Limits and
Legitimacy of Frameworks, is a study of this larger context.
I argue that the function of such constructed frameworks
and systems is seen to be in response to the uniqueness of
the human condition, its finitude and historical perspective.
The goals of metaphysical systems are described as attempts
to resolve basic disunity in experience; as a result,
appearance and reality are distinguished, and a unification
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and comprehensive criticism of experience is made.
Chapter Four is A Defence of Pluralism. In it I argue
that pluralism is a permanent feature of the human situation
and that various methods of doing away with pluralism cannot
succeed. Although the history of philosophy shows us a
continual conflict of metaphysical frameworks, many philoso¬
phers have claimed that underneath this pluralism lies some
One Framework; it is believed that such methods as dialec¬
tical and transcendental arguments, analysis of ordinary
language, and so forth can uncover this larger framework.
I defend the ultimacy of pluralism and reject the appeals
to these various methods.
Once pluralism is established as a permanent feature I
then argue that we are not lost in a relativism of autonomous
conceptual schemes. Chapter Five, Reason and the Extent of
Frameworks, shows that in pluralism rationality is not lost.
This is done by examining the function of frameworks and
analysing the conditions which give rise to framework con¬
struction. I argue that we do not have to choose between
an all-encompassing rationalist or transcendental framework
and a plurality of self-enclosed, incomparable frameworks
among which no rational judgments are possible. Both these
alternatives share the presupposition that frameworks exist
in no larger context, and a picture of man as endowed with
some indeterminate pure power o£ receptivity. In order to
develop a middle position that allows for both pluralism and
rationality, I develop a theory of metaphysical frameworks
which emphasizes the larger although non-conceptual context
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in which they exist and I describe more accurately the nature
of our subjectivity in its dealings with frameworks.
The metaphysical activity of reflection has its own
goals which, together with a shared ordinary language and
the data frameworks interpret, furnishes the general cri¬
teria that allows us to have reasons for framework choices.
The purpose of constructing a framework can be fulfilled in
varying degrees, and thus frameworks can be more or less
justified. This justification is a balance between elements
of relativism and objectivity; seen as expressions of human
finitude, justification is also a balance between pluralism
and rationality.
A false picture lies behind both the claim to possess
the One Framework and the opposing claim that no reason for
framework choice can be found. This is the image of our
subjectivity as an indeterminate power which can assume the
role of a pure detached observer. Against this view I
argue for a degree of non-passive involvement with the data
and facts of our experiences. Although subjectivity can
be described abstractly as a self-reflective process, no
subject actually exists without contingent determinations;
and these determinations cannot be changed by fiat even
when we are aware of their contingency. These then provide
concrete determinations of our general framework criteria,
but their contingency means that pluralism cannot be eradi-
dicated. This does not exclude self-criticism, since the
interplay of reflective totalization and the many local areas
of language which are what they are independently of any total
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framework provides a way to "be self-critical without having
to step outside all frameworks. That is, the problem
situation provides (in the very grounds of the conflicting
frameworks) a non-arbitrary standard for comparison and
evaluation. Thus we can reject misleading descriptions
of ourselves as either totally sovereign over or totally
constituted by our frameworks.
I then suggest that the idea of a Pure Subject functions
as a "regulative ideal"; although inconsistent with the con¬
ditions and possibilities of metaphysical knowledge, a re¬
gulative ideal does express a practical need to unify ex¬
perience; it has a psychological role, and originates in
our desire for life in a stable world, a world of fixed
meanings. Only by an abstraction from the dialogue of
philosophical inquiry does this motive for criticism falsi¬
fy itself in the form of an inconsistent ideal. I end
Chapter Five with several remarks about the validity of the
arguments in my thesis. Then, in the Appendix as I have
already described, there is a critical follow up to my in¬
troductory chapter, specifically concerning views of Wittgen¬
stein and Winch; its arguments run parallel to the thesis-





Social and cultural systems are more relevant and
immediate, particularly politics and ethics, than metaphy¬
sical systems. Although not necessarily different in kind,
they do provide a more common expression of the issues of
pluralism and relativity. I "begin with a brief survey of
these issues as found in the social sciences. As a variant
on metaphysical themes, this survey is primarily exposition;
in the Appendix;, however, I further develop a critical view
on this discussion which is a direct application of the ar¬
guments presented in the main text of my thesis.
Eirst I discuss relativism as a methodological recommen¬
dation, and as a»\ epistemological theory; I then examine it
on its own terms and in comparison with what seems to ac¬
tually take place. It is emphasized that the autonomy of
conceptual schemes is a philosophical thesis which needs
further defence. I then conclude with several critical re¬
marks establishing the starting points of my own analysis of
metaphysical pluralism.
Cultural studies and the relativity thesis.
Peter Winch is a proponent of cultural relativity. In
"Understanding a Primitive Society" Winch maintains that
world-views are autonomous and thereby immune to external or
1
cross-cultural criticism. To properly understand an alien
1
The position outlined here is argued by Peter Winch
in Section II of his article "Understanding a Primitive
Society" American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1963), pp. 307-324.
It is also reprinted in Rationality, ed. Bryan Wilson (Basil
Blackwell, 1970), pp. 78-111.
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society the anthropologist must make an explication of the
concepts and actions as they are found to he intelligible
in that society. For Winch, this means that the criteria
of rationality are internal to the practices in question.
Moreover, it means that each conceptual scheme has its own
and unique concept of rationality. It is a necessary con¬
dition of rationality that there be norms, but the existence
of any system of norms is sufficient for rationality. With¬
out criteria of intelligibility, there would be no possible
correspondence or conflict between word and action; there
would be no possibility of compatibility or contradiction.
Even if a language has no term for a concept of rationality,
one must be implicit and govern the use of that language.
When an inference or judgment is properly made, it is com¬
prehensible because of the concepts and logic peculiar to
the language and culture in which that judgment is made.
And, as this language and culture may be very different from
that of the anthropologist, then, to understand certain ac¬
tions and beliefs found in that culture, the anthropologist
must describe the rules and concepts of the language as they
are intelligible to the participants of that culture. It
would be wrong to attempt cross-cultural evaluations, argues
Winch. If the rules of intelligibility are internal to the
particular discourse then clearly the anthropologist examining
an alien society must not impose his norm of rationality where
in fact a different one exists. Interpretating an alien
society in this manner, however, is no easy task.
Often the anthropologist fails to make explicit alien
concepts and is then tempted to claim that the beliefs and
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practices described are 'child-like', 'silly', and perhaps
'irrational', and that such beliefs are simply false. Winch,
of course, rejects this type of evaluation, this 'conceptual
imperialism', and is critical of anthropologists for failing
to give due consideration to the differences in the norms of
rationality. It is in this manner that Winch argues that
the beliefs and practices of witchcraft and magic' among the
African Azande should not be considered irrational if com¬
pared to the norms of Western thought. In particular,
2
Winch attacks the views of Sir Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard.
Evans-Pritchard discusses the Zande culture and con¬
cludes that although many of their beliefs and actions are
fully integrated into their everyday life, nonetheless much
of the Zande practices are irrational and many of their be¬
liefs are false. Winch correctly observes that this criti¬
cism is based on scientific ideas and practices, and that
the Azande conceptual scheme does not represent reality as
it is known to our Western culture. But this comparison,
and indeed the Western criteria of intelligibility, is
irrelevant to the Zande concepts. It is rather the Zande
criteria of reality which must be applied in understanding
Zande behaviour. Winch states: "Reality is not what gives
language sense. What is real and what is unreal shows it¬
self in the sense that language has. Further, both the dis¬
tinction between the real and the unreal and the concept of
3
agreement with reality themselves belong to our language."
2
Evan Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic
Among the Azande (Oxford University Press, 1937).
3
Winch, ojo cit. , p. 309.
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Therefore the Zande conception of reality cannot fail to
correspond to 'reality' because reality is made relative to
their language. And this reality, Winch concludes, is
shown "by the use to which these practices and beliefs are
put in the people's lives.
The fact that our language contains the term's 'magic'
and 'witchcraft' does not mean that when these terms are
applied to certain concepts and activities in an alien
society, that both the alien society and our own must there¬
by share the same substantiating concepts. Winch believes
that Wittgenstein's analysis of 'family resemblance' applies
here, and that the Zande concepts of magic and witchcraft
may indeed be quite different than concepts with the same
name as found in our language. In our culture, for in¬
stance, behaviour based on magical beliefs may be correctly
considered irrational and the beliefs of magic considered
contradictory and false. Such valuation, however, is not
based on an independent and objective reality but rather on
our expectations of what is intelligible. And for the
Azande, the intelligibility of the world is different than
our own. Winch then points out a crucial difference be¬
tween our notion of magic and that of the Azande.
And this difference is, Winch suggests, the relation
to the social life in which magic occurs.
Concepts of witchcraft and magic in our culture,
at least since the advent of Christianity, have
been parasitic on, and a perversion of other
orthodox concepts, both religious and, increas¬
ingly, scientific. To take an obvious example,
you could not understand what was involved in
conducting Black Mass, unless you were familiar
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with the conduct of a proper Mass and, there- -
fore, with the whole complex of religious ideas
from which the Mass draws its sense. Neither
would you understand the relation between these
without taking account of the fact that Black
practices are rejected as irrational (in the
sense proper to religion) in the system of
beliefs on which these practices are thus
. . 4
parasitic.
Winch argues that the practices of witchcraft and magic in
our society are not independently intelligible, but have
sense because of a context of previous ideas. The notion
of black magic cannot be discussed without a comprehension
of the Christian concepts from which black magic is a pro¬
duct; and that is to say, blank magic has an "essential
5
reference" to these prior concepts. Therefore, in our
society the notion of magic might well be shown to be irra¬
tional; it may involve the denial of the very concepts which
are necessary for its own intelligibility.
In contrast, the Azande notion of witchcraft has no
'essential reference' to other, more fundamental concepts.
For them, witchcraft and magic play well accepted, central
and common roles in their lives. Evans-Pritchard states
that " their mystical notions are eminently coherent,
being interrelated by a network of logical ties, and are so
ordered that they never too crudely contradict sensory ex¬
perience. And he is aware of the distinction that the
Azande use explanation in terms of witchcraft to explain "why
9
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Pritchard's confusion lies in not "being content with elu¬
cidating the differences in the two concepts of reality-
involved; he insists that our concept is correct, and the
Azande are mistaken. This is a confusion, Winch maintains,
because concepts like 'reality' and 'correctness' are in¬
extricably intertwined with one another, and with the form
of life, the culture in which the concepts occur.
Winch's position is that there are no context-indepen¬
dent criteria of what is real or correct. This is argued
in a number of specific cases. Evans-Pritchard has shown
that the Azande believe that witches suffer from an inherited
organic condition which is passed down along "the gender lines:
the sons of a male witch are witches; and the daughter of
a female witch are witches. To the Azande, this means that
if a man is a witch then he inherited this characteristic
from his father. Witches are believed to have in their
bodies a 'witchcraft substance' which may be found by a post¬
mortem examination. If, however, a male dies and is found
to be a witch, it is not assumed that any of his sons are
also witches. To us, it would seem that all male members
of that clan are witches, if one is. Yet the Azande do
not believe, or act, or even recognize this conclusion.
Indeed, their behaviour is such to suggest that they impli¬
citly believe this conclusion is false. Is this observa¬
tion then sufficient ground for charging the Azande with
irrational behaviour? Evans-Pritchard thinks so. Winch
disagrees; because, he suggests, it is only for us, not
the Azande, that the problematic conclusion follows. We
charge the Azande with failing to take account of the logi-
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cal necessity of the case; but the inference is only 'neces¬
sary' to one who accepts the logic of our own culture. And
it is the universal applicability of our logic which should
be questioned, not assumed. Thus for Winch the argument
against the Azande is circular and begs the question. Winch
believes that any such attempt to criticize or evaluate
social or linguistic practices from outside involves the
conceptual error of applying irrelevant criteria.
Evans-Pritchard explains the Zande failure to notice
the unacceptable conclusion (as it would be in conflict with
their actions) by the fact that the Azande "have no theoreti¬
cal interest in the subject."^ That is, they do not find
occasion to draw deductive inferences about other members
of the same clan as an identified witch. Winch argues
that this lack of interest in theoretical questions is per¬
fectly Justifiable, because "Zande notions of witchcraft do
not constitute a theoretical system in terms of which Azande
9
try to gain a quasi-scientific understanding of the world.
The concepts of witchcraft and magic serve a practical and
immediate function, and are constituted by these activities
and not conceptual or formal analysis.
Central to Winch's analysis is the claim that different
concepts of rationality are possible. He argues that we
must take account of this possibility when trying to explain
the behaviour of a member of an alien culture. Winch writes:
"If our concept of rationality is a different one from his,
then it makes no sense to say that anything either does or
10
does not appear rational to him in our sense." And he
O
Evans-Pritchard, op cit., p. 25.




concludes: "... we cannot assume that it will make
sense to speak of members /In another culture/ as discover¬
ing something which we have also discovered; such discovery
11
presupposes initial conceptual agreement."
Winch is firm in his position against criticism or
appraisal of other societies. The understanding which the
anthropologist seeks involves bringing forth not only the
rules of behaviour and concepts in the language of an alien
culture but must, and this is most important, also recognize
and appreciate the point to the rules and concepts. What we
have to learn from comparative studies is the possibility of
different ways of making sense of human life, and of inter¬
preting the purpose of human actions. The path to 'wisdom',
Winch maintains, in the study of alien cultures is through
"fundamental concepts", which he calls "limiting concepts".
Winch writes: "Their significance here is that they are
inescapably involved in the life of all known human societies
in a way which gives us a clue where to look, if we are
12
puzzled about the point of an alien system of institutions."
Such fundamental factors as birth, copulation, and death are
so central that "... the very notion of human life is
1 ^
limited by these conceptions." ^
Internal cultural studies and criticism.
In the previous section I outlined Peter Winch's thesis
of cultural relativity. By explaining certain behaviour
and belief in an alien society by explicating the language,






only the motive of "behaviour but the very intelligibility
of such behaviour depends on those rules, concepts and prac¬
tices. This means that world-views are immune to external
criticism by maintaining their own criteria of rationality.
World-view autonomy, based on the plurality of norms of
rationality, is not, however, an absolute isolation as there
are certain 'limiting concepts' basic to all human culture.
These basic conceptions take on a variety of forms and thus
characterize each society.
Winch's argument for cultural relativity has further
consequences. Criticism and evaluation cannot cross con¬
ceptual boundaries. This must apply to intra-cultural dis¬
course as well for here too we have differing conceptions and
descriptions of an intelligible world. Not only are linguis¬
tically distinct cultures immune to cross-cultural criticism,
but so are the linguistic areas of science, religion, poli¬
tics, and history within one culture. Statements in any one
discourse cannot be evaluated by reference to the criteria of
any other.
Religion is an area where the diversity and differences
in beliefs and actions are most obvious. Here, Winch's posi¬
tion would suggest that the intelligibility, consistency and
even truth of religious beliefs and statements must be deter¬
mined by the 'logic' peculiar to the religious discourse in
question. If the meaning of a word is given by its use,
and if we can describe the word's usage, then it must have
meaning. And if standards of coherence, rules of inference
and criteria of truth are employed in a linguistic practice,
then their employment must in some sense be correct, since
28.
they do in fact function. Therefore the most that one can
do from outside such a self-sufficient mode of discourse is
map its structure so as to show what the rules are that
govern it. To criticize would then "be to misconstrue the
nature of linguistic practices. The actual usage of re¬
ligious terms is thus taken as normative for its appraisal
and analysis. There can "be no fundamental and independent
attack on religious discourse.
A proponent of intra-cultural relativity is Norman
Malcolm. In his article "Is It a Religious Belief that
'God Exists'?" Malcolm argues that philosophers distort the
logic of religious discourse when they discuss the question
14
whether God exists. It is argued that the most central
and "basic religious belief is not the belief that God exists
but rather belief in God. As one would expect, the belief
that God exists is problematic. However, Malcolm asks
what difference it would make whether one held that belief
or not? It does not seem that this belief could enter into
any form of life, Malcolm maintains, unless it is coupled
with a belief in God. Indeed, it would not be possible
within the Judao-Christian tradition, to believe that God
exists without also believing in Him. Eor within that
tradition God is real and central to men's lives; belief
in God involves trust and faith, awe and fear; it is a fun¬
damental belief. Malcolm then asks: "Would a belief that
He exists, if it were completely non-affective, really be
a belief that he exists?" ^
14
Norman Malcolm,"Is It a Religious Belief that 'God
Exists?" in Eaith and the Philosophers ed. John Hick (St.
Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 103-110.
Ibid., p. 107.
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It is central to the concept of God within our tradition
that there he this logical connection between the two beliefs.
A belief in God's existence simpliciter, independent of any
attitude toward Him or the fact of His existence, would be
of no philosophical interest; there would be no meaningful
context to justify or deny criticism. Such belief would
not reflect the religious situation in which the notion has
meaning. An independent analysis would fail to uncover
anything substantial (except, perhaps, the analyst's own
presuppositions).
Thus it is no surprise that philosophers have met with
little success in formulating arguments to prove the exis¬
tence of God. Malcolm states: "Arguing for the existence
of God ... appears to be an activity in which people make
up the rules as they go along ... there is no agreed-on
right or wrong in this kind of reasoning.That is to
say, the belief that God exists is one that we cannot grasp
unless it is placed in the context of the religious belief
in God.
Malcolm maintains then that there can be no relevant
evidence for the belief that God exists; the Old Testament
does not offer evidence for that belief, he observes, but
rather assumes belief in the God of the Jews. In fact, we
do not know what would count as evidence that God exists,
nor would we know what to do with it if we had any. There
is no question of verification or falsification of such a
belief. It is true that some of the beliefs involved in
"16
Ibid., p. 108. lor a criticism against the view
that no theological proof is religiously relevant see James
King, "Kideism and Rationality", New Scholasticism 49 (1975)?
pp. 431-450.
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the religious "belief in God are expectations about the
world; "but such a belief is held "... in such a way
17
that no fact of experience could falsify it." ' So what
might be called the factual belief, the belief that God
exists, is not a profitable object of philosophical analysis,
according to Malcolm.
If nothing would count as a refutation of the Christian
belief in God then neither would a proof for it appear re¬
levant. Thus belief is not to be understood in terms of
its formal and cognitive content alone. We are to address
our analysis to the meaning of the belief in God. To raise
the distinct question whether in actuality God does or does
not exist is to misunderstand the 'logic' and 'reality' of
religious discourse.
What must be realized is that religious statements
have meaning within a particular form of life, and not out¬
side it; it is appropriate to analyze the role they play
in the form of life, but it is not possible to criticize
the form of life as a whole. It makes no sense to ask for
a general justification of the criteria of intelligibility
themselves within the language; they can only be applied
as a part of religious discourse. If we remove concepts
from their context we abstract them from the human phenomena
which underlies them, and thus change their meaning. There
is no neutral ground on which to stand to evaluate religious
beliefs because their significance lies in the linguistic
context where they are used. Winch writes: "... in
discussing language philosophically we are, infact, dis-
^Malcolm, op cit. , p. 109
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cussing what counts as belonging to the world. Our idea
of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in
i 8
the language that we use." There is no way (because it is
claimed meaningless) to determine whether criteria of reality
themselves are 'valid' or 'true'. Tor, according to the
theory of conceptual relativity, there is nothing' for them
to be valid or true of apart from their own determinations.
To attempt such valuation is merely to impose the criteria
of one mode of discourse on another.
Another defender of religious autonomy is W. D. Hudson.
In his book on Wittgenstein he argues that it makes no sense
to attempt to evaluate the claims of religious discourse,
for that would involve criticizing them from an absolutely
neutral standpoint; it would require that we stand outside
19
all conceptual schemes whatever. And this is plainly im¬
possible. Hudson writes:
... we must say of religion in general, and
theism in particular, what Wittgenstein said
with wider reference, 'Our mistake is to look
for an explanation where we ought to look at
what happens as a proto-phenomena.' . . . like
any other conceptual scheme, a religion is based
logically upon presuppositions, and is bound
logically by frontiers; the former must be
accepted, and the latter respected, if the
game is to be played or the form of life taken
Peter Winch, The Idea of a_ Social Science (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 195817 P« 15.
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yW. Do Hudson, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Bearing of
His Philosophy upon Religious Belief (Richmond, Virginia:
John Knox Press, 1968).
20 Ibid., p. 67.
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This is the claim that locutions within any particular
realm of discourse are immune from criticism by other realms.
For anyone to challenge this autonomy would be to deny con¬
ceptual presuppositions, which would be merely to oppose
them with his own presuppositions. No argument can then
show one set of constituent premisses, concepts, or criteria
more valid than any other. Hudson concludes:
We have neither justified nor discredited
theism in any ultimate sense. The diffi¬
culty is to conceive of what would be in¬
volved in doing so ... it would see that
it is an illusion to think; that philosophy
can do more than reveal its presupposition
and draw its logical frontiers. That pre¬
supposition is God and those frontiers mark
21
off talk about God from other kinds of talk.
It is important to note that the immunity to criticism
also eliminates possible defence or proof of the basic con¬
cepts. For instance, it would be impossible, on this line
of argument, to obtain a logically demonstrative proof of
the existence of God (or of anything) because a logical de¬
duction only explicates what is already contained in the
premisses; it can add nothing new. Thus any valid argu¬
ment which concludes that God exists would be based on pre¬
misses which contain the necessity of God's existence; no
such premisses would be acceptable, however, to the unbe¬
liever or atheists. The only logical arguments which would
serve the purpose are those which cannot be used as one must
thereby believe (in accepting the premise) before one can be
^Ibid., pp. 67-68.
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compelled "by reason to believe. Only if one was not aware
of the implications of accepted premisses would a proof be
useful, but then the proof only brings out (it does not es¬
tablish, as to change an atheists to a believer) belief in
the conclusion.
An example of such attempted proof is the traditional
cosmological argument of Aquinas, a valid, deductive proof.
The argument is acceptable (if it is considered a sound
argument, with true premisses) only to those who already
implicitly accept a theistic world-view. This theistic way
of talking is the very use of the terms 'necessary' and 'con¬
tingent' , which are central to the argument. For to use
the concept of contingent in Aquinas' sense is to state a
question that can be answered only in terms of a necessary
being, namely God. So the argument cannot be persuasive
to those who are unprepared to accept its conclusion. The
non-believer would consider the required premisses false
and therefore the proof could not establish the truth of
the conclusion. Formal analysis (or proof) does have a
function, however, of clarifying and expounding the logic
of religious belief; and this is the function of religious
argument in general. In a sense, then, ultimate justifica¬
tion lies in the defining authority of religion, the Bible;
and this is, once again, not persuasive unless one accepts
that authority. The ongoing practices of religion are




A theory of understanding has "been set forth "by Winch
and others maintaining that conceptual schemes have an
autonomous existence. In the study of comparative socie¬
ties, this means that we must understand and evaluate the
alien culture on its own terms. The language usage in a
given world-view community carries with it the justifica¬
tion and explanation of the truth and rationality of its
constituent concepts, "beliefs and respective human actions.
This argument applies to any mode of discourse, for intra-
cultural as well as cross-cultural studies. I have out¬
lined how religion, on this account, must "be understood
within the context to which religious utterances and "beliefs
take place; and, that to impose an external standard, say,
to test religious claims on scientific standards (that is,
to judge the "beliefs from a different conceptual framework),
would fail to grasp the issue of proper analysis. An ab¬
straction from the initial context into another falsifies •
and changes the concept or "belief in question. Theology
has a grammar or logic of its own and this is not subject
to criticism or evaluation by any other standards.
If conceptual schema are autonomous, critically isolated
forms of discourse, then, it has been argued, there can be
no context-free vantage point for comparing and thus favour¬
ing one conceptual scheme over another. This is so because
judgment must take place within a given discourse and there¬
fore must assume the point of view of that conceptual system.
One system is not true while another false, nor are varying
systems approximations of the same reality. Rather, a
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language and its conceptual activity create the intelligi¬
bility of reality. And this is not a subjectivism; an
independently real nature is not affirmed by claiming it
unknowable.- The idea of an intelligible reality is cul¬
turally bound while the idea of a context-free objectivity
is misconstrued.
As stated, the position of relativism is strange
sounding because it seems to talk about what cannot be men¬
tioned. Conceptual relativity as presented here is a
theory of how beliefs and activities in various cultures
and disciplines should be understood. It contrasts with
what many people in fact do. It is not a descriptive
theory, though description is its recommendation; it is
prescriptive and methodological even though it strives to
be non-imposing. In fact, however, it has imposed quite
a deal. The exact nature of the working presuppositions
of any conceptual scheme has yet to be explained or analyzed;
this means that the autonomy argument has not yet been shown
conclusive and thereby the thesis of non-critical understand¬
ing remains a recommendation only. Conceptual imperialism,
however, also must be proved if this is the alternative. We
still must make philosophical sense of the conceptual rela¬
tivity thesis. My own position, once again, is someplace
between autonomous pluralism and The One True conceptual
scheme.
Relativity as a recommendation.
The meaning of the cultural relativity thesis cannot
escape the bounds of the society which asserts and accepts
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its recommendation. It cannot "be claimed that, as a theory,
relativism is true ahout all societies; for truth is, the
relativist wants to maintain, strictly relative. This pre¬
sents an awkward situation: if relativism is true then we
cannot consistently claim that it is appropriate to apply
this view of interpretation to a culture or conceptual scheme
different than our own. That is, the claim that' there are
different realities for each different conceptual scheme
cannot he made consistently, and cannot he made without
reaching heyond the hounds of our own conceptual capacities.
We can only make claims ahout our reality. Thus the rela¬
tivist must question the applicability of his recommendation.
I suggest that this difficulty will clear, however, if
we prohe deeper into the consequences of the thesis. In
doing this, one may remark that as a working hypothesis for
cultural studies, relativism is unique to 20th century Euro¬
pean and American societies. It has become of increasing
interest and development since the 1920's, in both philosophy
and social anthropology. And, if this theory derives from
our conceptual scheme, as no one would deny, then we must
(to he 'consistent' with the thesis) inquire into this con¬
text as well as alien societies; we must examine our mo¬
tive for the theory as well as base our studies of other
cultures upon its recommendation. This meta-theoretical
problem is more philosophical than anthropological; the
difference,though, is one of degree and not of kind if the
theory is to survive criticism. The social anthropologist,
of course, need not worry ahout meta-theoretical explication;
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only the validity of his work depends upon it, not the value
or purpose of his work.
To understand and demonstrate the theory of cultural
relativity (not as a mere method practiced "by the anthropo¬
logist hut) as a conclusion about the nature of man and his
comprehension of the world, we find that relativism in a
conequence of our liberal ideology; the theory reflects
A
contemporary sentiment and debate about the nature, control
and development of our own democratic and industrialized
society. Let me explain.
In our society 'democracy' is a central concept which
characterizes much activity and organization. It is also,
in an epistemological sense, a form of scepticism. We are
aware of the fallibility of judgment. This awareness has
grown to a degree which now casts doubt on authority.
Fallibility plus the further awareness that in our culture
there exists an abundance of alternative views in most
matters from religious belief to historical explanation,
suggests to us the consequence of a 'democratic epistemology
a fundamental privilege for the individual point of view.
Moreover, it is believed that this is justified because
there are (truly) many legitimate points of view, each appro
priate to the individual. It is even fashionable, at least
in ethics and religion (and even in some theories of science
to say there is no absolute truth, no moral or religious
norms or codes valid for all men in all cultures. One who
claims contrary to this is considered offensive, misguided,
narrow minded and arrogant. Our ideology, then, is not
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only to "be tolerant of others in areas of varying opinion,
"but is to claim that nobody has or could have a monopoly of
truth. In democracy, truth is shared; truth is made rela¬
tive and places the ultimate authority of belief in the in¬
dividual conceptual scheme, society, or person.
In the Azande culture, by contrast, there is' little if
any alternative explanations of the various aspects of their
intelligible world. Here tradition takes control (and res¬
ponsibility) over the individual. Where there is no apparent
alternative there is a compulsion of acceptance; there is,
with no alternative present, no possible doubt, no possible
scepticism. The Azande would not dream up the relativity
thesis. But in our culture, diversity and scepticism are
common. The relativity thesis is, perhaps, a result of this
diversity and alternative awareness. What better way to
manage one's way through complicated and diverse society than
to tolerate differences and to understand variety as legiti¬
mate.
If each society and indeed each mode of discourse has
its own criteria of truth and rationality, then one should
expect that without theoretical reflection there would be
a tendency toward conceptual imperialism — the imposition
of one's concepts and notions of truth to all problems of
understanding. Autonomous structures of knowledge are, in
a sense, 'absolute' but relative and finite forms of know¬
ledge. It is not the case that all societies maintain
the relativity thesis. Indeed, most people in alien cul¬
tures simply believe the 'truth' of their point of view.
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Unenlightened relativism, an understanding without philoso¬
phical reflection or ideological disputation in this line
of thought, does tend toward the naive projection and uni-
versalization of one's own beliefs and practices. It is
not uncommon for a first reaction to judge an alien society
in terms of one's own more familiar ways of doing things.
However, because this interpretation of the theory of
understanding is itself culturally bound, we find the po¬
tential conflict of the universalization of relative truth
no bother when we maintain a view of tolerance. Relativity
may then be a mere rationalization as witnessed by the
numerious authors expressing the thesis in a number of ways.
The temptation to accept (and indeed the acceptance of) re¬
lativism precedes criticism or justification of that point
of view. This has a striking similarity to the potential
conceptual conflict in the Azande belief about death dis¬
cussed earlier, but this time it is us that face„: the theore¬
tical problems to solve.
Relativity as a prejudice.
It should now seem consistent with the claims of rela¬
tivism that the view be judged intelligible on its own
ideological prejudices. And not, it is noted, on the assump¬
tion of context-free applicability. Ror it is only with
the assumptions of realism that relativism is made to seem
inconsistent by claiming a universal thesis from a particular
world-view. The relativity thesis is not a direct result
of scientific methodology, it is not the conclusion of em¬
pirical investigation but is rather a different conceptual
fiber than that found in science. The apparent criticism
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of contradictory self-reference is not valid within the demo¬
cratic epistemology discussed above. If the basis of the
relativity recommendation is conceptual prejudice and if
the theory is intellectualized prejudices, then there must
be an alternative to which the criticism is directed from
or is in comparison to; vi.z, scientific realism.'
Now, society is not static. The thesis of relativism
has had a steady development over the past fifty years in
Western academics. Before this, the conceptual prejudice
was, as mentioned, scientific realism (resulting in concep¬
tual imperialism, where analysis and evaluation of alien
ideas is based on the assimulation of the observer's point
of view, a naive extension and imposition of one set of
concepts upon another). This theory assumes that the ob¬
server's perspective is true for himself as well as true
"of the world in general" — meaning the world was indepen¬
dently characteristic in the same manner as it is known to
be characterized by the observer. Other views of the
world were simply mistaken. This theory is labelled
' ethnocentrism' — the interpretation of all cultural phe¬
nomena in terms of categories applicable to one's own
society. The reason for this may be the natural inclina¬
tion but need not always be naive as I've mentioned. In¬
deed, relativism is a reaction to a powerful and attractive
theory.
The alternative to relativity.
Ethnocentrism can be both a manner of approaching cross-
conceptual studies as well as a developed theory of under-
standing. In contrast to relativism, the apparent differ¬
ences in the variety of cultures and conceptual schemes is
found intelligible dy implicit and deep rooted universal
categories relating not only to the particular society's
conception of the world but to an essence of man. Ration¬
alized ethnocentric exploitation in comparative social
studies is thus not all critical; it can lead to a theory
of human nature. The diversity of culture can be seen
grounded in principles common to all cultures through '
this human nature.
A good deal of effort has been spent along these
lines by philosophers and social anthropologists. Basic
general laws and categories would serve as parameters with
the universal system of interpretation. The variety of
cultures could be explained by special considerations —
e.g. geographical conditions, historical influences and,
like in the natural sciences, fields of specialization would
develop. Cross-cultural terms such as 'trait', 'institu¬
tion', 'culture', 'sub-culture', 'belief' would function
much as "mass", "motion" or "velocity" are used in physics.
From these, more limited terms like 'kinship', 'manners'
and 'morality' would then be introduced. Methods employed
by this cross-cultural discipline would consist in the 'com¬
parative method', in functional analysis, and in typological
analysis. Once the nucleus of the basic categories of
culture are assembled, a genuine view of the more pervasive
dimensions of the activities of man would become apparent.
Man as an object of study would follow. For instance, the
phenomenon of morality could be accounted for, not from the
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highly contingent enterprise of any given moral system,
hut from general laws explaining such a universal need, and
condition for the expression of a moral system.
In the 19th century the possibility of such an approach
for the study of man was uncritically assumed as an out¬
growth of the scienticism of Spencer and Mill popular at
the time. More characteristic of this century, however, is
the examination of difficulties with this view and, in more
recent years, developing theories in reaction to it. Simply
put, in trying to expound the ideas of ethnocentrism when
rationalized as a -universal theory of understanding, it was
found that there were a number of hidden influences not
22
compatible with the goal of the theory.
There are a number of tacit assumptions made when one
tries to develop a universal science of man. Discussed by
most advocates of universal anthropology is the view that
maintains some 'human nature' linking all men together by
the same 'generic essence'. That man has such a nature
or essence is defended in Thomistic-Aristotelian communities
as the basis for what they term 'philosophical psychology'.
Other, more persuasive assumptions are made.
It is generally assumed, for example, that the sciences
are structurecj in a way that relates each to every other,
and that this relation is invariably one of subsumption.
Physics is considered the basic science subsuming all others
under it. The subject matter of physics is the least pos¬
sible domain of concern for science. It is, therefore,
universal in its grounding all other sciences. The para-
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Man and His Works (New York: 1948).
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digm of explanation for the other sciences is physics.
Following physics is chemistry, physiology, "biology, psy¬
chology, anthropology and sociology, in decreasing order of
scope and generality. This kind of thinking, then, can
"be found "behind many of the attempts at a general science
of man.
Another possible assumption in the construction of a
universal science of man comes from the other physical
sciences. Many of the invariant factors listed above are
similar in tone to the jargon of biology and psychology.
There have been attempts, for example, to show that Freudian
categories apply to all men even though the way, say the
Oedipus complex would show itself would depend on local
conditions. Even Biology, almost as a tryanny of genes and
endocrines, presents what many consider a suitable context
for the study of man. Here the techniques of chemistry
and physiology can be enlisted and variations clearly de¬
marcated. Psychological categories would also be employed.
Laws about what all men in certain conditions would do play
an important role. For example, correlations between popu¬
lation density and aggressive behaviour could be explained
in terms of psychological stress and the causes of it. In
this fashion wars and other less conspicuous rituals could
be explained effectively.
Beside assumptions about the domain of the sciences,
there are assumptions about culture itself. These may be
putatively descriptive and uninterpreted accounts of what
23
culture is supposed to be. G. P. Murdoch maintains that
23
For a historical account of the problem of defining
'culture' see Raymond William's article "Culture and Civiliza¬
tion in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 2, ed. Paul Edwards
(New York: Macmillian Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 273-276.
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culture is learned "by process of inculcation and is not
innate or transmitted biologically; it is social in that
learned habits are shared by members of the organized social
aggregate; it is ideational in that group habits are con¬
ceptualized in institutions and readily distinguishable
from idiosyncratic habit; it is gratifying in that it
satisfies the basic biological and psychological needs of
the members of the aggregate; it is adaptive in that it
obeys laws of evolution; and it is integrative, i.e. it
24
strives for wholeness and unity. Murdoch concludes:
If the seven fundamental assumptions outlined
above, or even any considerable proportion of
them, are valid, then it must necessarily
follow that human culture in general, despite
their historical, diversity, will exhibit cer¬
tain regularities or recurrences which are
susceptible to scientific analysis, and which,
under such analysis, should yield a body of
. . 25
scientific generalizations.
Closely linked with this kind of approach is the view
that culture has certain 'functional prerequisites' which
are necessary conditions for a society to maintain intact.
The conditions are sometimes outlined as sociological, re¬
lating to the maintenance of social ends; other times, as
biological, relating to the survival of the organism. But
even these views assume certain other ideas. For instance,
what constitutes 'society' must be understood. Here, one
view is that society is like an organism, while another
24
This account of culture is presented by George Peter
Murdock in "The Cross-Cultural Survey", Readings in Cross-




(proposed by Beattie and Emmet) is that 'society' is a con-
26
ceptual tool and way of organizing experience.
Problems of the alternative to relativity.
I have "briefly mentioned some of the assumptions made
"by those who would like to put anthropology on a functioning
par with physics with respect to subject matter. In attemp¬
ting to develop the idea of a universal science of man, a
number of problems have been revealed. It has been recog¬
nized that the task set for themselves is not easy. In
this section, then, I want to mention some of the recognized
problems internal to the enterprise.
One of the proponents of the alternative to the cul¬
tural relativity thesis I mentioned was J. H. M. Beattie.
In his discussion of the proposed science of man he does
recognize some difficulties. Beattie states that "even the
most matter-of-fact descriptions are shot through with abs-
27
tractions, usually unanalysed 'common sense' ones." Conse¬
quently, "the appropriateness of any particular framework
of explanation must be a hit-or-miss affair, subject to
po
continuing revision and reformulation." Despite these
reservations, Beattie does not see in them any impediment
in principle to carrying out the general study of man in
society. He notes that social anthropologists study (i)
what actually happens, (ii) what people think happens, and
29
(iii) what they thxnk ought to happen. In one sense,
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"understanding a society means "being able to explain what
really happens and why; in another sense, "understanding
consists in knowing what it would he like to think like a
member of that culture. Beattie considers both indispen¬
sable for understanding in social anthropology and sees no
difficulty with either kind of understanding.
An anthropologist, Clyde Kluckhohn, has also warned
of the difficulties to be found in a universal anthropology.
He writes:
Most cultural menographs organize the data
in terms of the categories of our own Western
culture: economics, technology, social or¬
ganization, and the like. Such an ordering,
of course, tears many of the facts from their
own actual contest and loads the analysis.
The implicit assumption is that our categories
are 'given' by nature — an assumption contra-
4
dieted most emphatically by the'rvery inves-
tigations of different cultures.
But in spite of this comment, Kluckhohn rejects the idea
that cultures are "disparate monads and, hence, strictly
31
noncomparable entities." For he admits that "there is
a generalized framework that underlies the most apparent
and striking facts of cultural relativity. All cultures
constitute so many somewhat distinct answers to essentially
the same questions posed by human biology and by the general-
32
ities of the human situation." And concludes, "valid
30v Clyde Kluckhohn, "Universal Categories of Culture"
in Readings in Cross-Cultural Methodology ed. Frank Moore
(New Haven, 1961), p. 102.
^ Ibid., p. 102.
Idem.
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cross-cultural comparisons could "best proceed from the in-
varient points of reference supplied "by the "biological,
psychological and socio-situational 'givens' of human life."
from these illustrations, we see the attitude that
while anthropology is seen to have problems in methodology,
these problems are looked upon as the result of rash judg¬
ment and gratuitous assumptions on the part of the anthro¬
pologist. There are no difficulties in principle with
the methods, especially when guidance is sought among the
natural sciences. Throughout, it has been assumed by
everyone considered in this anti-relativistic camp that
the data of the natural sciences are the true 'givens' which
are, assuredly, unaffected by cultural barriers and served
as a stable point of departure for the comparative approach.
A thoroughgoing materialism and empiricism is found beneath
the ideas of Beattie, Kluckhohn, and others maintaining a
science of culture. The question of the relevance of the
natural sciences has not concerned the social anthropologist
Moreover, when difficulties were noted with the methods of a
■universal anthropology, these methods (comparative, func¬
tional, historical, etc.) were saved by a recourse to what
the natural sciences had established.
A cross-cultural discipline as thus far outlined is
decidedly uncritical in adopting (or projecting the pre¬
supposition of) the mentality of the natural sciences into
the social studies. This is to neglect that science, as
we know it, is a development in our culture. Perhaps
modern science is the 'hallmark' of Western civilization
and therefore necessarily uncritically accepted. The so
^^Ibid. , p. 104.
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called 'legitimacy' of the scientific mentality is reflected
in these universalized anthropological values, values re¬
flecting "basic concepts of intelligibility in our culture.
Relativity theory and science.
The critical study of the antithesis of relativism has
striking similarities to the relativist's claim. The men¬
tality of modern science is seen as a basic prejudice.
What then about the relativist's account of science?
Michael Polanyi is an advocate for the humanization
of the physical sciences, just as Winch calls for the human¬
ization of the social sciences. For Polanyi, the discipline
and discourse of science is a form of fideism — a view that
all knowledge ultimately rests upon premisses accepted by
faith rather than reasoning or evidence. He rejects the
doctrine attributed to Descartes that man's knowledge can
only advance or develop legitimately if it does so by degree
and if subject to the watchful eye of a, methodic doubt.
Rather, science is possible, he argues, because of what he
considers the implicit faith the scientist has in scientific
methodology. In an article Polanyi states that a belief is
held 'implicitly' if it is held "by reliance on a particular
34
conceptual framework by which all experience is interpreted."
This framework, a 'fiduciary framework', is then discussed:
I hold that the propositions embodied in natural
science are not derived by any definite rule from
the data of experience, and that they can neither
be verified nor falsified by experience according
to any definite rule. Discovery, verification
^"Michael Polanyi, "The Stability of Beliefs",
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (1952),
pp. 217-232, quote p. 217.
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and falsification proceed according to certain
maxims which cannot he precisely formulated
and still less proved or disproved, and the
application which relies in every case on a
personal judgment exercised (or accredited)
by ourselves. These maxims and the art of
interpreting them may be said to constitute
the premisses of science, but I prefer to call
them our scientific beliefs.
Polanyi is interested in the stability of beliefs.
He presents a description of what he terms "defense
mechanisms of implicit beliefs" and goes on to argue that
these same mechanisms are found both in the beliefs of the
Azande in the power of poison-oracles and in the beliefs of
scientists in their scientific procedures. A 'belief-sys¬
tem' has certain mechanisms which protect the system against
doubts arising from the introduction of evidence or claims
damaging to the system and which also prevent the germina¬
tion of any alternative system on the basis of this evi¬
dence. This process is, in part, what is meant by 'ra¬
tionalizing' .
Polanyi argues that it is just as fruitless to try
to convince a tribesman that the judgments of poison-oracles
are based on chemo-physiological causation as it is to con¬
vince chemists that the phlogiston theory of combustion is
correct. Neither can be discredited outright; for how
would one in a non-question-begging way go about doing that?
Rather, a choice of hypotheses is made on the basis of cer¬
tain chosen, desired ends. This is not to say that Polanyi
35Ibid., p. 219.
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denies that one could not have reasons for choosing science
56
over magic, only that these reasons relate to and grow
out of the "basic, underlying fiduciary framework of Western
man. They are not reasons generated from an Archimedean
assessment of both modes of life. We cannot break through
what he called the 'logical limitations' of our scientific
57
framework. Por no matter how exhaustively we study the
Zande conceptual system, we will never see these beliefs as
false or illusory without imposition of our own value struc¬
ture onto the values of the Azande.
This theme is further developed by Polanyi in his book
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Personal Knowledge. In this he elaborates on his notion
of the premisses of science. He speaks of the 'commitment'
to a certain framework of ideas. Polanyi writes:
When we accept a certain set of pre-supposi-
tions and use them as our interpretative
framework, we may be said to dwell in them
as we do in our body. Their uncritical
acceptance for the time being consists in
a process of assimilation by which we iden¬
tify ourselves with them. They are not
asserted and cannot be asserted, for asser¬
tion can be made- only within a framework
with which we have identified ourselves for
the time being.^
Science, then, commits us to a certain 'vision of reality'
whose legitimacy is beyond the reach of any "objective
36 Ibid., p. 250.
^ Idem.
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51.
criteria of veri-Biability — or falsifiability, or testabil-
40
lty, or what have you." The Laplacean delusion of
strictly objective knowledge, devoid of cultural values,
is not only an ideal but an ideal to which the actual pur-
41
suits of science pays no head. And were this ideal
ever met, the content of science would be nothing. Polanyi
then argues that "Beliefs and valuations have . .' . func¬
tioned as joint premisses in the pursuit of scientific
42
enquires."
Polanyi states that the concept of belief came to be
rejected by modern thinkers since Descartes as a source of
knowledge, because of the authoritarian excesses of Scholas¬
ticism. 'Knowledge' and 'belief' were looked upon as
opposite poles. It is Polanyi's intention to bring back
what he takes to be 'true sense' of 'belief'. He writes:
We must now recognize belief once more as a
source of all knowledge. Tacit assent and
intellectual passion, the diaring of an idiom
and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to
a like-minded community; such are the impul¬
ses which shape our vision of the nature of
things on which we rely for our mastery of
things. Wo intelligence, however critical








Relativity theory and language.
The relativist argues that the organized body of be¬
liefs and linguistic practices found in all discourse from
science to religion, is not only necessarily presupposed
in our experience of the world and expression of this, but
that the background of language as such must also be seen
to be characteristic of, as well as characterizing, our
understanding. By making 'reality' reflective of language
and not, as usually assumed, language mirroring reality,
the relativists are placing man in the centre of the con¬
ditions of knowledge. As we normally think of ourselves
living in the world, they suggest that the world also
dwells in our being. I turn next to the conditions of this
conceptual primacy of the relativist's theory, viz. in
language.
In Language, Thought and Reality Benjamin Lee Whorf
argues that the way the Hopi Indians see the world is quite
different from the way Indo-European people see the world.
This difference is noticable because of the differing struc¬
tures of language. The concepts of 'past', 'present', and
'future' are not to be found in the Hopi language. Neither
is there a concept of 'time' as a flowing, ceaseless con¬
tinuum in which all things partake. Whorf suggests that
the Hopi could not understand as we do what it means to
cross the international dateline, or what the notion of
'progress' could mean in our sense. These linguistic facts,
44
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality
ed. John Carroll (Cambridge, 1966).
53.
based on Whorf's detailed fieldwork, and the apparent fact
that the Hopi do not appear to be baffled by their world-
view, leads Whorf to contend that the Hopi language and
culture conceal a metaphysic very different from our own
Newtonian spatio-temporal one.Instead of a cosmology
framed in terms of space and time, the Hopi perceive the
world in terms of 'being' and 'becoming' — "manifested"
46
and "manifesting" Whorf describes. To the former be¬
longs what we attribute to the 'past' and 'present', though
these are not distinguished, and the latter belongs what we
attribute to the mental and futural. This distinction
corresponds to our objective and subjective realms, although
for the Hopi both are equally 'real'. Their thinking and
that of a "paleface" belong to a different "unit class of
mentality." ^
Besides drawing attention to different ways people
view the world, Whorf warns of the difficulties of trying to
reconstruct an alien Weltanschauung in our own terms. He
writes: "The very natural tendency to use terms derived
from traditional grammar, like verb, noun, adjective, passive
voice, in describing language outside of Indo-European, is
48
fraught with grave possibilities of misunderstanding."
Grammatical categories, Whorf tells us, grow out of distinc¬
tions made within a language or family of related languages.
"Noun" is defined functionally as 'a word which does so-and-
so.' But this does not mean that the category 'noun' is
^ Ibid., pp. 58 ff.
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going to "be useful in understanding languages outside the
Indo-European tradition. To a certain degree, being able
to use a noun is tied in with a tradition that leans heavily
on the concept of 'substance' as a way of looking upon
reality.
To the extent that Whorf seeks to impress upion us both
that other people's 'vision of reality' may be markedly dif¬
ferent from our own and that there are difficulties in
coming to understand one 'unit class of mentality' from the
vantage point of another, he is a proponent of cultural re¬
lativity. However, in certain places, when Whorf is speak¬
ing generally about his work, he, like Polanyi, seems to im¬
ply that the picture of man constructed by natural histor¬
ians, Darwinians, Freudians, is the 'true' picture of man.
Whorf implies here that man has risen from the ape and has
perfected the means of communicating complex thoughts in an
LlO,
economical manner. y Whorf praises Edward Sapir, by whom
he had been greatly influenced, for seeking the connection
Y 50
between "language, culture, and pschology.Here,
A
then, Whorf is using 'animal' and 'psychology' as meta-
categories which transcend all 'unit classes of mentality'.
Are the differences between the Hopi and our own languages
then as radical as he wants to maintain? Is Whorf suggest¬
ing the cross-cultural approach to anthropology or is he
defending cultural relativism? Neither his position nor





Lewis S. Feuer is critical of 'linguistic relativity'
and, in particular, of Whorf's theory.^ If Whorf claims
that language is characteristic of an implicit metaphysics,
how then is it possible for people with the same language
to develop different metaphysics? Moreover, people with
radically different languages could produce the same meta¬
physics, Feuer suggests. He then argues that differences
in syntatic structure or differences in tenses between two
languages do not necessarily indicate a difference in philo¬
sophic ideas. People who do not distinguish the past and
present might merely be employing a technique known in play-
writing as the 'dramatic present'. This does not mean
that they see different worlds. Rather, distinctions
between past, present and future are basic aspects to the
human experience of time which is universal.
Feuer develops his position that there are universal
categories and common human experiences by returning to the
biological and essentially Aristotelian model. He writes:
A common, universal, scientific mode of think¬
ing manages to express itself in all languages.
It is the linguistic aspects of the common
struggle of men everywhere for survival in the
midst of their environment. There is the im¬
pact on all languages of these categories and
distinctions which facilitate the matter of
fact causal reasoning without which we could
not cope with their problem of biological
existence.52
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Hence, there is nothing mysterious in the fact that the
Eskimos have three different words for what we call 'snow',
words which translate to 'packed snow', 'slushy snow',
'flying snow'. This only indicates that snow is of much
an importance to the Eskimo, so much so that he "builds his
home out of it, that it "becomes pragmatically necessary for
him to make finer distinctions than would "be necessary under
other circumstances. In effect, then, Peuer is claiming
that the principles of linguistic relativity is an ad hoc
hypothesis superimposed to fit some facts of linguistic
"behaviour.
Eeuer has raised the question of what kind of evidence
the principle of linguistic relativity rests? Is it an
empirical generalization or an a priori recommendation?
However, in this debate of analysis we have also seen the
question raised of what kind of evidence there is for the
claim that there is a common human experience employing uni¬
versal categories. Is this view based on a priori recommen¬
dations? If so, it would be impossible to prove and if
applicable only so by imposition, not necessity. Or if
this is an empirical thesis then it must be established.
Eeuer's argument turns on the assumption that signifi¬
cant linguistic differences should, if Whorf is correct,
correspond to differences in philosophic ideas. And he
considers that he has proved his point when he notes that
those American Indians who do not distinguish between day-
before-yesterday and day-after-tomorrow have not developed
a metaphysics in which the immediate past and immediate
57.
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future are identified. But Whorf might argue that Feuer
is assuming that the differences must "be philosophical
differences. This argument, in turn, presumes a certain
conception of philosophy where man's reaction to the world
he encounters takes the shape of a metaphysical doctrine
about the nature of reality. Whorf, however, would want
to hold that differences between 'unit classes of' mentality'
correspond more to the world-view out of which a certain
philosophical position will develop, with the world-view
prior to the philosophical ideas it nurtures. Philosophy
would be an explicit re-construction and rationalization
of that world-view and take on various forms, and not by
definition correspond or underlie the world-view. Philosophy
as it is known in the West would be gust one of the possible
products of man's world-view. Art and history, for instance,
are other products. And if so, Feuer then begs the question
with the idea of 'philosophy' he states.
Conceptual relativity and objectivity.
Central to the theory of conceptual relativity is the
contextual relation of 'knower' and 'known'. This context
I've called "conceptual", referring not only to concepts but
to one's vision of the world, to the intelligibility and
ible
intelligence experience and encounter with the world. As
such, this includes 'the world' as one feels one's self in
the world: the personal (or subjective) and the public (or
objective) aspects of the world. I'm referring to the
'form of life', the 'constellation of absolute presupposi-
^Ibid. , p. 88.
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tions', the 'Weltanschauung', the 'unit class of mentality'
and 'fiduciary framework'. The conceptual scheme is unique¬
ly finite for the relativist. In contrast would he the
necessity of a general framework thought to he found in all
cultures, underlying universale conditions and common ex¬
periences for all people in all societies. Contrasted is
a context-independent world or nature which the particular¬
ity of all cultures and the individuality of all people
relate to.
As a consequence of the central notion of the contex¬
tual relation — the internal relation of the knower and the
known, an epistemological presupposition of Winch's internal
relation of concept and context autonomy — the conceptual
relativist argues that each conceptual scheme provides the
sense of the world. The conceptual scheme does not corres¬
pond to an independent world to give this sense hut rather
defines a relative and dependent characterization of the
world. This is not, however, a sceptical claim. Indeed,
the relativist wants to overcome the traditional dichotomy
between belief and knowledge and make knowledge possible —
albeit a finite and relative knowledge. The road to know¬
ledge begins with the assumption of the implementation of
some conceptual scheme. This primacy (and not 'given facts
of nature') has ontological status. The conceptual world
then is no illusionary world^ not an approximation of some
independently characterized world; but rather an 'objective
world' bound to cultural and not natural phenomena. The
relativist's world is in opposition to realism and naturalism,
the assumptions of empiricism and materialism. The rela-
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tivist's 'world.' is meant to "be a form of knowledge about
the world as authentic as any knowledge can be.
Theoretical relativity.
Conceptual relativism is about the diversity and in¬
telligibility of world-views. It is not, however, indi¬
cated in the content of this conceptual diversity; diversity
is rather characterized an relativistic. I have shown how
conceptual relativism can be set forth as both methodological
recommendation and theoretical explanation for the problems
and nature of understanding. As such, relativism is a
philosophical position inneed of defence.
As stated in the introduction, my study and its argu¬
ments begin with the fact of conflicting and competing al¬
ternative frameworks. I am beginning with the fact of
something people do. Anthropologists, sociologists, his¬
torians, philosophers, politicians and ordinary people
frequently engage in the mutual criticism of frameworks.
More than a recommendation is needed from the relativity
thesis to convince us that such an activity is nonsensical
or impossible. We need to know about the nature of that
activity before the view of autonomy is acceptable.
We believe that there is communication between parti¬
cipants in different forms of life. And communication re¬
quires some shared medium. This medium exists before the
relativist makes his claim; we cannot ignore this condition.
If frameworks were really discrete and autonomous then there
could be no conflict, no disagreement; indeed, no argument
(valid or invalid) could be expressed. But if there is,
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as it is our aim to show, a shared medium, some larger con¬
text to frameworks, then forms of life must in fact he part¬
ly related, and thus not truly discrete or autonomous.
Radical pluralism entailing the multiplicity and critical
isolation of the norms of rationality cannot he maintained;
there cannot he truly discrete forms of life and thus no¬
tions of rationality cannot really he all that different
and independent after all.^ There must he room for criti¬
cism.
The problem with the Winchian autonomy thesis then
is that it abstracts from the reality of historical dia¬
logue an unrealistic picture of conceptual schemes; it
neglects the area of conflict and criticism. For Winch,
the idea and its context are only internally related, a
relation whereby the idea would loose its meaning and thus
loose the possibility of external framework criticism when
separated from its context. But as I have emphasized, the
dialogue of conflict, whether rationally justified or not,
between conceptual frameworks does go on. What I am sug¬
gesting then is that the limitation of an internal relation
of concept and context actually reaches beyond itself in
the recognition of alternative conceptual frameworks. One
54
A similar argument is offered in an article by John
Kekes, "Rationality and Coherence", Philosophical Studies 26
(1974), pp. 51-61. Here Winch's theory for a pluralism of
norms of rationality is rejected as being inconsistent because
it both requires that there be distinguishable forms of life
and at the same time makes it impossible to distinguish them.
Different criticisms on the same autonomy theme are offered
by the following: Alasdar Maclntyre's "Is Understanding
Religion Compatible with Believing?" pp. 62-77 and "The
Idea of a Social Science" pp. 112-130 both in Rationality
ed. Bryan Wilson (Basil Blackwell, 1974); Kai Nielsen's
"Wittgensteinian Fideism", Philosophy 42 (1967), pp. 191-209;
"Rationality and Relativism", Philosophy and the Social
Sciences 4 (1974), pp. 313-331, and "The Coherence of
Wittgeinstein's Fideism", Sophia 11 (1972), pp. 4-12.
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should, thus "be more optimistic about understanding the
dialogue of criticism than Winch would allow.
Writing about Winch and his Wittgensteinian influence,
Karl-Otto Apel makes such an optimistic appeal for the
appreciation of conflict in the historical and contemporary
dialogue of conceptual schemes.
Winch, however, due to his Wittgensteinian
presupposition that the language games de¬
termine the limits of understanding and that
any question can be asked meaningfully only
within a specific language game, arrives at
a kind of 'monadology1 of different cultural
systems.
As finite human beings who cannot know sub
specie aeternitatis the final result of his¬
tory, one will have to accept with Wittgen¬
stein the existence of different forms of
life as different forms of understanding.
But from this IT DOES NOT FOLLOW, in my
opinion, THAT PHILOSOPHY SHOULD GIVE UP ALL
ATTEMPTS TO CRITICALLY EVALUATE THE KNOWLEDGE
ATTAINED IN VARIOUS FORMS OF UNDERSTANDING
(e.g. in religion, or in myth, science and
philosophy). Instead they all should be re¬
lated to the common interest in knowledge of




^Karl-Otto Apel, Analytic Philosophy of Language and
the Geisteswissenschaften tran. Harald Holstelile (Dordrecht,
Holland: Reidel Publishing Company, 1967), p. 5^, emphasis
is mine. Apel continues: "Winch's assumption of the lang¬
uage game, only understandable by and in itself, is really a
mere theoretical abstraction, which is strictly applicable
only in mathematics One could therefore feel temp¬
ted to play off Wittgenstein, the critic of language and
metaphysics, against Wittgenstein, the 'surveyer' of the
language games (who leaves everything 'as it is'), by point¬
ing out that most language games relevant for the history of
the human mind, if perhaps not 'idling', so still need a
supplementary interpretation — to be fully understandable —
which goes beyond the internal relations of the concepts used
and takes into account the actual behaviour of the language
game participants as not consistent with the concepts used in
continued overleaf.
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In sympathy with the above quote, I feel that a 'supplemen¬
tary interpretation' is needed to fully appreciate the sig¬
nificance of concepts in their contexts. Beyond the Win-
chian internal relation we must also appreciate the compara¬
tive and critical area where concepts and conceptual frame¬
works can he evaluated.
Conflict is significant.
My thesis-argument begins with three assumptions:
(1) that pluralism in both cultural and philosophical areas
is already present, (2) that we have a motive or desire to
make evaluations and choices among the various alternatives
in this pluralism, and (3) that differences and conflict
between alternatives are meaningful and therefore it is
possible for us to have good reasons for our choices. My
'thesis-argument argues for the plausibility of the third
assumption, and to show that critical choice among alter¬
natives is possible without assuming either one absolute
framework or affirming total relativism for all the views.
The first two assumptions are descriptions of historical
fact. Assumption (3) is not. Wanting to choose among
alternatives does not itself amount to a given ground for
making choices. Wanting to choose and making the rational
choice are not identical.
55 continued from previous page.
that game for public interpretation of the behaviour. In
other words: I would like to see the language game - as
opposed to Winch's conception - as a dialectical unity of
'use of language', 'practical form of life' ancf'understand¬
ing of the world', which means that these three 'moments'
(as Hegel used the word) or aspects which constitute the
language game do not always have to agree with each other,
but rather can stand in a certain discrepancy towards each
other and still make up one language game." Ibid., p. 56.
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Perhaps the meaning of an argument is only apparent.
How do we know we are not deceived in our critical dialogue?
To answer this we must realize that there can "be no a -priori
guarantee of valid communication, for indeed there are argu¬
ments which miss the point of the conflict, and there are
'conflicts' which may he resolved as not really being con¬
flicts. (These possibilities as well as genuine' arguments
are illustrated in the next chapters). The answer to this
question must be empirical, for it depends on particular
arguments and conflict; we must consider the context and
content of any conflict to determine whether it is genuine.
I will next show that the very fact that an argument may
be unfounded is a reason why it may be genuine.
In the last section above I argued that there must be
something in common with alternatives when, from our own
conceptual framework, we recognize pluralism. If the al¬
ternatives are neither incomprehensible nor simply false
then to make sense of them there is already a common ground
for comparison. Without this possibility, alternatives
would not be intelligible. But the strict autonomy
theorist rejects a priori this possibility; he argues dis¬
tinct standards of rationality and total immunity to criti¬
cism. And yet the strict autonomy theory also asserts
that the alternatives are legitimate conceptual schemes,
and the theory encourages non-critical acceptance. The
theory thus works on a premise which it strictly denies.
This is why I argued in the last section that more atten¬
tion should be paid to the dialogue of conflict and com-
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parison between different frameworks. This is not to
suggest, however, that there necessarily is perfect trans¬
lation of any concept, or that some conflict may not really
be an illusion, or that some arguments may be misplaced.
But there is something in common, a general ground of in¬
telligibility which allows alternatives to appear as alter¬
natives, not simply incomprehensible. The very recogni¬
tion of the alternative as such admits there is more to
one's conceptual scheme than an internal relation of con¬
cept and its context. It is therefore possible for (some)
conflict to be genuine; philosophy can take place.
I began the Introduction of this study by describing
philosophy as dialogue, both in historical and contemporary
senses. What was most apparent in this dialogue was neither
the attainment of philosophical truth or the failure to find
philosophical wisdom. Bather, I said that what was most
certain is that philosphers have always disagreed. And as
long as they disagree, I want to suggest, there will still
be philosophy. We cannot disagree on the intelligibility
of our disagreement without ceasing to philosophize; al¬
though we may misinterpret each other, recognizing a con¬
flict is itself some form of intelligible agreement. Wow
we may not understand each other's point of view, or one
may simply be false while the other's position true, or we
may both be correct in our assertions about different matters.
But any such unfounded argument, where conflict is only appa¬
rent and where arguments miss the point, actually predicates
itself on the possibility of something in common, some¬
thing comparable - if nothing other than being an al-
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ternative view. What I am emphasizing here is only the
possible legitimacy of the dialogue, and that conflict and
comparison can he interpreted and evaluated, not rejected
a priori as being unfounded. I have not argued that
philosophy necessarily exists as dialogue or that criticism
is essential for philosophical knowledge; a philosopher,
it might be shown, could maintain a solipsistic position,
an incommunicable position, but that is not at issue here.
With a survey of the various views on pluralism and
relativity in the social sciences, I began this chapter by
emphasizing the immediacy of the situation, and by sugges¬
ting the need to account for the ongoing practice of criti¬
cism. I was concerned with the dynamics of frameworks
more than framework; structure. I now turn to a more
specific account of pluralism, namely pluralism in meta¬
physical systems. I begin by adopting Stephen KSrner's





An opinion widely accepted "by scientists, historians,
anthropologists and philosophers is that meaning is a_ func¬
tion of conceptual schemes. A scientific conceptual
scheme provides a method and suggests the problem field
as well as standards for acceptable solutions; a scien¬
tist thus limits, defines and directs research. The his¬
torian recognizes that history is written from a given
point of view, be it Catholic, Protestant, Marxist or
Liberal. Such ideologies, the basic ideas of the his¬
torian's conceptual scheme, provide a guide for the selec¬
tion of relevant data and a theme for constructive inter¬
pretation. A similar need is satisfied by the anthropolo¬
gist's conceptual scheme. Criteria for the selection,
interpretation and explanation of behaviour is supplied;
the anthropologist distinguishes and differentiates various
cultures and societies by recognizing their respective con¬
ceptual schemes of religion, science, politics, etc.
Differing conceptual schemes account for the variety
of 'world-views' or cultural metaphysics as well as pror-
viding the stage for the more practical work of philoso¬
phical analysis. For the philosopher we find this generic
phrase "conceptual framework" to include: form of life;
paradigm; way of thinking, acting, believing; set of basic
assumptions or beliefs; a language game. The philosopher
has used such terms for a_ priori knowledge, depth grammar,
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logic and ontology. Kantian categories provide a frame¬
work, as do scientific theories. Frameworks can also
give form to thinking and factual discourse; they can
provide structures that help determine action and choice:
sets of values, social and political patterns, role ex¬
pectation, ideologies and so on. But in general we may
say that a conceptual scheme is necessary for organizing
the data of experience so that we can perceive, think and
talk about the world in a meaningful way. Behind any
religious, historical, moral, social, economic, mythical,
or artistic experience there is a specific conceptual frame¬
work characterizing that experience. And such a background
is needed before reflective understanding and knowledge is
possible. A system or framework of concepts thus provides:
(1) for the categorization of basic items (events, objects,
values, or forces, i.e. the terminology of ontology) in the
given field of experience, and thereby (2) the constitu¬
tive and individuating principles associated with this cate¬
gorization of items, as well as (3) the rationale or logic
underlying the connections and relationships of the language
used to articulate an understanding of the given experience.
Restated: the categorical framework provides the categories
and necessary connections that define and are used to ex¬
press (in language, thought, behaviour, etc.) an area of
1
experience.
We possess conceptual frameworks without ever con¬
sciously learning them. Whole lists of categories and
Stephen Korner, Categorial Frameworks (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1974). See p. 10.
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principles can "be disengaged from our talk and activity.
We use them, but do not look at them. Philosophers have
developed many methods of uncovering such principles.
Socratic questioning leads the respondent to discover his
own presupposed categories and values. Various hermeneu-
tic techniques try to speak the shared unspoken meanings
and values that structure our community with other people.
Ordinary language analysis tries to show us what we "know"
all the time when we talk. The study of human experience
by eidetic analyses tries to arrive at statements about
necessary connections of meaning in terms of general ideas
,'st
or essences. Logical reconstructions try to build models
of our frameworks. Using such methods, we can come up
with frameworks for mentalistic language, or religious
language, or the presuppositions behind giving promises,
or doing Newtonian science. I do not mean to deny the
difference and incompatibilities among these various methods,
or to prejudge questions about which ones are appropriate.
Still, they do all agree in seeking necessary connections
for various areas of experience or discourse. Such in¬
vestigations can be carried out for their own sake, to
clarify presuppositions. But the traditional aim of
philosophy has been to link self-awareness with self-cri¬
ticism. Thus we may seek our frameworks in order to ques¬
tion them, and relate them to one another. The critical
reconstruction activity which results is the concern of
this study, namely the motive, Justification, and rational¬
ity of metaphysical systems — the highest form of concep¬
tual frameworks.
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Conceptual frameworks can be local or total, unreflective
or self-conscious. This study will deal with self-conscious
reconstruction of total or metaphysical frameworks.
Frameworks can be local or total, dealing with one area
or with all of experience and discourse. This distinction
may seem straight-forward, but it is difficult to apply.
Most local frameworks do not include principles defining
themselves as local, or relating themselves clearly to
other areas. Often a local framework will tend toward
a creeping totalization, as its categories and principles
are extended to ever wider areas thus excluding other
possible interpretations. We may find ourselves with
several of these incipient totalities jostling within us.
Since the seventeenth century the West has been trying to
unify competing total claims from a materialistic science,
a personalist common sense, and a teleological religion.
This kind of situation can give rise to the desire for
unity through a self-consciously constructed framework.
This type of metaphysical framework is the topic of my study.
Sometimes we have more than the competing totalizations
that result when local frameworks extend themselves. We
may find that we have an articulated total view which re¬
lates various areas to each other. Considerable effort in
our past cultural history may have formed this view, but we
find ourselves possessing it 'almost as naturally as we have
hands or feet. When they remain unreflected on, these
total views have enormous influence. And yet circumstances
can lead us to see that there are other possible views.
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Whether we react with calm or with acute anxiety, the aware¬
ness "brings on a self-reflective or critical questioning.
The products of framework reconstruction may not differ in
form from unreflective frameworks, hut they stand in
different contrasts and result from choice and self-criti¬
cism. Since they are conceptual, and so expressible in
language, local and total frameworks can be shared. The
presuppositions of Newtonian science, or of giving a promise,
exist for us. Sharing these frameworks forms a community.
A group of individuals whose local frameworks happen to
coincide are not necessarily a community. That requires
shared practices and life, so that rules and frameworks
are possessed by "us", and not by "me and you and him and
him".^
Total frameworks may be held by a community as a
community, or be the possession of a single individual,
e.g. Spinozism before the circulation of the Ethics. Yet
even before it was made public, when the specific frame¬
work Spinoza developed belonged to him alone, his effort
to better his understanding was a personal contribution to
a shared dialogue and a shared cultural task. Thus the
same local or total framework can exist in a number of ways:
as individual belief, as shared by a number of individuals,
or as shared by "us" and a basis for community. In any of
these locations it may be consciously reflected on and re¬
constructed.
2
Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Science of
Man", The Review of Metaphysics 25 (1972), pp. 3-51* See
pp. 22-29.
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We are dealing, then, with the self-conscious attempt
to construct a total world-view. A unified vision of the
whole of human experience can he achieved in many ways.
Metaphor, analogy and the idea of a model are perhaps the
most common, in science and philosophy. Often such ideas
lie behind elaborate conceptual systems. In this study,
however, I am concerned with the conceptual systems them¬
selves, the synthesis that results from classifications,
rules, and general principles. At their most wide-ranging,
these conceptual systems form metaphysical theories and
ontologies.
Conceptual frameworks contain certain types of principles.
To provide detail and some insight into the structure
of metaphysical frameworks I will adopt a descriptive
rubric developed by Stephen Korner in his book Categorial
Frameworks.^1 Korner believes that metaphysics aims at the
exhibition of implicitly accepted categorial frameworks,
at their critical examination, and at their modification.
The following general characterization of metaphysical
principles is suggested: (i) Metaphysical principles are
non-empirical; their acceptance or rejection does not
depend on experiment or observation. (ii) They are not
logically true in the sense of being substitution-instances
of logical principles. (iii) They are comprehensive in
the sense that they are applicable either to all entities
or at least to the entities of one category or maximal kind.
3 ••
Korner, op_ cit. , p. 60 and passim.
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And (iv) metaphysical principles are 'prior to experience'
in the sense of somehow determining the structure of ex¬
perience, rather than "being determined "by it.
Korner then suggests that a metaphysical framework can
"be viewed as a set of principles of the following types:
(I) Categorial Principles:
(a) acceptance or rejection of a classification
of "objects" into particulars and attributes
(b) acceptance or rejection of a classification
of particulars into independent and depen¬
dent, and the same for attributes
(c) listing of the highest genera in each of
the four groups generated by (a) and (b)
(d) statement of the "constitutive principles"
for each of the classifications
(e) statement of the "individuating principles"
for each of the classifications
(f) statement of a notion of logical implica¬
tion and its rules
(II) Transcategorial Principles:
statement of principles which are valid
for any entity as such simply in terms
of it being an entity and not in terms
of it belonging to one of the highest
genera.
(Ill) Metacategorial Principles:
statement of principles about the cate¬
gorizations in (I) and (II). Such prin¬
ciples could give common features to all
the highest genera, relate one classifica¬
tion to another, put limits on the other
principles, etc.
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In the following discussion, the term "framework" will
he taken to refer to a set of principles which more or less
fills this description. The principles which comprise a
framework are part of first-order discourse about a given
subject matter. Arguments about which principles to accept
can be carried out as straightforward ontological, cosmolo-
gical, epistemological arguments.
The descriptive rubric is only an expository device.
It has both the advantages and the disadvantages of clarity.
It loses something of the suggestiveness of the metaphor of
a framework. I make no claim that all frameworks can be
perfectly described in this way. Such a thesis is false.
There are metaphysics which do not fit. Tor example,
medieval analogy ontology does not fit because the multiple
analogy between God, immaterial entities, material sub¬
stances, and intentional entities make it difficult to
produce a list of independent particulars and attributes,
since "independence" is one of the characters possessed
analogously, as is "unit" and even "being".
There are also systems of thought, such as Hegel's,
designed in conscious opposition to this kind of classifi-
catory thinking. Then, there are philosophical systems
which are not "metaphysical" at all, such as Wittgenstein's.
Comparison with this model can still furnish a useful start¬
ing point for discussion of such systems. Tinally, this
description fits most smoothly for classical and pre-Kantian
metaphysical schemes. The welter of ontological-epistemo-
logical principles that make up nineteenth century German
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systems are harder to describe in this way, although it
seems that transcategorial principles are still at their
heart. More recent systems are easier to deal with; for
example, Bergmann, Whitehead, Sellars, and Strawson can be
described rather well. Although the rubric is not per¬
fect, it will suffice to expose the problem of pluralism.
While I do not claim that every framework must fit
this description exactly, I do regard transcategorial prin¬
ciples as the essential ingredient of any metaphysical frame¬
work. By themselves, such principles provide only a general
vision of the nature of reality. They have to be made
applicable to various areas of experience and language.
This is the function of categorial principles. It seems
to me that other methods could be used, as in the medieval
analogy theory or the Hegelian method. As long as a sys¬
tem of principles provides transcategorial principles to¬
gether with some articulation which mediates them to dif¬
ferent areas, it will be a "metaphysical framework" in the
sense outlined above.
Categorial principles including ontological classifications.
The first two items under "categorial principles" (I,
a and I, b) concern the division of "objects" into particu¬
lars and attributes, or a denial of that division, followed
by a sub-division into independent and dependent particulars
and attributes. Such principles are of the form "There are
(are not) independent particulars", and "If something is an
A it is an independent particular". Frameworks could differ
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either as to which of these classes are non-empty, or as
to what "objects" are to be assigned to what classes. For
example, numbers may be conceived of as particulars or
attributes. The class of independent particulars is more
or less the class of substances in the Aristotelian sense,
that is, entities whose existence is not in another entity.
The class of dependent particulars corresponds roughly to
the Aristotelian secondary substances. Independent attri¬
butes would be the basic attributes of independent parti¬
culars, while dependent attributes would be functions of
independent attributes. Spatial location would be an in¬
dependent attribute for Newton, a dependent attribute for
Leibniz. On another application of the terms, the inde¬
pendent particulars would be Platonic ideas, while the things
of this world would be dependent particulars. On a third
use the only independent particulars would be Leibnizian
monads; all other "particulars" would be well-founded
phenomena and hence dependent. This brings up the impor¬
tant point that the relations between the items are not
fixed. Exactly what constitutes an independent particular
and how it is related to dependent particulars is a matter
expressed by the framework itself. Such relations are
expressed in metacategorial principles and can vary from
framework to framework.
The third item under "categorial principles" (I,c)
consists of a listing of the highest genera or maximal kinds
of particulars and attributes. Such principles would have
the form of "There exists G, H, J, K" and "If something is
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an A then it is in genus G. " Aristotle's categories re¬
present one classic listing of highest genera. The recent
discussions of "ontic commitment" leads to similar lists.
As an example of the application of the first three
items (I, a, t>, c) I will next consider what is thereby ob¬
tained by comparing the philosophical systems of Spinoza and
Leibniz. Independent particulars for Leibniz are monads
(God, and all the degrees of monads) and dependent particu¬
lars are well-founded phenomena (bodies, regions of space,
etc.). In Spinoza's philosophy, independent particulars
are represented by only one genus, one individual, namely
substance or God; while dependent particulars are the
modes of bodies and mind. Lor Leibniz, independent attri¬
butes are monadic perceptions (one genus, but varying con¬
tinuously in clarity) while for Spinoza they are the in¬
finite attributes of God. Dependent attributes for Leibniz
are relations among monadic perceptions, also the properties
of well-founded phenomena, especially spatio-temporal re¬
lations, casual relations, etc. Dependent attributes for
Spinoza are the properties of finite modes (spatio-temporal
properties, mental perceptions).
In addition, the relations of dependence differ. Lor
Leibniz they are due to the free choice of God under the
principles of sufficient reason and the best. The inde¬
pendent attributes (monadic perceptions) determine what
monads will be chosen for existence in the world. They de¬
termine what the well-founded phenomena and their properties
will be. Lor Spinoza independent attributes are decisive
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in determining what dependent particulars and attributes
will exist, but the independent attributes are those of God.
These define possibility rather than being a selection from
possibilities. Similarly there is a difference between
Leibniz1s "kind of emanation" linking God and the world
and Spinoza's "indwelling and not transient efficient
cause of all things."
Strictly speaking, God is the only independent par¬
ticular for Leibniz. To express this fully we could use
a three-tiered system of independent/dependent/very-depen¬
dent to classify God/monads/well-founded phenomena. Or
we could class both other monads and well-founded phenomena
as dependent, and make the difference clear by other prin¬
ciples. This flexibility points out that our scheme from
Korner is a descriptive device and not a hidden core of
all metaphysical systems. Precisely how it is applied
depends on the purpose at hand. For example, my compara¬
tive classification brings out the parallel between indi¬
vidual monads and the Spinozistic substance. The three-
tiered classification would bring out the overall resem¬
blance between the roles God plays in both systems.-
Constitutive and individuating principles, and a specific
logic.
So far I have considered the classificatory aspects
of a framework. These classiciations cannot stand alone.
I have already pointed out that they are supplemented by
metacategorial principles describing their inter-relations.
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In addition, constitutive and individuating principles
are needed to make sense of the classification. They also
provide new areas where frameworks can diverge.
A constitutive principle (l,d) takes the form "There
exists examples of attribute A, and if something is a member
of genus G, then it is necessarily an A." These principles
state logical consequences of an entity's belonging to a
particular classification. "If X is a material object,
then X has spatio-temporal location" (or, is impenetrable,
or, is a congeries of monadic relationships, or, is inde¬
pendent of all other material objects, or, is related to
all other material objects, etc.). A constitutive prin¬
ciple states the necessary conditions for an entity to be
in a particular classification. It may state sufficient
conditions as well, but that varies with the framework
involved.
Constitutive principles are in the form of implica¬
tions, and this makes them particularly important in philo¬
sophical argumentation. One of the most common type of
philosophical disagreement comes about when thinkers agree
on what entities fall into a given classification, but
disagree on the constitutive principle involved. This
disagreement may be expressed in a variety of ways. They
may disagree on the correct analysis of material objects
or on what material objects really are or on what it means
to be a material object. In any case they are disagreeing
on consequences that follow a priori from the fact that an
entity is in a certain classification. On more abstract
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levels this kind of disagreement can "be very crucial and
lead to large-scale misunderstanding. For example, "sub¬
stance" has "been thought of at times as constituted by in¬
dependence (Aristotle, Spinoza), by a specific nature which
expresses itself (Aristotle, Leibniz) or by being a passive
substrate which has nothing to express (Locke). ' The fact
that Descartes adheres to the first and second of' these
while Gassendi and Hobbes adhere to the third plays havoc
with their discussion of the Meditations, as I will show
later below.
Individuating principles (I, e) give the necessary
conditions for something to be a distinct member of some
highest genus. For example, "If something is a distinct
material object, it has a unique spatio-temporal location."
The current dispute about the conditions of personal iden¬
tity involves similar principles. A frequent form of
philosophical attack is to allege that a thinker cannot
give individuating principles on a category, say that of
abstract entities. Another illustration is Strawson's
com+«UH i»Y
claim that individuating principles in non-ordinary)(modes
of individuation if they are to work at all. Again, on
the level of attributes, there was considerable argument
among medieval Aristotelians whether reference to quantity
was necessary to individuate species of material objects
as well as individual objects. Although individuating
principles state the necessary conditions for the applica¬
tion of a predicate to an object, Korner suggests that
this idea can be developed to also give the sufficient con-
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ditions "by making explicit the demarcation of the maximal
kind.^
The final item under "categorial principles" is the
specification of a notion of logical entailment (I, f).
This is needed because many framework principles are in
the form of implications. In Categorial Frameworks,
Korner devotes considerable space to showing that factual
and practical thinking presuppose different logics, classi¬
cal and intuitionist respectively. He also shows that any
one logic can be regarded as fundamental and all others
derived from it as reduced or expanded versions. The meta¬
physical frameworks we are considering fall within the sphere
of Horner's factual thinking, but they too are affected by
the availability of alternative logics.
There has always been an ambiguity about logic's re¬
lation to ontology. Is logic a neutral tool, or an ex¬
pression of ontology? Is Aristotle's subject-predicate
logic the organon he thinks it is, or does it stem from
his metaphysics? From the time of the Rationalists, through
the nineteenth century, up to the Tractatus, this ambiguity
remains. Now that we have many logics to choose from, we
must ask again whether logic is framework-dependent or
neutral among frameworks.
There is a basic sense in which logic is independent
and neutral. We have intuitions about what patterns of
argument are valid and bring success in dealing with the
world. These are given, independently of any formalization
^Ibid., pp. 6-8.
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or any framework. If someone denies them, and claims he
has "a logic of his own" which allows him to admit round
squares or deny the transitivity of entailment, we will
reply that he is free to construct anything he likes and
call it a logic, "but we cannot see how he will "be able to
use the results for framework-purposes, or how he' will be
able to square his construction with evident facts.
On the other hand, there is a stronger sense of "logic"
which blends with that of a "framework". We cannot avoid
ontological issues when we formalize logic. Quantification
theory demands choices between finitary and infinitary -uni¬
verses of discourse. Modal logic requires many ontologi¬
cal decisions. As we go along, our "logical intuitions"
and "ontological intuitions" cannot be kept clearly dis¬
tinct. In fact, metaphysical frameworks can be put into
the form of logics plus assorted definitions. The various
framework principles will appear partly as definitions and
axioms, partly as formation rules, and partly as semantic
rules. Putting frameworks into this form emphasizes one
of their functions, their ability to act as a kind of
canonical grammar. All these things blur the line between
logic and frameworks.
It is tempting to regard the difference between the
basic and the stronger senses of "logic" as matters of quan¬
tity. Thus, modus ponens and propositional logic are part
of the common base, while the choice between S4 and S5
modality is framework-dependent. Unfortunately, there is
no way to draw such a neat line. There is no abrupt change
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in the kind of decisions we make when constructing a logic.
Also, as Korner points out, even a law as "basic as non-con¬
tradiction has different meanings, in the sense of different
consequences, in different systems. For instance, it may
or may not entail the law of excluded middle.
The ancient ambiguity about the relation of logic to
ontology persists. We cannot get rid of it by assigning
different portions of logic to the spheres of "given data"
and "constructed interpretation." This may indeed be
the same for frameworks themselves. In the end, this am¬
biguity is the same problem of pluralism and rationality
that I am dealing with.
Transcategorial principles.
The principles I have been discussing (I, a-f) forw\
the first major division of a metaphysical framework. Taken
by themselves, these principles furnish explicit statements
of "ontic commitments" or descriptions of "regional onto¬
logies." They describe the basic objects of a realm of
discourse. It is only with the addition of transcate¬
gorial principles that they become concerned with the
highest genera of entities as such.
With "transcategorial principles" (II) we Join a tra¬
dition leading straight from Aristotle: metaphysics is a
science of being as such. The addition of transcategorial
principles transforms a local framework into a metaphysics.
These principles introduce the concept of "being as such"
or "an entity as such". The highest genera dealt with.in
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the categorial principles thus "becomes the fundamental
kinds of entity. The transcategorial principles themselves
concern every "being, no matter what genus it "belongs to.
These principles are not summaries or generalizations: they
do not merely express features common to all the genera.
They deal with features of any entity as such, logically
prior to the division into genera. For example, "If X is
an entity, it is unified", or " . . . composed of act and
potency", or " . . . knowahle", or " . . . related to other
entities". Included in such principles would "be the topics
discussed in the medieval treatises on the "transcendentals"
(ens, unum, verum, "bonum, aliquid, res) — predicates that
transcend all genera and apply to all beings — "being" itself
is not a genus. The principle of sufficient reason in its
various forms is a transcategorial principle, as is the
principle that no distinction between entities is allowable
without separation of the distinguishing items, the principle
that all entities are composed of simples, and the negations
of these principles. Such principles influence whole
classes of frameworks, and it is here that the most widely
shared presuppositions of a given era can be found. And
here, for example, the sudden shift away from absolute
idealism at the beginning of this century seems due to a
shift in transcategorial principles which makes certain
approaches to the problem of the one and the many in terms
of internal relations or organic wholes seem absurd. This
kind of shift affects epistemology as well as ontology. It
is only after the shift that various quick and easy refuta¬
tions of idealism gain their currency. In the nineteenth
84.
century, refuting absolute idealism tended to be a voluminous
task.
Most transcategorial principles concern the problem of
the one and the many. They have their impact on epistemo-
logical areas as well as in metaphysics proper. Both meta¬
physics and philosophic method are attempts to deal with the
one and the many. There are many examples where the two
run parallel: Aristotle's pluralistic ontology and pluralism
of methods, Plotinus' formless One and ultimate silence in
philosophy, Spinoza's monism of being and his mos geometri-
cus, Bradley's logic and his ontology. One of the merits
of the German Idealist tradition was that it recognized
this interplay and tried to deal with it explicitly. Both
the Critical Philosophy and Hegel's long discussions about
how to begin philosophy attempt to avoid legislating method
in terms of ontology, or vice versa. The wholesale adop¬
tion of a piecemeal approach to philosophy in early analytic
thought effectively and deliberately excluded any ontology
which did not accept the principle of simple location for
entities and bits of knowledge. The breakdown of the epis-
temological side of the bias can be traced through Wittgen¬
stein' s various phases. Similarly, the methodological
principle of "no distinction without separation" has been a
central part of the defence of nominalism all through history.
Metacategorial principles.
"Metacategorial principles" (III) have as their object
the other principles of a framework. They may give common
features of various classifications. A common feature of
the categorial principles of a categorial framework may be,
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for example, that its constitutive attributes are non-percep¬
tual or contain non-perceptual ingredients. Metacategorial
principles may also relate one classification or principle
to another. For example, that every member of the category
of material objects 'participates' in a member of the cate¬
gory of Platonic Forms. And metacategorial principles may
express limitations on the framework: that it accord with
some religious revelation, or with ordinary language, or
with science, that it sanction certain values, etc. Al¬
though metacategorial principles can state the relation be¬
tween the principles and categories of the framework, they
do not go further and give criteria for the adoption of
specific principles. For if they did, the framework would
become completely circular — legislating its own truth con¬
ditions — and therefore insulated from all criticism by
comparison with data. Perhaps some transcendental and
Hegelian frameworks do' attempt this, but they fail to be
completely insulated, since the adoption of the transcen¬
dental method itself lies outside the framework.
Because our descriptive rubric contains metacategorial
principles, it has a wider extension than Kant's "dogmatic
metaphysics" or a generalization from pre-Kantian systems.
It can be said, for example, that Kant himself offers a
framework which resembles a traditional metaphysics but
differs in the meta- and transcategorial principles needed
to express transcendental idealism. And I think that Kant
would be content to be so classified. After all, he wrote
the Metaphysics of Morals and the Metaphysics of Nature.
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Using this description, we can group together Locke, the
rationalists, Kant, the Ueo-Kantians, and Wittgenstein in
the Tractatus as offering frameworks, even though it would
he untrue that they all offer traditional metaphysics. This
allows a significant contrast with thinkers like the later
Wittgenstein who offers neither a traditional metaphysics
nor a framework.
As thus described, metaphysical frameworks can he seen at
work in examples from the Leihniz - Clarke correspondence.
In order to show metaphysical frameworks in action, I
would like to present several examples of how this descrip¬
tion can illuminate philosophical disputes. These examples
will also serve as short case studies in meta-physical plura¬
lism. The first, which concerns disagreement on various
issues hetwenn two frameworks, is drawn from the Leibniz-
Clarke correspondence.
There are two striking areas of framework-difference
between Leibniz and Clarke, the first in classification and
the second in constitutive and transcategorial principles.
Leibniz and Clarke can assign the same "object" to different-
categories. For instance they disagree on whether spatial
relations are dependent or independent attributes. In
Leibniz's view, space is a well-founded phenomenon, ultimate¬
ly a relation dependent on the monadic perceptions and the
principles of the best. For Clarke space is an independent
attribute, a property of God, or more precisely, an eternal
property caused by God's existence but not a property of God.
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They also disagree on what categories there are to assign
things to. From each one's perspective, the categories
of the other "becomes distorted and fragmented. Leibniz
affirms a set of highest genera that would include monads,
monadic perceptions, and well-founded phenomena, as well as
the somewhat obscure divine causality and the possible sub¬
stances. Clarke affirms a more traditional list of cate¬
gories which seem to break down into substances (bodily and
incorporeal), properties of substances (primary qualities
and ideas), and relations between substances (geometrical
and causal).^
An example of a disagreement arising from this difference
of classification is Clarke's attack on Leibniz's doctrine of
time. Clarke argues that time cannot be a relation because
time has quantity while a relation has only order. Leibniz
answers that since there is no vacuum in time or space, the
ordering will be an ordering of oust these items in just
this order. The items will create the extent of time,
which then can be measured if one wishes.^ Clarke misun¬
derstands this argument. He assumes Leibniz is saying that
time contains order plus "the quantity of duration inter¬
vening between each of the particulars succeeding in that
order". Clarke accuses Leibniz of contradicting himself
But Leibniz had said there was no intervening duration at
all, since there is no time independent of the items ordered.
There is no empty vacuum in which the temporal order could
be expanded and contracted in duration while keeping the
5
¥. von Leibniz, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence
ed. H. G. Alexander (England: Manchester University Press,
1976). See Clarke's fifth reply, sec. 36-48. pp. 103-104.
^Ibid. see Leibniz's fifth letter, sec. 105? pp.89-90.
^Ibid. see Clarke's fifth reply, sec.104-107,
pp. 89-91.
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order and items ordered the same. The "intervening dura¬
tion" is simply other items in the order. When the density
of the items ordered is taken into account, the order does
"fill" the time and define the duration. Since their
ontologies are different, Leihniz and Clarke never get the
issue clearly before them.
One of the reasons it is so difficult fo*Leihniz and
Clarke to communicate on this point is their disagreement
on individuating principles. Clarke's particle substances
are individuated by their spatio-temporal positions. Leib¬
niz's monads are individuated by their complete individual
concepts in the mind of God, that is, by their individual
natures, which are summations of their perceptions. Since
Clarke's substances can have external relations which in¬
dividuate them, there is a possibility of identical in-
discernibles. Further, there is a context in which the
substances reside, a field of relations (space-time) which
can be conceived of as empty. Thus it makes sense for
Clarke to ask about the metric of the temporal order separa¬
ted from the ordering itself. On the other hand, since
Leibnizian substances are individuated by their internal
properties, two absolutely similar substances would be iden¬
tical. There is no context in which to make them discern-
ibly different. Space-and-time is a function of the al¬
ready determined individuality of the substances, so it
cannot be used to individuate them. Neither can its
metric properties be separated from the ordering they give it.
The other important framework difference I wish to point
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out is one involving constitutive and transcategorial prin¬
ciples. Leibniz and Clarke agree on the transcategorial
principle that every entity has as a sufficient reason a
cause of some sort. They differ on what constitutes a
cause and how an entity must he explained. For Leihniz
one of the constitutive attributes of an existing entity
is its position in a network of final causality regulated
by the principle of the best. On the transcategorial level
the principle of sufficient reason is interpreted in accord
with final causality. For Clarke one of the constitutive
principles of an existing entity is its being caused by
God's power of efficient causality. The principle of
sufficient reason is interpreted in this fashion by Clarke.
Each philosopher admits both final and efficient causality,
but each makes one of the causes dominant. For Leibniz,
final causes have the constitutive role. Efficient causes
are either relations of well-founded phenomena in nature,
or the peculiar divine "emanation" that creates and con¬
serves the world. These are both determined by the prin¬
ciple of sufficient reason and the best. What the efficient
causes and their effects will be is due in the long run to
final causes. For Clarke, efficient causes have the con¬
stitutive role. Final causes are allowed for in the notion
that God designs the world and has a motive for what he does.
But Clarke allows that God's motive could simply be the de¬
sire to do this rather than that because he wants to do this
rather than that. Thus final causes have no independent
determining power.
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This difference comes to the fore in a number of ways.
Tor example, it clouds the continuing discussion of whether
or not it is to God's credit that he might correct the
machine of the world from time to time. Both thinkers
share the same motive here; they each want to magnify the
dominion of God. Each wants God to be supreme and indepen¬
dent of the world, but they arrange this differently. Eor
Leibniz God's dominion is in terms of wisdom-guided power,
while for Clarke it is in terms of independent causal
efficacy. As a result, tinkering with the machine of the
world is for Clarke a sign of God's supreme dominion and
something to be welcomed. Eor Leibniz such tinkering would
be a continual reminder of the failure of God's wisdom and
is to be denied.
Similarly, the long discussions about divine freedom
can be summed up by saying that for Leibniz motives are final
causes while for Clarke they are efficient causes. Thus
Leibniz can feel that the principle of best preserves God's
freedom while Clarke can accuse him of necessitating God's
choice since the principle acts as a foreign force on God's
decision. On the other hand, Leibniz can accuse Clarke of
having an unmotivated divine choice which is no different
from randomness. To Leibniz, Clarke's God who can decide
even when there is no sufficient reason why something should
go here rather than there is a random actor, in no way
different from the Epicurean swerve of the atoms. To
Clarke his God is not at all like the Lucretian atoms, since
they simply swerved without any cause, while God causes him-
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self to decide. That is precisely, his motive and his free¬
dom. Thus the framework differences "bring shifts in the
meaning of the principles on which Leibniz and Clarke claim
to agree, such as the principle of sufficient reason and the
importance of preserving God's dominion.
Finally, the correspondence gives us some evidence about
the psychological effects of frameworks. For us today, the
doctrine of monadic perceptions mirroring the universe is
a difficult one. So too is Clarke's doctrine that absolute
space is caused to exist not by some creative act of God,
but by the sheer existence of God. The correspondents
share our difficulties, but for each of them the difficult
notions are those of the other man. Leibniz never feels
at ease with Clarke's notion that God's every existence
causes something, and he keeps trying to change it into
some other view. Clarke, on the other hand, comments about
monadic perceptions "all this I acknowledge I do not under-
Q
stand at all". This raises the question how much of what
we find unintelligible or inconceivable is due to our frame¬
works .
There is another side to the disagreement between Leib¬
niz and Clarke. Our account makes it seem that while they
thought they were arguing about space and time and God's
freedom they were really only expounding different frame¬
works for dealing with these problems. This view tends to
turn their discussion into two parallel monologues. Impor¬
tant as the analysis of framework presupposition is, we
cannot forget that its context is a philosophical argument
^Ibid., see Clarke's fifth reply, sec. 83-88,
pp. 109-110.
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in which the two men are trying to arrive at the truth about
certain issues. Frameworks are not elaborated for their
own sakes, but in the hope of arriving at the truth. Frame¬
work construction is not its own goal. If the argument
between Leibniz and Clarke were truly a matter of parallel
monologues, then there would be no problem of pluralism
except retrospectively for the historian. Philosophers
would merely spin out their systems in isolation.
Metaphysical frameworks and discussions of the mind-body
problem.
I have just discussed an example of how differences
between two frameworks affect a series of problems dealt
with by Leibniz and Clarke. It will be of interest to see
how differences of frameworks affect the same problem dealt
with by a number of philosophers. The mind-body problem
provides a good example here. I will first sketch out
how varied the treatment of the issue may become, then
examine a particular discussion in more detail.
As the problem is usually set up in textbooks, we are
given two phenomena, the "mental" and the "physical", and
asked to relate them. The two phenomena are roughly de¬
fined as the "me" of introspection and the "me" of science.
A typical treatment of this sort can be found in Jerome
Schaffer's Philosophy of Mind.
_
Jerome Schaffer, Philosophy of Mind (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968). Also see Chapter 4 in James Cornman
and Keith Leher, Philosophical Problems and Arguments (Mac-
millian, 1968). The epistemological importance of the mind-body
problem is recognized when Woody Allen in Getting Even (Indiana:
Warner Books, Inc., 1971), p.28, writes: "In formulating any
philosophy, the first consideration must always be: What can
we know? That is, what can we be sure we know, or sure that we
know we knew it, if indeed it is at all knowable. Or have we
simply forgotten it and are too embarassed to say anything?
Descartes hinted at the problem when he wrote, 'My mind can
never know my body, although it has become quite friendly with
1 — I IT
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Schaffer introduces the problem of mind-body as follows:
Let us confine ourselves to that form of con¬
sciousness which consists in having what I
shall call mental events: those particular
occasions which consist in the having of
some thought, the feeling of some sensation,
the imagining of some mental picture, the
entertaining of some wish, etc. Our problem,
then, will be to determine what it is that
has the thought, feels the sensation, imagines
the mental picture, entertains the wish, etc.
The various theories concerning what has
the mental events fall into three basic cate¬
gories. (1) there is the view that they
happen to purely nonmaterial things
(2) there is the view that they happen to
purely material things. ... (3) there is
the view that they happen to things which are
10
neither purely material nor purely nonmaterial.
After considerable argument, Schaffer eliminates some of the
alternatives.
From what we have seen so far in this book, it
is unlikely that we will be able to "reduce" the
phenomena of consciousness to physical phenomena;
that is, it is unlikely that we will be able to
show either that consciousness is definable in
terms of the physical or show that it is in fact
• identical with the physical. If that is the
case, then we must face the problem of how the
two phenomena are related, if they are related
11
at all.
Finally, he concludes for one of the alternatives:
. . . must we remain completely on the fence
with respect to epiphenomenalism or interactionism?
There is one rather indirect consideration which
10
Schaffer, op. cit., see pp. 3^-35.
^Ibid. , p. 60.
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I think has some weight in tipping the scales
toward epiphenomenalism. We have very good
reason to "believe that "brain events themselves
have causal effects ... on mental events. . .
On the other hand, we have no experimental
evidence to show that mental events, by them¬
selves, ever affect other mental events or
brain events, and we have no reason to think
that further developments will give us such
evidence. . . And that means that perhaps it
is more reasonable to accept epiphenomenalism
12
than to believe in interactionism.
This discussion shows many of the characteristics common
to mind-body discussions. It starts with a basic dichotomy
which is taken as evident and clear. It defines the alter¬
natives in terms of the notion of matter and this in turn
through reference to science. It eventually picks one of
the classic alternatives (interaction, epiphenomenalism,
idealism, materialism, double-aspect theory, parallelism,
occasionalism, pre-established harmony). These alterna¬
tives are cleverly put forth in pictures in Richard Taylor's
1 ^
book Metaphysics. ^ The pictures bring out very clearly
that the problem is conceived in terms of relating two
given phenomena. Taylor's own discussion starts with the
same question and argues to a materialist conclusion, using
the following principle:
From the fact that a .certain state is in some
respect unusual it does not follow that it is
a state of an unusual thing, of a soul rather
than a body, but rather that if it is a state
of the body it is an unusual one, and if it
is a state of the soul it is no less unusual.
12Ibid., p. 75.
^Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 13.
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Nothing is made clearer, more comprehensible,
or less strange by postulating some new sub¬
stance as the subject of certain states not
14
familiar to the natural sciences
Such textbook presentations never touch the core of
the problem. They work within a fixed cluster of alterna¬
tives which are determined by the way the problem is posed.
We have to break down this restriction. There are not two
given categories of "mind" and "matter". The data and
experience which lead to this dichotomy can be treated in
many ways. Even if we accept the dichotomy we can give
the two categories many kinds of constitutive principles.
In Leibniz, for example, the body is not of the same
ontological status as the percipient monad; it is only
a well-founded phenomenon. This, and the doctrine of
harmony, change the alternatives offered in posing the
question. There is a sense in which Leibniz is an inter-
actionist, yet when the derived status of the body and
causality is taken into account, he is a parallelist.
But the parallel is not between two entities of the same
level. The physical is a dependent particular.
There are other ways of putting the two categories
15
on different levels. In Sellars' version of the identity
14Ibid., p. 29.
15^Por details on this see: Wilfred Sellars, Science,
Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963),
esp. p. 31; Wilfred Sellars, Science and Metaphysics:
Variations on Kantian Themes (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1968); Richard Berstein, "Sellar's Vision of Man-In-
The-Universe", parts I and II, 20 (1966), pp. 113-143 and
pp. 290-316; and Michael J. Loux, "Recent Work on Ontology",
American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1972), pp. 119-138.
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theory there is no single entity corresponding to either
the usual "mental" or the usual "physical" sides of the
standard dichotomy. There is rather a set of causal re¬
lations among a group of whatever the ultimate physical en¬
tities turn out to "be. This corresponds to my mind and
brain. There are also roles this aggregation plays in
certain types of interactions with other similar aggregations.
These roles form the basis of the "subjective" vocabulary
of morals, and the ontological vocabulary of abstract en¬
tities. The "mental" content of my "mind" is handled by
the ultimate neurophysiology, but not in terms of the con¬
cepts of today's science. The identity theory has grown
into a complicated set of conceptual replacements depending
on a different set of constitutive principles. For example,
Sellars rejects the view that introspection can be taken as
constitutive of the mental: there can be no incorrigible
first-person report which establishes the "mental" as a
sphere in its own right. This one move alone forces a
new posing of the question.
The line between the "mental" and the "physical" can
be drawn in different places. Husserl and other phenomeno-
logists would include in the "mental" subject far less than
the textbooks (or Descartes, for that matter). Many ob¬
jects ordinarily classed as "mental content" become part
of the "world" rather than of the subject. This is par¬
ticularly true in the idealistic versions of phenomenology.
In any case, given the theory of constitution, both the
"mental" and the "physical" of the textbook presentation
become dependent particulars.
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The point of this review has "been that the unitary-
phenomenon of man can he analysed in many ways. Even if
we agree that relating the "mental" and the "physical" is the
issue, differences in constitutive principles and categories
can radically affect how we pose and answer the problem o-^
understanding mind and body.
Metaphysical frameworks and Descartes' replies to objections.
As a final illustration of how frameworks illuminate
philosophical disagreement, I will consider certain details
of the mind-body problem in the discussion between Descartes
and Hobbes. In his objections to the second Meditation,
Hobbes asserts that
... all Philosophers distinguish a subject
from its faculties and activities, i.e. from
its properties and essences; for the entity
itself is one thing, its essence another.
Hence it is possible for a thing that thinks
to be the subject of the mind, reason, or
understanding, and hence to be something
corporeal; . . . ^
To this Descartes replies:
When I have said, this is the mind, the spirit,
'
the intellect, or the reason, I understand by
these names not merely faculties, but rather
17
what is endowed with the faculty of thinking; . .
... it is certain that no thought can exist
apart from a thing that thinks; no activity,
no accident can be without a substance in which
Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Des¬
cartes tran. Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, vol II





. Moreover, since we do not apprehend
the substance itself immediately through itself,
but by means only of the fact that it is the
subject of certain activities, it is highly
rational, and a requirement forced on us by
custom, to give diverse names to those sub¬
stances that we can recognize to be the sub¬
jects of clearly diverse activities or acci¬
dents, and afterwards to inquire whether those
diverse names refer to one and the same or to
1 P)
diverse things.
Descartes then goes on to argue that bodily attributes
agree in posing extension while mental attributes agree in
presupposing thought. These two fundamental attributes
have nothing in common. Hence, given the guarantees on
clear and distinct perceptions, they must belong to two
completely diverse substances.
This disagreement can be expressed as follows. Des¬
cartes and Hobbes agree on the transcategorial principles
that all entities must either be substances or inhere in
substances. They disagree on what are the constitutive
principles of a substance. They also disagree on the
metacategorial issue whether clearly distinct concepts
prove distinction of kinds of substance.
To take the last point first: Hobbes tries to weaken
Descartes' argument from distinct concepts. He argues that
ideas and images are not so far apart, so that perhaps the
concepts of thought and sensation are not so distinct.
In his final objection about the sleeping atheist, Hobbes
questions the kind of certitude Descartes seeks. In
Ibid., p. 64.
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Gassendi's objections, this point is pressed more directly
when Gassendi refuses to believe that Decartes' "doubts"
are meant seriously. Gassendi claims there is no higher
certitude to be sought, and no lack of it to occasion
doubt. This is a disagreement over metacategorial prin¬
ciples concerning the certitude of categorial principles
and the evidence they demand. Descartes demands more
evidence and different sorts of evidence from that demanded
by Gassendi or Hobbes.
Even accepting Descartes' conclusion that the concepts
of thought and extension are clearly distinct, Hobbes argues
that this has no bearing on the dualism of body and soul.
This is because he has a different conception of substance.
Hobbes defines substance as "a material, subject to acci¬
dents and changes". This is a Lockean view of substance:
the constitutive principles of substance is its ability to
be a substratum. What it is a substratum for depends on
the accidents. It is neutral, otherwise it could not be
a substratum. In contrast, the passage cited above re¬
veals that Descartes holds to an Aristotelian view of
substance. The constitutive principle of a substance is
its being an individual instance of some nature. This
nature expresses itself in accidents and activities; it is
discoverable from them. Clearly distinct activities argue
to clearly distinct natures and so to different kinds of
substance. Eor Hobbes, however, clearly distinct activi¬
ties argue only to themselves. Substance remains a neu¬
tral substrate. Thought and body can share a common sub-
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stance, with the difference in kind of accidents accounted
for, if necessary, "by making the predicates of the body
qualities of the substance and the mental predicates its
actions, as Hobbes explains in his example of leaping
and the leaper.
None of the thinkers sees clearly how they differ.
Hobbes and Gassendi use language which is for them technical
and framework-laden. "Matter" and "subject" have meanings
which are not those of ordinary usage. Descartes does
not see this, and accuses them of not departing far enough
from ordinary language. Descartes writes:
I admit also quite gladly that, in order to
designate that thing or substance, which I
wished to strip of everything that did not
belong to it, I employed the most highly
abstract terms I could; just as, on the
contrary this Philosopher ^Sobbes7 uses
terms that are as concrete as possible,
e.g. subject, matter, body, to signify that
which thinks, fearing to let it be sundered
19
from the body.
On the other side, Gassendi accuses Descartes of coming up
with nothing new or informative in this characterization of
the self as a thinking-thing. Everyone knew that all
along. He does not see that for Descartes "thinking" and
"thing" (or substance) are involved as framework terms
(in categorial principles). They are no longer simply
descriptive.
It is revealing that both Descartes and Hobbes do
not question the principle that the self is to be classed
^Ibid., p. 63.
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as a substance. Despite all their differences, it is the
similarities between them which show up when we look at
both from the point of view of certain later frameworks.
Both earlier philosphers still use the notion of a "thing"-
with a "nature" and "activities" as a transcategorial
characterization of an entity. It is just this that the
nineteenth century philosophers attempt to eliminate in
favour of the pure activity of the self-reflection con¬
stitution of the Spirit. Such a construction of a new
highest genus and new transcategorial principles makes the
older views seem more brothers than enemies. They are
seen to share a deep presupposition to which there are al¬
ternatives. Attaining such insight is one sense in which
philosophy can be said to advance.
In the last pages I have been trying to illustrate
framework differences. After these examples it should be
clearer how we are presented with a multiplicity of frame¬
works when we begin to think about a problem such as the
mind-body issue. Various frameworks give us different
ways of stating the problem. Even within a cluster of
frameworks with broad agreement on some principles, there
20
are still many possibilities.
Metaphysical frameworks relate to data which is presented to
them.
I have pointed out that we possess many local frameworks
which do not always have clear-cut limits and relations with
20
On the issue of metaphysical pluralism, ¥. Allen,
op cit., p. 29, does not summarize my discussion when he
writes: "We can say that the universe consists of a substance,
and this substance we will call "atoms", or else we will call
it "monads". Democritus called it atoms. Leibniz called it
monads. Fortunately, the two men never met, or there would
have been a very dull argument."
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each other. They can all jostle for priority. We find
ourselves with conflicting beliefs about how to relate them.
Besides our local frameworks we may have a more or less ar¬
ticulated total view created by the adjustment of our local
frameworks or handed to us by our culture and history. By
various routes, we can come to want a total view or to see
our present one as located among various possibilities. We
thus arrive at the task of self-consciously reconstructing
a total framework.
I have taken a closer look at what principles such
self-conscious frameworks contain, especially transcategorial
principles, valid for any entity as such. These provide
vocabulary and rules which go beyond any local principles.
The other parts of a framework mediate and articulate this
unity.
Frameworks are not free imaginative constructions.
They are not empty rules for games no one plays; they are
meant to apply to our world. Let us call whatever things
a framework orders and interrelates its "data". By their
nature, metaphysical frameworks have an unlimited field of
data. They must relate to literally everything: to facts
about the world, ordinary language, religion, science, art,
thoughts, emotions, objects, experiences, actions, as well
as to philosophical results like explicit local frameworks,
distinctions, rules, presuppositions, necessary connections.
We cannot ignore such data, or wish them away. Accounting
for data is what frameworks are for. The data provide
criteria and form the common base which allows conflicting
frameworks to conflict.
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A difficulty arises at this point. Metaphysical
frameworks give us principles for speaking about all entities.
Any attempt to assemble data will involve language about en¬
tities. We will want to speak about thoughts, actions,
electrons, angles ... as entities. But there seems to
be no neutral language; however we talk, we will be using
some framework. Hence, if frameworks legislate what are
allowable entities, each framework will become the master
of its own closed circle. All data within the circle
will support the framework because no other was allowed to
enter. Frameworks will absorb their data. This threatens
us with all the problems raised by Paul Feyerabend concerning
scientific theories: There is no neutral observation
language; no terms have the same meaning in conflicting
theories; each theory has its own objects, world, and con¬
firmatory experiences; so choices between them become ar-
?1
bitrary or matters of taste. This objection forces us to
be more precise about what is and is not neutral among
frameworks, and what powers frameworks have over their data.
We must distinguish between a datum referred to as it
is, and a datum presented as a datum. The colour of the
ink on this page is a potential datum for the study of
human vision. But it does not become presented to us as
a datum until we ask questions such as "Why isn't the ink
a pale yellow?" Data give information about which of
several possible alternatives has actually been realized.
Paul Feyerabend, "Consolations For the Specialist"
in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge ed. Imre Lakatos
and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge University Press, 1977),
pp. 197-230.
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("Which is the most- powerful underground, movement in Brazil?"
"We have no data on that".) The colour of the ink; on the
page can tell us which of many ranges of frequencies the
human eye actually distinguishes. When we speak of "data
for a framework" we must make the same distinction. Thoughts,
Einstein's formulae, angels, and the distinction between
"ought" and "is" are all data for metaphysics, but merely
referring to them does not present them as data.
Frameworks deal with kinds of entity. Their principles
give rules relating various kinds of discourse. The indi¬
vidual emotion, angel, or material object is significant
because it reveals something about its general type. (The
notion of an "individual" is a striking example: we are
interested in irreduciable individuality as a general type
of entity). Thus framework data involve types of entity
andwhole levels of discourse.
The first requirement for turning potential into actual
data is seeing some kind of entity or discourse as a_ whole.
We need a perspective on material objects, or angels, that
tells us what is significant about them. Putting this in
the formal mode: we need rules for material object talk
which let us see it as a set of sentences generated by a
finite set of categories and procedures. When we find a
local framework for material object talk we are able to see
it as a distinct whole with significant features.
The second requirement is seeing our potential data _as
_a limited whole. It is one thing to discover the framework
of material object talk. It is quite another to claim that
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material object principles provide a total framework for
all entities. I spoke earlier of the colour of ink becom¬
ing a datum when we asked the right questions. If we want
to turn local principles into data for metaphysics, we ask
"Are these the categories and principles for any entity as
such, or only for a local area?" "Do these rules include
strict transcategorial principles or not?" Asking these
questions involves entertaining the possibility that the
principles for "being" will be wider than those under con¬
sideration. This means that the local principles are con¬
ceived of as local, as part of a larger whole.
The third requirement for presenting framework data
as data involves seeing the limited areas as related to
other areas. Even if we agree on the analysis of mentalis-
tic talk, we may differ over how to relate it to scientific
talk about brains. Presenting mentalistic talk as data
involves admitting the possibility that its relation to
other areas might be different than some view suggests.
And to do this we must be able to talk about the rules and
principles of local areas in a language rich enough to dis¬
cuss different possible total orderings.
Metaphysical frameworks as used to reinterpret as well as
relate data.
The last pages concerned how data became relevant to
frameworks; I now turn to the influence frameworks have
over their data.
We can move from concrete talk about intending to go
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to the store, through analyses of intending and actions,
to relating the common sense local framework to that of
science by means of some overall metaphysics. What is
crucial is that we have no rigid rules about how to do this.
There are few clear-cut areas of discourse which distinguish
themselves from others. To see an area of experience or
language as a limited whole, we must make judgments about
its extent, its rules and necessary connections, about what
is important and what is not, what is form and what is
matter. For instance, is the existence of a "mind" part
of the matter reported on in mentalistic discourse, or only
a form for reporting on behaviour? There are no rules
for settling this. Philosophers have developed various
methods, but there are no rules about which method to use
and where to apply it.
This forces us to ask whether there are unique local
frameworks for each area, or whether different methods might
come up with different results. The answer varies. Even
without discussing the efficacy of various rival methods,
we can see certain problems. Well-defined activities like
Newtonian science or giving promises can have clearly statable
rules and principles behind them. Most of our talk cannot
be so neatly described; we have to delimit the areas before
we can study them. It is not surprising that results differ.
With areas like religion or philosophy we have a dif¬
ferent problem. Although we may be able to distinguish
religious practice, our analyses give us not local frameworks
but agents' self-interpretations in terms of shared meanings
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and goals. We get no ontology from "religion" (although, a
given way of being religious may involve holding a certain
ontology).
Thus we have a curious situation. The data remain.
People go on being religious, weighing oranges, giving
promises. The world goes on its way. Our framework
analyses do not hide or remove the data. Yet we have no
straightforward access to it as data. When we organize
and analyze it for philosophical purposes, we make judgments
and selections that follow no fixed rules. Similarly,
while we can bring data to bear for or against a framework,
we cannot neatly separate a framework into data plus inter¬
pretation.
We have similar problems when we interrelate various
areas. There are no evident rules about how to relate
science and common sense. We do have feelings and judgments
aboutvfaat is natural and important. We may well have un-
reflective total views at work. At times the various levels
themselves will contain directions on how to relate them, but
these often conflict. We are heir to the results of his¬
torical dialogue on these matters, a dialogue that both
helps and confuses. There are so many possible priorities.
In spite of this lack of rules, we cannot be merely ar¬
bitrary. I have no right to produce an analysis of reli¬
gious language that does violence to the internal criteria of
the area. I may suggest new internal criteria, but they
will be judged by the action of religious people; I have
no legislative power. Religious language is what it is
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independent of my analyses. Even if my analyses enter into
the self-understanding of religious people and change reli¬
gious practice, a new analysis will he necessary. The second
analysis will he again distinct from its object. The data
are just there; I cannot revise their internal structure.
And yet this still leaves us quite flexible. Though
I cannot arbitrarily revise the internal structure of re¬
ligious language, I can relate or reduce or translate reli¬
gious language as a whole into some language I think more
fundamental. Eor example, I might reinterpret religious
language in the terms of some psychological or sociological
theory. In a similar fashion, thematerialist will find a
way of translating talk about minds into some scientific
language which does without the entities he denies. These
moves give us the possibility of criticizing the objects of
a given area of language in a manner resembling the Marxist
critique of classical political economy for reifying as
"things" or "forces" what are properly described as rela¬
tions or as the results of complex economic and social
interactions. It is true that the metaphysician has the
obligation to deal with the objects of all the areas of
language, but one way he can deal with them is to offer a
set of translation rules which show that a particular area's
objects are to be understsood as functions of the objects
of another area. Even the rare optimum case of a clearly
defined and agreed on local framework does not settle the
question which languages are fundamental.
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In this process of investigating data and "building
frameworks, no datum is privileged. I cannot wish any
datum away, nor can I take any analysis or datum as defini¬
tive of the total view. However I react to the data, I
can always go too far. My translation of religious langu¬
age or my treatment of material objects may be Just too
much. Or I may push my enthusiasm for science too far.
There are no rules here, either, but when we sense someone
has gone too far, we seek to prove it by finding reason
in the data. The best philosophers are gifted with the
sensitivity to feel such violations and the ability to
show where the transgression occurs.
These are all matters of Judgment in both of Kant's
senses. We seek the appropriate general categories for
the data, and we also seek in the data details that prove
22
or disprove suggested general principles. If we forget
that framework reconstruction is a historical process that
requires Judgment, we will have trouble understanding the
relation of frameworks to data. It is easy to imagine
an atemporal confrontation between data and frameworks,
or an atemporal legislation of data by frameworks. Neither
of these pictures is true, because the process is temporal,
sequential, and reflective. It involves Judgment and mu¬
tual interactions. We begin philosophizing with unreflec-
tive frameworks of varying complexity. We work step by
step at clarifying the data and constructing the frameworks.
Neither is sacred; interpretation is, in part, creation.
Aristotle might reinterpret a student's research report in
22
Immanuel Kant, Kant's Critique of Judgment tran.
J. H. Bernard (London: Macmillian and Co., Ltd., 1931)? see
Introduction, part IY, pp. 17-20.
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oysters to accord with his doctrine of the four causes.
Here he uses framework principles as rules. Or, after
long reflection on mathematics, he might decide that Plato
was right after all, and revise his principles about secon¬
dary substances. Here, framework principles seem like
generalizations. This double aspect, this vacillating
authority, may seem strange but it is actually quite common.
Most of our practical rules are like this. They are not
generalizations to be upset by the first discrepancy, but
neither are they absolute rules which will be enforced
at all costs. Again, it is a matter of judgment, and
there are not fixed rules.
Frameworks are 'ultimate' in several senses of the word.
With the relation of frameworks and their data in mind
we can go on to discuss in what sense metaphysical frame¬
works are ultimate. There are at least four ways in which
they are ultimate. The weakest is simply that they are
the most general categories we can use. With frameworks
we are dealing with "entity as such" and with highest
genera of being.
The second and stronger sense arises because frame¬
works are more than generalizations. Within limits they
have the power to reinterpret their data. We have seen the
complex relations frameworks bear to their data, with con¬
siderable room for judgment and varying options. Much
recent discussion in philosophy of science centres on the
degree to which large scale scientific theories have a
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similar relation to their data. What distinguishes meta¬
physical frameworks is that they have this freedom with
their data combined with extreme generality.
The third sense of ultimacy follows from the first
two. Metaphysical frameworks are our most general rules
for conceptual thinking. There is no Super-Framework in
which they are embedded. They are not reinterpreted in
accord with still higher rules. It is this feature which
makes pluralism such a problem. Framework reconstruction
is not an arbitrary activity but yet it does not proceed
by following anything like a larger-scale framework. What¬
ever criteria there are, they do not relate to frameworks
in the same manner as these relate to their data.
The fourth and most important sense of ultimacy follows
from the third. Because of its contents a metaphysical
framework cannot be conditioned by a larger conceptual
framework. If this is true, then it is impossible to
discuss the plurality of frameworks and disputes between
them without taking sides in these disputes. These frame¬
works are ultimate because there is no possible neutral
conceptual meta-standpoint on framework disputes. And
this statement must be clearly understood. From the stand¬
point of science it would be possible to do a psychology
t
or biology of each dispute without commixing ourselves to
one side or the other. If we are only talking about the
occurrence of the disputes, or about their content as a
fact to be explained, then we can talk neutrally. But as
soon as we deal with the content as content there is no
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neutrality possible. That is, any description of a frame¬
work dispute which moves away from a verbal report and tries
to categorize or describe the dispute in philosophically
useful terms may soon introduce descriptive predicates which
will not be acceptable to both parties. Neutral verbal
reports are achieved by mentioning, not using, the term of
the dispute. Any attempt to use the terms or arbitrate
between the parties from a neutral point of viewwill have
its neutrality open to attack.
It is this feature above all others which distinguishes
the types of frameworks we are considering from those dis¬
cussed in the philosophy of science. While a scientific
theory can reformulate its data to some extent, it is not
ultimate in regard to conceptual thinking: a neutral des¬
cription of scientific disputes seems possible, because
scientific theories can be embedded in more general or more
formal conceptual structures which are neutral between rival
scientific theories. In cases of framework dispute such
as we are considering, there may not even be concensus on
what the elements under dispute are. George may feel
that his ontology includes Edward's, whereas Edward finds
certain of George's assertions impossible, false, or just
unintelligible, so he denies the possibility of the inclu¬
sion. Because a metaphysical framework sets conditions of
reality and possibility, it also gives a specific viewpoint
on the multiplicity of other "possible" frameworks. It
excludes some frameworks from serious consideration, brands
others as unintelligible, explains the errors of others,
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and relates itself in a friendly way to still others. It
is not that frameworks disagree on the ordering they give
to members of the plurality; they can also disagree on
which members there are.
Similarly there can be no successful attempt to attain
a neutral standpoint and resolve the issue in a non-trivial
dispute from a neutral vantage point. This follows from
the inability to get a neutral description of the dispute
and the questionable status of any supposedly neutral
principles. I am arguing that there is no non-trivial
neutral meta-philosophy which does more than report.
Attempts to achieve neutrality and still do philosophy
tend to shatter into two parts. One attains neutrality
by staying reportorial; the other resolves the issues.
2-5
The "linguistic turn"^ can achieve neutrality only by be¬
coming a descriptive science, a linguistics of philoso¬
phical disputes. Reporting the dispute solves no issues
and cannot even decide whether the issues are resolvable.
To take a stand, we must introduce principles beyond pure
reportage. Such principles will not be framework-neutral
nor supported from somewhere out of the reach of framework-
interpretation. They thus cannot be both unquestionable,
agreed on by all frameworks, and still able to resolve any
issues.
Furthermore, the very attempt to isolate a neutral
standpoint from which to discuss frameworks depends on
prior judgments that such a detached standpoint is possible
and that it must be used to resolve framework disputes.
^Richard Rorty, "Metaphysical Difficulties in
Linguistic Philosophy" in The Linguistic Turn ed. Richard
Rorty (University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 1-39-
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This involves denying quite a few principles, whether rationa¬
list or empiricist, concerning the nature of intelligibility.
The method which is supposed to achieve neutral arbitration
actually has hidden allegiances within the various frame¬
works. There would be no problem except that the method
pretends to be impartial. The number of candidates for the
position of neutral meta-standpoint indicates there is some¬
thing amiss with this quest. Otherwise we are forced into
an ascending hierarchy of quests, but what neutral method
decides among rival candidates for the role of neutral
method of deciding? It is true that some frameworks have
among their metacategorial principles the claim to have
achieved a neutral point of view. To the extent that they
make such a claim, this study disagrees with them. Thus
our very discussion exemplifies our conclusion that there is
no neutral standpoint: we are describing framework disputes,
and we find the terms of our description themselves work
for some frameworks and against others, at least on meta¬
categorial issues, and perhaps on others as well. The
possible circle involved in this process will be discussed
later. For now I need only note the consequence of making
the point support its content.
There are, then, at least four senses in which metaphy¬
sical frameworks are ultimate. (1) They are the most general
conceptual structure we have. (2) They can reformulate their
data. (3) They are not embedded in any higher conceptual
structure of rules. And (4) there is no possible neutral
conceptual meta-standpoint on their disputes. The last two
senses are what complicate the problem of pluralism.
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And yet metaphysical frameworks do exist within a larger context.
The problem of pluralism can be reconciled. To say
that frameworks are ultimate in the above four senses is not
to say that they exist in no larger context. True, they
exist in no larger conceptual context of rules. Still,
framework reconstruction remains something we do.' It exists
in a context of practice, activity, and purposes. Our very
awareness of the plurality of frameworks shows that frame¬
works do not encompass us absolutely. They may be about
everything, but they are not everything.
While they remain the ultimate structuring of our con¬
ceptual systems, frameworks can be reflected on in a variety
of ways. They contain self-reflective metacategorial prin¬
ciples. They can be described, although there are difficul¬
ties with the idea of a neutral description. We can have a
psychology, a sociology, a biology of framework-thoughts.
This is not to say that framework disputes can be resolved
sociologically. Still, holding frameworks is an activity
with causes and conditions. "To be an ultimate structure"
does not equal "to have no context". What will concern us
later will be the teleological and purposive context of
frameworks more than their scientific and causal conditions.
Another important qualification on the ultimacy of meta¬
physical frameworks is that there are other ultimate struc¬
tures in other spheres. Metaphysics is our ultimate con¬
ceptual structures, but there are other mental activities
besides conceptualization. We can have large scale moral
and value structures, ultimate mythic or religious symbol
systems, highest scientific theories, and perhaps something
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like ultimate political or practical judgments on means-
ends. These various ultimate structures are linked "be¬
cause each can serve as data for the other.
The important point for my purposes here is the
difference between self-reflection within such ultimate
structures, and the relation by which one ultimate struc¬
ture is used as data for another. For example, when in
the biological sciences the theory of evolution is proposed
it may be criticized (not on scientific but) on religious
grounds. It is a religious judgment, then, about the
religious neutrality or the religiously critical status
of this scientific theory. Although it is one thing to
achieve a religious self-understanding and symbolization
of religious practice, and another thing to do philosophy
of religion, these areas of discourse and meta-discourse do
relate; they are not autonomous. Another example is seen
when a behaviourist psychology interprets religion, and
experimental methods in behaviourist psychology are criti¬
cized from a moral base. If in the former we reinterpret
the arguments and judgments of the latter, we get into a
meta-scientific position. But even here, as before, we
have partly scientific, partly moral views. These rela¬
tions can exfoliate endlessly. Here, however, I am not
concerned with other ultimate structures but with the
general context of activity supporting them and metaphysical
framework reconstruction. If the problem of pluralism is
less urgent in science than in metaphysics, it is more ur¬
gent in ethics and in religion. It is most urgent when we
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consider cultural and institutional frameworks. Although
the answer to pluralism need not he the same in all areas,
discussion of one area may indeed shed light on the others.
That, at least, would he a benefit of this study.
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Chapter Three
LIMITS AM) LEGITIMACY OF FRAMEWORKS
The relation between framework -principles and ordinary
language is not simply logical.
Consider a simple declarative proposition. . If I say
to you, "George is an old-fashioned Catholic," I give you
"both information and rules. I enable you to place George
in some classification of religious practices. He is an
old-fashioned Catholic and not old-fashioned Baptist or
Jew. Depending on the depth of your knowledge you can
infer other facts about George. He probably goes to Mass
every Sunday, says the rosary, would defend such and such
beliefs and attack such and such others. You might even
make guesses about his probable ethnic background and poli¬
tical views. You are able to draw these inferences because
I have placed George in a category which has connections
with various propositions and activities. Much of what
you know about George could be put in the form of hypo¬
thetical statements. "If I observe George on Sunday he
will be seen going to church". "If I argue with George
about papal infallibility he will take an affirmative
position and may get angry". In this sense the infor¬
mation I gave you provides rules for how to deal with
George and what to expect when you do. It gives you some
of George's contours, and you can use this knowledge to fit
in with the shape of his life as you might learn your way
around a house you visit.
The meanings of both "George" and "old-fashioned
Catholic" depend on what they contrast with. I am speaking
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of George, not of Tom or Harry. He is an old-fashioned
Catholic, not a Muslim. These contrasts depend in turn on
further information. Muslims are an uncommon sect; without
"background we would learn little from a contrast "between old-
fashioned Catholic and Muslim.
Besides such "background, the very activity of classi¬
fying George's religion presupposes that George is obser¬
vable, that it is the same George who goes to church each
Sunday, that George is honest in avowing his beliefs,
that the content of "old-fashioned Catholic" and similar
predicates does not change from day to day. These are the
sort of presuppositions that Wittgenstein is fond of point¬
ing out.
How are framework principles related to "George is an
old-fashioned Catholic", its associated background, and
presuppositions like "George is the same from Sunday to
Sunday"? Do framework principles occur among the logical
consequences of "George is an old-fashioned Catholic"? We
might think that the proposition implies "George is the
same from Sunday to Sunday" which then implies "George is
a substance". But this will not work. Consider the
principle linking "substance" to "endurance through time".
In its most general form ("If anything is a substance, it
can endure through time"), the principle cannot be inferred
from "George is the same from Sunday to Sunday", for this
would be an illicit move from particular to universal.
In its particular form ("If George is a substance, he can
endure through time"), the principle can be inferred only
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"by the addition of its general form. Similar arguments
will show that no other framework principles can "be conse¬
quences of ordinary propositions.
Are framework principles then premisses for ordinary
propositions? from the principles "If anything is a sub¬
stance, it can endure through time" I can derive '"If George
is a substance, he can endure through time". Given "George
is a substance" I can then conclude "George can endure
through time". But unless I want to claim that all sub¬
stances necessarily endure, which causes other difficulties
when applied to George, I cannot move from "George can en¬
dure through time" to "George is the same from day to day".
The framework principles are not sufficient; we must add
premisses to prove that George is actually the same each
day. These premisses will rely on ordinary criteria of
sameness: "I saw George each day last month and he looked
the same to me" or "The man in question attends church each
week with George's wife" or "I spoke to George and he remem¬
bered coming last week". Together with the framework prin¬
ciples, these do allow us to infer "George is the same from
day to day". But, without any framework principles at all,
they still allow us to infer George's sameness. Framework
principles are not necessary to obtain the ordinary proposi¬
tions. Since they are neither necessary nor sufficient,
they do not function as premisses.
I might try to avoid this conclusion by saying that
the substances in question are particles which do not
necessarily endure. I can then use my framework principles
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as premisses for concluding that various particles are in
fact the same from day to day. But I have not yet pro¬
vided a way of identifying those particles, and I still
have no way to conclude anything ahout George. Perhaps
those particles now compose a tiger, or remain forming
the body of a brainwashed human we would no longer iden¬
tify as George. There is no escape from ordinary criteria.
There is another possible relation: perhaps framework
principles are presupposed by "George is an old-fashioned
Catholic" and "George is the same from Sunday to Sunday".
This interpretation is provided by Strawson in his Intro¬
duction to Logical Theory. Statement A presupposes B if
-i
A is neither true nor false unless B is true. Thus
"The King of France is bald" is said to presuppose "There
exists a King of France". On this account, "George is an
old-fashioned Catholic" is neither true nor false unless
"George exists" is true. It may also seem right that
"George is an old-fashioned Catholic" is neither true nor
false unless "George is a substance" is also true. But
there are several problems with this suggestion. If I am
a Spinozist, I will substitute a different presupposition,
perhaps "George is a finite mode of infinite substance".
This is not an alternative for "George is a substance" in
the way that "George is really alive" might be an alternative
presupposition for "George exists". But how can we have
two alternative but incompatible presuppositions? The role
of "George is a substance" seems more complex than Straw-
sonian presupposition.
P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory
(London: Methune and Co., 1952), p. 1
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Secondly, "substance" is a technical word. If I
question speakers in order to elicit presuppositions behind
"George is an old-fashioned Catholic" I have to ask tech¬
nical questions to get an answer about substance. That is,
I have to offer a classification scheme which the speaker
has not used (for example, I might explain the Aristotelian
categories). Then I can ask the speaker where George fits
in my scheme. It seems, then, that "George is a substance"
is presupposed only if the general principles establishing
a certain categorial scheme have already been accepted.
This conditional relation does not fit the Strawsonian use
of presupposition.
Finally, once the speaker has my categories in mind, he
will try to classify George by referring to my criteria for
substance. To do this, he will return to ordinary facts
about George, stable without framework language. Using
these he will try and decide if George is independent and
enduring enough to meet my definition of a substance.
Although it would take lengthy consideration of examples to
clarify it, I think these ordinary facts turn out to be
presupposed anyway, even without the detour through "George
is a substance". It is therefore not clear what is added
by presupposing "George is a substance".
And yet it remains true that something like "George is
a substance" is indeed presupposed. Consider "George is
an individual", where "individual" is taken in an ordinary
sense: to say George is an individual means that he has a
recognizable history, that he is not different men each day
wearing George-masks, that he is not under the total control
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of someone else. There are no framework categories used
in these criteria (and paralleled arguments would show that
they do not themselves presuppose framework-principles).
The whole chain of presuppositions stays within the circle
of ordinary language. In some sense, "George is an indi¬
vidual" is presupposed hy "George is an old-fashioned
Catholic". But not in the Strawsonian sense. "The King
of France is "bald" is meaningful, hut neither true nor
false, if there is no King of France. On the other hand,
if George isn't an individual, what does "George is an old-
fashioned Catholic" mean? We are tempted to say that the
statement is ill-founded, or a category-mistake. (Note too
that any interpretation that gives it meaning also gives
it a truth value: "George is not an individual, hut a role
played hy several spies" lets us determine that it is or
is not part of the role for "George" to he an old-fashioned
Catholic).
That the subject of propositions like "George is an
old-fashioned Catholic" has to he what we ordinarily call
an "individual" seems to he a local principle with con¬
siderable necessity behind it. If we disobey it, we just
do not make a statement. There is no way to reject it and
still say "George is an old-fashioned Catholic". (Just as
we cannot reject the Queen's move and still play chess).
On the other hand, that the subject of statements like "George
is an old-fashioned Catholic" has to he what we technically
call a "substance" seems to have only a dependent necessity.
Spinozists will embrace a different principle. The various
technical principles are interpretations of the ordinary
124.
notion of individuality. My point is that the ordinary
notion must he presupposed, hut no metaphysical one need
he. Metaphysical principles have other purposes than
guaranteeing ordinary statements which already have their
own criteria and presuppositions.
The metaphysician may still contend that you cannot
really say "George is an old fashioned Catholic" without
presupposing that George is a substance. Paced with the
ordinary person who has never heard of substances, the
metaphysician would reply that the ordinary man does pre¬
suppose that George is an individual with such and such
qualities, which are only possible because George is a
substance. Then we introduce our Spinozist, who has a
different interpretation of individuality. The two meta¬
physicians begin to argue about what the ordinary man really
presupposes. Meanwhile, the ordinary man goes on pre¬
supposing that George is an individual. He has no need
to wait for the outcome of the argument, since that debate
only affects the interpretation of what he is doing. He
doesn't need to use or affirm any framework principle in
order to talk about George, though a framework principle
may be used to interpret what goes on when he does so.
Thus we have to distinguish local and total frameworks.
A local framework may require that we presuppose "George is
an individual". Total frameworks stand at one remove.
Instead of a relation between a principle and a proposition,
we have the complex interpretative relation of framework to
data. There is no simple two-place relation like "premiss"
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or "consequence" or "presupposition". There are too many
statements on too many syntatic levels involved, as well as
translation rules, and modal operators. Galling metaphy¬
sical principles "rules" or "interpretations" is less mis¬
leading concerning their complicated relationship than
calling them Strawsonian "presuppositions", "but such terms
give us little detailed descriptions of the relation.
Framework-principles function like rules and introduce an
appearance/reality distinction.
There is a distinct move from local to total frameworks.
Newtonian science can "be seen to illustrate this. By adopt¬
ing certain laboratory procedures, using certain equations,
and accepting certain arguments patterns, I can find that I
am committed to universal scientific determinism and a par¬
ticular view of secondary qualities. There is no reflec¬
tive construction involved, only a kind of explication.
When thinkers realized that Newtonian science demanded
these principles, the item available for interpretation be¬
came science-plus-these-principles. If, like Kant and
Leibniz, they sought a different metaphysics, they found
ways to interpret the scientific principles as only local.
If they wished to make the scientific principles into a
universal framework, thqy did so. The conversion of such
principles into a metaphysics involves the introduction of
"transcategorial principles". While Newtonian science
presupposes that all its objects are causally determined,
this of itself does not say that all entities are so deter-
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mined, unless we add the principle "all entities are avail¬
able to scientific investigation".
The motives for this move to a metaphysical framework
will he examined below. Our concern now is the structure
of the move. Ve introduce the new concept "an entity as
such" (or "being as such"). With this notion we can seek
statements true of any type of entity.
This search lets us ask of local principles: "Are
these the principles for any entity as such?" Once we
have our transcategorial principles, we can interrelate
various local frameworks. We may just treat them as
specifications of the more general principles. More fre¬
quently, we find that they need some interpretation to make
them fit. We can arrange this when we present the local
area as data, or when we interrelate various areas.
Consider, for instance, the identity theory of mind
which expresses a relationship of reduction for two local
areas. This theory is a version of materialism, claiming
that mentalistic and physicalistic expressions differ in
significance or connotation but, upon inspection, will turn
out as a matter of empirical fact to refer to or denote
one and the same thing, namely physical phenomena. There
is a de facto, not a logical, identity here; it is claimed
to be an empirical discovery that water is H^O, or that
lightning is a particular sort' of electrical discharge.
When Hobbes stated that the feeling of pleasure was really
only motion about the heart, he did not make an analytic
claim about the synonymy of meanings here; rather, he asser-
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ted the synthetic hypothesis that the referent of "a feel¬
ing of pleasure" will turn out to he a motion about the
heart. To further illustrate this let us examine the
assertion that I have in mind finishing this paper.
An identity theorist might criticize me, saying "I
understand what you mean, that you intend to finish, not
let things drag on, or run off to America. But you say
this the wrong way. The 'mind' is not a receptacle or
a grasping hand. It cannot 'have something in it'.
Besides, you quantify over 'minds', which are mythical
entities. In terms of my (i.e. the identity theorists)
framework principles you ought to say something like 'My
"brain contains the following configurations . . . which in¬
volves the following dispositions . . . '"
Working from materialistic principles, the identity
theorist has concluded that mentalistic language uses
categories and principles that wrongly describe what is.
His concern is not my single statement about finishing
this paper, but aWiole kind of language. He has rules
for translating any proposition of that kind. He may or
may not say that his translation could replace ordinary
mentalistic talk for ordinary purposes, but he will insist
that for framework purposes his interpretation is correct.
If he argues for this, he must first defend his frame¬
work principles, then use them for a modal argument. The
structure of the argument might be the following: From his
principle he derives the modal proposition "Impossible (p.)"
where "jd" is some mentalistic statement-form. Or perhaps
he concludes that my "p_" is ill-formed, the result of a
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category-mistake. Using his translation rules, he intro¬
duces a proposition "jd ' " which is supposed to he the correct
version of my proposition "jd". The value of his modal
derivation comes from his ability to use the sameprinciples
and rules to draw other conclusions about a wide range of
subject matters. Recall the earlier discussion of George's
sameness from day to day. Metaphysicians are not interes¬
ted in proving whether George in fact endures through time,
but in accounting for the possibility that he can, and doing
so in a way that lets them draw many other conclusions as
well. In the case of George, there may be no translation
necessary but there is still a modal conclusion.
We can see 1his modal character of framework principles
in another example. A present-day Aristotelian might
assert "There are substance^ and if anything is a substance
it has a nature which expresses itself, is an ultimate sub¬
ject, and endures through accidental changes". What does
this tell us? It can be put two ways. If we emphasize
"There are substances" we contrast with other possible meta¬
physics, such as "There are monads" or "There are actual
entities" or "There are prehensions". The statement "There
are substances" then tells us which rules are the "correct"
ones to use. Ultimate logical subjects are to be talked
of in the vocabulary of substances and their qualities, not
in that of concrescing actual entities, or windowless monads.
We can also emphasize "There are substances", which con¬
trasts with "Substances are logical constructs" or "Sub¬
stances are ideas". This again tells us how to talk: sub-
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stance language is not reducible to other kinds of talk.
Substance-explanations need not be further explained.
We sometimes treat frameworks as applying to a range
of propositions that have already been reinterpreted to
accord with the framework principles. This gives the
framework the look of a set of axioms and definitions for
a modal logic. Seen this way, the plurality of frameworks
resembles alternative axiom systems with their sets of
theorems. Everything is neat and sharply defined; we can
relate the systems in many precise ways. Under this view
constructing frameworks looks like an isolated activity
which produces a series of closed systems.
A fuller picture emerges when we take frameworks as
applying to all propositions, ontologically correct or not.
Then frameworks begin to look like rules for reinterpreta-
tion, with more a deontic than an alethic modality. We
no longer have a simple deduction; instead we have a com¬
plicated activity where propositions are seen in their
original context, then presented as data, reformulated if
need be, and given a modal status in relation to the prin¬
ciple. This exposes the ragged edges of what can seem a
smooth process. There is room for judgment. A given inter¬
pretation might fit beautifully with the principles yet be
wildly out of touch with its original context.
This complicated process takes ordinary propositions
and considers them in the modal context of framework prin¬
ciples even though that modal context is not used in their
original function. The result is a kind of "appearance/
reality" distinction. This is not, however, the distinc-
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tion of "appearance" and "reality" as it might appear
within a framework such as Bradley's or Plato's, although
some distinction of this sort appears in almost all frame¬
works. What I am referring to is the distinguishing and
reinterpreting that occurs in the use of frameworks. This
provides a "basis for drawing an explicit appearance/reality
distinction within frameworks. Which particular' experiences
are real and which are unreal is not entailed by the frame¬
work, but the framework does provide the context in which
we distinguish what may be called "real". I am not speak¬
ing of the usual appearance/reality distinction within or¬
dinary language. This concerns the difference between true
and false diamonds, or bent sticks in and out of water.
You can measure a table with the metre stick that appears
bent in the water, but you cannot measure with its fractured
cousin. Constructing a framework involves a different dis¬
tinction. "I see what you mean but you can't put it that
way". "Now I see why it is really correct to say it in
terms of substances". The practical use of the original
statement is not denied. You cannot secure a loan with a
fake diamond, but you can convey information, make commands,
or perform a wedding with formulations deemed ontologically
incorrect. To the identity theorist, my statement about
having in mind finishing this paper gives only an appearance
of the way things really are, even though the statement is
appropriate and successful in its context (i.e. it rightly
informs my supervisor of my intentions). Parmenides is
the archetypal thinker who accepts ordinary talk as prac¬
tically useful but refuses to say it describe what really is.
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Plato's reaction to Parmenid.es is the archetypal metaphy¬
sical reaction: he does not deny the search for the ways
things really are, hut he finds more adequate principles.
It is often said that metaphysics consists par excel¬
lence in the introduction of new and strange entities.
This need not he the case, butwhatever entities a' framework
asserts, the prime activity of the metaphysician hecomes
interpretation (and, if necessary, reinterpretation) of data.
The entities, new or old, furnish only his means. Reinter¬
pretation accomplishes his goals. It is these goals I will
now examine.
The metaphysician uses framework-principles for unification,
self-criticism, and for dealing with the demands of time.
The metaphysician's goals will show us the context of
activity which provides his criteria. His framework has a
point; it is not just an "idling of language". We can
also find out from the goals whether framework construction
is a necessary activity.
The position can he phrased in a Kantian way. Local
frameworks are matters of the understanding — the faculty
of thinking the objects of sense experience. Metaphysical
frameworks, however, come from the faculty of reason —
where thinking transcends the conditions of possible ex¬
perience. Knowledge found or made by the understanding in
the area of local frameworks is useful in various and prac¬
tical ways. Reason, however, is concerned with principles,
not rules; it seeks to unify the rules of the understanding
2
under principles. Is there any use for this activity, we
2
See W. H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics
(Edinburgh University Press, 1975)? pp. 171 and 241-242.
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may ask? Are there any "ends to reason" that it serves?
I have argued that metaphysical frameworks are not ab¬
solute grounds or starting-points. They presuppose things-
to-he-unified-and-interpreted. I am now inquiring about
the purpose they serve. As articulated total views, they
attempt to remove disunity and conflict about reality,
possibility, and importance. When we work at reconstruc¬
tion they provide room for self-criticism, and help us deal
with novelty and change. They do these things by making
the appearance/reality distinction mentioned earlier, and
by trying to say what really is. Thqypromise us truth;
they give us at least unity.
The prime function of a metaphysics is to unify its
data. When we find our experience or formulations leading
to a conflict about what is real, what is possible, or what
is important, we can try to construct a framework which
will give us a unified scheme of principles for settling
such disputes. For example, we may be scientific realists.
As a result we may find ourselves torn various ways about
how to describe the reality of mental acts, or persons, or
freedom. The conflict is not an idle one. It has impact
on our attitudes and self-image, perhaps on our laws and
institutions as well. For example, it might influence the
techniques of behavioural modification that are made legal.
There are many resolutions of this particular conflict.
They all involve some use of framework principles to justi¬
fy eliminating one of the contending descriptions, harmoniz¬
ing them, hierarchizing them, or reinterpreting them.
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Conflict may "be over possibility. We have certain
religious beliefs, or have had certain peculiar experiences,
and wonder if they can be taken literally. Is it possible
that there be a life after death, a provident God, a mystical
One, telepathy, dreams about the future? Questions about
possibility are usually answered by referring to 'science:
"Can we travel to Mars in a week?" What happens'when the
possibilities in question seem outside present-day science,
as in psychic phenomena? Prudent waiting seems advised.
But suppose we need a decision now. A dream has ordered
us to change our life style because of some impending
catastrophe. We may seek out principles about possibility
in general. More important, what if the dispute seems
disconnected from science as in religious matters? These
touch our hopes and fears, our expectations and standards.
We may seek proofs; we may seek to know what is possible
and what is not, or what follows in other areas if we accept
a God or the validity of mysticism. These types of ques¬
tions lead us to construct frameworks and appeal to their
principles.
Conflicts of importance can also arise. We can dis¬
agree about what are the important relations, generalizations,
structures, or entities amid the multitude of matters of
fact we are presented with. "Importance" here is used as
that which establishes this rather than that perspective for
unifying a multiplicity into a whole. Conflicts of impor¬
tance concern basic choices of viewpoint and priority. Meta-
physicals frameworks articulate such decisions in detail.
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"Importance" can also refer to value conflicts. These
need not be settled by recourse to conceptual frameworks,
but naturalists about value may find themselves drawn into
framework questions about reality and possibility in the
course of deciding questions of value and obligation.
Because of conflicts, we look for what is really real —
a notion which serves as a regulative idea guiding our
attempts to unify our experience ever more adequately —
really possible, and really important. When we work with
frameworks, we do not claim "I have unified my experience"
but rather "These are the general principles of reality
and possibility". Nevertheless, we choose principles
according to their power to unify while accounting for im¬
portant data.
The conflicts we have been discussing arise within one
person. Clearly they can aLso arise in communities, among
different persons, and among different communities. It
might seem as if the situation were radically different in
the latter cases. Even though I arrive at a framework
which unifies my experiences, you may arrive at a different
one, and disagreement is translated to a new level. This
is possible. But it is also possible that I will be sus¬
pended between several frameworks. The frustrating effects
of pluralism will be the same in either case, and recourse
to violence or separation as solution is as possible within
a single person as between several people. The results of
framework reconstruction are also the same. Just as I can
find myself more unified, so we can find that we have created
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a deeper community than "before. One of the traditional
roles of metaphysics has been the construction of a deeper
and so potentially larger community than men's local frame¬
works and interests allow.
A second goal is self-criticism. Frameworks can de¬
mand close scrutiny of some formulation in light 'of other
parts of our experience. They can serve to bring about
consistency and harmony, because in a larger conceptual con¬
text things that would otherwise remain separate can be made
to touch on another. As I will suggest, there is a sense
in which frameworks create the problems they solve. Looked
at positively this means that they allow new kinds of uni¬
fication and self-criticism.
The whole enterprise of framework reconstruction exists
because we are self-reflective, and can become aware of
disunity an disunity. We can also come to question our
total view, and see it as one among many possibilities.
Since we receive our unreflective total views from our cul¬
tural community, where they were once elaborated, framework
reconstruction is one way of criticizing that culture and
community. Although direct critique of values and insti¬
tutional patterns is more trenchant, metaphysical analyses
do give access to deeper shared beliefs and presuppositions.
We have been speaking of the need for unity and self-
criticism. These are not just constant pressures from some
static situation. We do not live in a static world; in
addition to disunity among our beliefs and commitments, we
confront disunity across time and change. We experience
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novel challenges to our formulations and "beliefs. There
are demands put upon our language-games, as well as demands
they put upon us. If our situation were basically unchang¬
ing, we might do without the unification and criticism
metaphysical frameworks provide. Whitehead comments on
this:
In the stabilized life there is no room for
Reason. The methodology has sunk from a
method of novelty into a method of repeti¬
tion. Reason is the organ of emphasis upon
novelty.^
Wittgenstein's charge that metaphysics is idling of language
stems in part from seeing the world as settled. He tries
to recall us to facts about our language-games as if these
games did not change. The only change he speaks of comes
discontinuously: We were constituted by game A, now we are
constituted by game B. No one brings about the change re¬
flectively; it Just happens, though it may start with some
one person. Language games do not strain against time
and novelty. They are all right as they stand. We are
back with Hume's reliance on custom in a stable society.
Once we allow the possibility of self-reflective cri¬
ticism of language games and frameworks, once we see that
we put demands on them as we use them, then change becomes
more continuous. It is in part our attempt to keep unity
and coherence amid the pressures of novelty. This is not
to say we should go to the other extreme and view ourselves
as autonomous legislators of language-games and frameworks.
3
A. North Whitehead, The Function of Reason
(Princeton University Press, 1929), p. 20.
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This would he to fall into the dichotomy of making our
rules either arbitrary or simply received.
Frameworks can be used to resist change by reformula¬
ting novelty away and confining the impact of time. Or
they can be used to spread novelty throughout our beliefs
and comments. Again Whitehead speaks of a similar point.
When the novel speculation is produced a
threefold problem is set. Some special
science, the cosmological scheme and the
novel concept will have points of agreement
and points of variance. Reason intervenes
in the capacity of arbiter and yet with a
further exercise of speculation. The
science is modified, the cosmological out¬
look is modified, and the novel concept is
modified. The joint discipline has elimina¬
ted elements of folly, or of mere omission,
from all three. The purposes of mankind
receive the consequential modification,
and the shock is transmitted through the
whole sociological structure of technical
4
methods and of institutions.
In this light philosophical treatments of Darwin and Ein¬
stein provide interesting examples of both these reactions
to change.^
Frameworks themselves exist in time. When we are con¬
fronted with multiple total views, we are not confronted
by a timeless set of logical entities with timeless logi¬
cal relations. This may be the way we analyze past frame¬
works. Since some past options are alive today, some may
seem to have that timeless character. But even the old
^Ibido, pp. 86-87.
5 See Chapter VI in Earner's Categorial Frameworks.
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frameworks are presented in a new context with new questions.
Our options are unif i.ed •, they are not systems but promises
and suggestions, lines of research which could be pursued,
single principles not yet filled-out. Pluralism as we
live it does not have the cut-and-dried character we see
in historical examples. Instead of deciding among an array
of jewel-like philosophical systems, we are asked to decide
among programs for philosophy to pursue. The problem of
pluralism is ultimately one of practical reason, in Kant's
sense. It concerns a choice among possible objects to
be created by our efforts and choices, rather than an
evaluation of finished and complete wholes.
I have been trying to show that frameworks serve legi¬
timate purposes. In carrying out these goals they may
reinterpret their data. This does not amount to claiming
frameworks can replace ordinary language for its purposes.
Framework principles may find their way into ordinary talk.
Reinterpretations may become a new ordinary talk. But none
of this says the reinterpretations must be used for ordinary
purposes. Although some frameworks may make this claim,
it is not necessary.
The goals of metaphysics are legitimate and stem from certain
permanent types of disunity.
I have argued that frameworks respond to various kinds
of disunity and conflict. They find their justification in
dealing with disunity, and their criteria arise from this
context and purpose. It may now be asked whether frame-
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work-reconstruction is a necessary activity. This question
suhdivid.es into two: Are the kinds of disunity we spoke of
above a permanent feature of human life? and Is framework
reconstruction the only way to deal with them? I will
argue that the disunity is indeed permanent, "but that there
are other programs for resolving it.
Three kinds of disunity were mentioned: (i) disunity
due to time and novelty; (ii) similar conflicts "between one
person or group and another; and (iii) conflicts of one
area of experience or formulation with another over reality,
possibility, or importance.
The first type, disunity through time, cannot be avoided.
We always find ourselves with a partly opaque past that helps
make us what we are, hence we can never be sure we know all
about ourselves. Even if we try to avoid all novelty from
outside, we may find it has been with us all along. As for
the future, no matter how much we try to secure ourselves
against change we cannot hold on tight to everything. There
always remains the kind of change in us and in our world which
we wake up to discover has already happened, behind our backs.
Disunity of the second type, among people and groups,
cannot be removed. It can be neutralized for long periods
of time by enclosing it within some overarching unity, per¬
haps a cultural wholeness such as Chinese or Indian civiliza¬
tions have manifested. Allegiance to some common values and
ways of life can restrict disunity to a defined area. The
alleged "background of Western culture" is due in part to
the loss of such unifying commitments and consequent sharp-
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ening of conflicts which were there all along.
Even when cultural unity is present it is not allegi¬
ance to a common metaphysics. It may include a few meta¬
physical principles that are almost "universally shared, hut
for the most part it is composed of shared values, ways of
acting, and beliefs about the world. All of these can be
data for a variety of metaphysics. Although the Greeks
may have shared a common principle about the primacy of
form, a Plato is not a Democritus. Even the unity of
Indian culture, widely considered a shared metaphysics,
really consists in an elaborate set of shared goals and
practices, a common commitment to the ideal of "liberation"
from the material world, moksa, and common belief in some
divine ground. These can be expressed in differing frame¬
works, as can be seen from the disputes among the Hindu
schools. A common metaphysics may help express and communi¬
cate a cultural unity, but the two are not identical.
Even if all the members of a culture did in fact share
a common metaphysics, time and circumstances could lead
them to question it. Articulated total views were once
chosen from among many possibilities. Although one might
become the unreflective definition of "reality" for a group,
there is no reason in principle why it could not again be
viewed as needing justification or criticism.
It may seem that this last point appeals to some social
contract about ontology, or to a mythical Moses of metaphy-
/
sics who decrees a framework which then becomes "second
nature" for his community. My point is that total views
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lie on a continuum running from elaborately articulated
metaphysical systems to the kind of monochrome totality
that results from ruthlessly universalizing a local frame¬
work. Simple extension of a local framework can occur
without reflection — indeed this happens all too frequent¬
ly; the resulting conflicts demand thought. Elaborate
total views are reactions to disunity; they come from
reflective thought, whether that of an individual or of
a long group process.
What of the third kind of disunity? It is in many
ways the most important. "If everything on our experience
fitted together, we would feel no need to tie things to¬
gether. In such a case the other kinds of disunity would
be less burdensome".
But this ideal is an illusion. What would it mean
to have everything fit together? There is an image mis¬
leading us here. It is as if all the areas of one's life
were jigsaw puzzle pieces, so cleverly shaped that they
formed a single interlocking whole. If they are flawed,
or we were unable to put them together, we would have to
erect artificial frames, as we lock in the pieces of a
mosaic. This image is striking, but how do we apply it?
What are the pieces of our lives? Presumably things like
religion, political beliefs, science, career goals, the
colour red, matter, the heavens above us and the moral law
within us. How do these "go together"? The image de¬
ceives us by confusing different kinds of unity. There is
the unity of individual psychological integration, which
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can be achieved in various ways. There is also the unity
of a society and way of life where everything has its
place. These unities can be worked at, and when they are
achieved we ought to picture them as organisms, not puzzles.
Yet even smoothly functioning social organisms can be
questioned and interpreted in a framework. Members of the
society may not have a motive to do so, but it is possible.
If the image of "everything fitting together" seeks these
unities, we can understand how it applies or does not apply,
and still learn nothing about framework unity.
Imagine a landscape where everything fits together
without any imposed plan, or think of scientific data which
obligingly arrange themselves into a smooth curve as the
figures are recorded. Could the pieces of our lives fit
together in this way? Such images are behind the feeling
we have that there must be only one framework. But what
would it mean to apply these images? How could the pieces
of our lives be different for them to fit together better?
What would have to be different about our politics, or
our science, or our experience of sensation, or matter?
What could it mean to say they could fit together in ways
they do not? If we exclude social and psychological dis¬
harmony what does it mean to say that they do not fit to¬
gether?
I suggest it does not mean anythingi Aside from
psychological and social unification, the pieces of our
lives do not in themselves either fit or fail to fit to¬
gether. What frameworks unify are formulations. My
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experience of matter and my politics neither fit together
nor conflict. They just are what they are. We can
obtain descriptions of the experiences, presuppositions,
local frameworks — these are what can conflict and fail
to fit together.
Even formulations do not conflict unless they are
brought into contact. For instance, they might be rele¬
vant to the same decision. They might be conflicting
descriptions of "the same entity" — as in the conflict of
science and common sense over mental language. They might
be conflicting descriptions of "entities in general" — as
in the conflict of science and religion over the ultimate
type of causation. They might be conflicting descriptions
of "entity as such" — as in disputes over transcategorial
principles. Formulating the conflicts in terms of "en¬
tities as such" is what allows them to be resolved by frame¬
works. It is also what demands framework-resolution.
Our experience contains diverse elements and formula¬
tions. Various areas may presuppose different local frame¬
works. This diversity is a fact. It seems a contingent
fact but when we try to specify how it might have been
different we run into problems. I have been contending
that the feeling our experience could be more unified than
it is translates with no remainder into images for psycho¬
logical and social wholeness. We think of experience as
a senseless whole where each part fits in with every other
without the need of formulation and unifying concepts —
all we have to do is discover this unity. Such unity is
a myth. It is an illicit importation of social or psycho-
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logical wholeness, or else an elevation of "brute coexis¬
tence. There is no synthesis without synthesizing, no
articulated unity without articulation. Without formula¬
tion and articulation I have neither unity nor conflict
among the pieces of my life. Coexistence "by itself neither
raises nor solves any problems. Problems arise with the
addition of some drive to unity which makes mute diversity
into disunity. We have already considered some of the
reasons we might come to feel the diversity of our frame¬
works as a disunity.
Disunity can be met in other ways than by using metaphysical
frameworks.
We can now approach our second question: Is framework-
reconstruction a necessary response to disunity? As noted
earlier, there is a sense in which frameworks create the
problems they solve. The disunity they deal with has to
be treated a certain way before it becomes amenable to
framework-resolution.
Is there an alternative then? We could avoid having
any reflective totalization at all. We can try to keep our
experiences or our social way of life and unreflective frame¬
works as a background we never look at, and we can deal only
with issues as they arise in the foreground.
More precisely asked: Is there an alternative to meta¬
physical frameworks once the diversity of our experience and
formulations has become a matter of conscious awareness or
concern? When we see the diverse areas and formulations as_
diverse, can we avoid unifying them by a framework?
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The distinctive move that allows and demands meta¬
physical frameworks is the formulation of disunity in terms
of the concept of "entity as such" and transcategorial prin¬
ciples. If we can avoid these moves we can avoid metaphy¬
sics. This would mean: (a) accepting the rules and cri¬
teria of ordinary language (such as, in the earlier example
"George is the same from Sunday to Sunday" with the ordin¬
ary criteria for asserting it); (h) accepting the implied
local frameworks of various areas and activities (such as
demand that George "be an "individual"); and (c) not affirm¬
ing any of these as principles about "being" or "entities
as such". Local frameworks are still treated as local
with no claim to universal status, and no universal prin¬
ciples about "being" are affirmed.
We are talking about a different way of meeting the
problem of disunity, not about a way of avoiding it. There
is a totalization involved, but not in terms of "being".
What we are speaking of is the program of a self-conscious
philosophical therapy which breaks the traditional link
between "object of knowledge" and "being", which is pre¬
supposed by both realism and idealism. Principles claiming
universal validity about being are either argued away or
treated as generalizations, which lack the power to bring
about reinterpretation of local framework principles. This
amounts to a refusal to make the strong appearance/reality
distinction, or to apply modal categories to ordinary dis¬
course in the way described earlier.
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To accomplish this the local principles themselves
must he seen in a different light. Localprinciples seem
to make existence claims for different types of objects.
If we view them as defining different regions of "entities",
we have already set the stage for metaphysics. So we must
reinterpret what it means for local principles to be true,
and what it means for them to make existence claims. If
we want to break the link between "object of knowledge"
and "being" we must supply an alternative account of what
it is to be an object of knowledge, or what it means to
affirm a proposition. Wittgenstein's interpretation of
when asserting a proposition is a fitting move to make in a
given language-game is an example of such an alternative
account.
As a result of this alternative account, local frame¬
works are never presented as data for metaphysics. Since
their principles are not viewed as asserting necessary con¬
nections among regions of "entities", we never ask the ques¬
tion "Are these principles valid for all entities"? Never¬
theless, by its emphasis on the local nature of all prin¬
ciples, the alternative approach does allow us to prune back
the unwarranted extensions of local principles which are one
source of the conflicts that lead to metaphysics. Indeed,
Wittgenstein spends much of his time doing just this. Ques¬
tions of priority and importance are also dealt with, but as
matters requiring "therapy" or existential decision. No
framework-resolution of such questions is needed since the
various local areas are never brought into contact, and trans¬
lation of one area's principles into another kind of language
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is impossible. The resulting diversity can "be simply accep¬
ted, "because unity is found on the more primal level of prac¬
tice. This common origin in human practice allows us to
see local principles in a unified way, "but not in terms of
an articulated unity of their objects. For the metaphysical
system of principles about objects or entities, this approach
substitutes a detailed and interrelated study of uses,
language-games, or forms of life.
Wittgenstein is the leading modern representative of
this program. It is an alternative which can be pursued,
although the changes it demands go deep. Its existence
shows that frameworks are only one possible response to dis¬
unity.
Wittgenstein's "alternative program" to metaphysical con¬
struction.
In the alternative program Wittgenstein emphasizes the
active and ongoing, the lived linguistic situation. As
part of the language game which is actually played, any
comment made in that situation must be in order as it is;
the meaning of an utterance is understood, according to
Wittgenstein, when seen only in this context, what people
intend to do when they say what they say. There is thus
no question of dismissing any comment, and there is no
attempt to describe the world the way it "really is" for
that is not what is meant in the situation. Wittgenstein
is not saying that we cannot misuse language, or fail to
follow the rules of a language game properly. What is
denied is a purpose beyond the given context of the prac¬
ticed linguistic activity.
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The alternative program is a defence of common sense.
If an expression has a use in ordinary, non-philosophical
language, then that fact is taken as exempting it from
philosophical criticism. Wittgenstein's argument here is
that an actual use implies proper use. Now it is true
that we would he surprised if a philosophical argument
proved that modern science was a fraud. It would take
more than clever arguments to make us give up our political,
moral and legal practices. And it would take more than
philosophical analysis to make us seriously wonder if
there is anything to religion. With Wittgenstein I do
not want to deny the content of the concepts we act and
live with. But we may also observe that spiritualism and
astrology can he described as well established linguistic
practice, as can witchcraft and magic in some cultures.
And yet these are easier to doubt. The reason for this
ease, however, is the lack of our own commitment; it is
a question of our own interests, not the establishment of
the practice. We must then ask if the claim that "this
game is played" entitles an existing linguistic activity
to be respected just because it is practiced?
The claim of the self-sufficiency of ongoing linguis¬
tic practices and the argument that ordinary language is
"alright as it is" are developed in detail and criticized
in the Appendix. I mention Wittgenstein's view here as
the alternative to metaphysical programs merely to emphasize
the active need for metaphysics. In the main, I suggest
three failings of this alternative program — failings
which all admit a theoretical element for a more comprehen-
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sive view than the immediate language game playing allows.
(1) Admitting the autonomy of various linguistic prac¬
tices does not eliminate the problem of sorting out and ex¬
plaining how disparate forms or frameworks can coexist. We
do not live in a world of only one linguistic type of prac¬
tice. We admit varying degrees of importance for each of
many accepted frameworks. The alternative program is un¬
able to comment on this hierarchy, to explain how they re¬
late. And to work out the view of whether science dominates
religion or art, or morality dominates science, and so forth,
is the task of metaphysics. The alternative program does
not meet this challenge.
(2) The alternative view asserts an overall view
about all language games when arguing the significance of
local frameworks as local. If the various claims of the
scientist, theologian and moralist all account for different
descriptions for different purposes of a given situation in
human experience, and if in doing this it is claimed that
there exists no conceptual, ideological or moral conflict
in making these various claims, then there is assumed a
theoretical view of this given situation. And that given
situation, its description from various perspectives, is
the business of metaphysics. The alternative program thus
admits a comprehensive view when claiming the autonomy of
each linguistic practice.
(3) The alternative program claims that ordinary
language works effectively in getting its job done. It
also claims that ordinary language is free of philosophical
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paradoxes and problems, and that ordinary language should be
used as the standard for adjudicating philosophical disputes.
This is to equate common sense, as embodied in ordinary
language, with philosophy. But I want to suggest that or¬
dinary language taken in its ordinary sense includes various
puzzles and paradoxes which give rise to traditional philo¬
sophical problems. Can one then appeal to the source of
the puzzlement as the criterion for deciding when they have
been correctly resolved? Whether or not this can be done,
we must also observe that in attempting to do so we have
raised ordinary language to the status of a philosophical
criterion, and in doing this one has engaged in a mode of
discourse which would never have been uttered by ordinary
people, in ordinary language with common sense meanings.
This activity of the alternative program clearly refutes
itself. For it offers an interpretation of philosophy
while (in that interpretation) claiming that an interpreta¬
tion of philosophy cannot be made. Once again we see
practices within a given context reaching beyond themselves;
the call for metaphysics is again heard.
But even with the alternative program, there are pressures
in experience to return to metaphysical thinking.
I have described an alternative program to metaphysical
construction and pointed out its inherent failures; as a
theory it cannot eliminate metaphysics. Next I want to
describe more immediate pressures working within local areas
that direct us to metaphysical systems. The cost of the
alternative is high, for the problem of plurality, this time
the various accounts of knowledge, must still be met.
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The alternative to reflective totalization is the
attempt to keep our experiences, our social way of life and
our local frameworks as a "background we do not directly look
at, a way in which we deal with issues only as they arise
within the given language game. But there is always the
possible danger that disunity itself will be an issue that
arises. For example, science causes difficulties. If
we accept scientific realism in any form, we are driven
towards questions when scientific descriptions conflict
with others —situations where science, religion or moral¬
ity make claims about the same event. Such conflict tends
to reintroduce the concept "alternative descriptions of the
same entity" and with this concept we are on the road to
metaphysics once again. Another example: new technologies
may pose moral problems that involve relating hitherto
separate areas of activity and discourse. The acceptance
of psychological findings has modified recent thought about
criminal responsibility. Pleas of temporary insanity and
social deprivation are considered legitimate. In recent
years, then, it seems that the deterministic overtones of
the social sciences have spread beyond the bounds inside
which they have traditionally been. Moral praise and blame
seem to be diminishing in degree of responsibility as a re¬
sult of scientific discoveries. There is here the threat
that a language game which lias been played may cease to be
played, or to be significantly modified in form. Possibili¬
ties which were not considered fifty years ago are accessible
today. This means that, contrary to Wittgenstein, perhaps
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not all confidently played language games are equally well
played.
In general, this means that agreement among the prac¬
titioners of an ongoing linguistic activity does not fully
protect it from fault or criticism. And thus we may say
that for a linguistic discourse to "make sense" more than
an internal sense is required. Consider the purposes and
activities of a religious discourse. Whether or not true,
religious language makes sweeping claims that are hard to
treat adequately without some reference to the notion of
"entities as such" or transcategorial principles. Although
primarily practical and not theoretical, the internal sense
of religious practices must also assume certain; otherwise
independent facts. We pray about things or events in the
world, beyond the religious context. If God did not really
exist, we could not make legitimate sense of the religious
language of prayer. For if an accepted notion is to be
legitimate it must also have its connection with other
sides of experience. And that is to get beyond its inter¬
nal sense. But getting a more connected and coherent pic¬
ture is exactly the business of metaphysics.
The above remarks on religion are not meant as an argu¬
ment in the philosophy of religion, but to emphasize that
theoretical commitments are involved in non-theoretical uses
of language. This opens the door beyond the immediate
perspective of the alternative program and onto the area of
metaphysical thinking.
The alternative program replaces self-criticism with
self-recollection. We are reminded of the rules of our
language game and form of life. We are brought up against
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fundamental given determinations of our subjectivity. But
is this move an adequate substitution? Wittgenstein is
often reproached for imprisoning us in given language games.
This can lead to serious problems when dealing with diversity.
Wittgenstein has no political philosophy to help us deal
with ideological conflict; he only remarks that "you play
your game, we play ours". Against this, I suggest that we
have recourse to metaphysics to meet this difficulty, and
that we are not persuaded "by the alternative program that
no general theory of politics is needed.
Another problem is that the alternative program
capitulates to change. Language games alter by a kind of
eruption. Now there is something correct about this, but
is there not more to it than that? The alternative program
seems to overlook our self—conscious attempts to bring
about and deal with novelty in our thought and language.
These various considerations do not invalidate the
alternative program. What they show is that even in the
middle of the most successful philosophical alternative
to framework reconstruction, there are pressures (and
indeed certain needs) to return to metaphysical frameworks.
This reinforces my conclusion that frameworks are legitimate
and, even if only contingent, at least hard to escape. I
have argued that metaphysical frameworks serve certain pur¬
poses and help resolve certain conflicts: I will next dis¬
cuss how this can be maintained in the face of pluralism.
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Chapter Four
A DEFENCE OF PLURALISM
The plurality of frameworks is a permanent feature of the
human situation.
Philosophers recognize the problem of pluralism when
they produce arguments against other frameworks than their
own. Diverse metaphysical frameworks cannot coexist
peacefully; they cannot be treated as local areas to be
harmonized by assigning them portions of some larger field.
The role of metaphysics cannot be shared because it claims
to describe the principles of reality and possibility for
entities as such, and thus it claims to possess the whole
field. Ib can only treat other frameworks as enemies or
as diminished parts of itself. And thus the totalizing
move in metaphysics makes pluralism a problem rather than
just a condition.
In this chapter I want to show that the plurality of
frameworks we find throughout history and present philosophy
is not a removable feature of our situation. I will argue
against various attempts to discredit all but one framework
or to show _a priori that pluralism is false. These ways
try to remove pluralism by some special argument about
frameworks in general, rather than arriving at one frame¬
work by the patient comparison which concludes that one
framework is better than all .the rest. I do not mean to
exclude this latter kind of argument, whichwill be dis¬
cussed in the next chapter. This chapter, then, is a
defence of pluralism.
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Appeals to a direct intuition of reality fail to provide a
criterion for the truth of frameworks.
The simplest way to remove pluralism is to argue that
one framework is true and all others false. A way to do so
is to claim that framework principles can be directly com¬
pared with reality. They either correspond or they don't;
those who hold false frameworks have not compared frame¬
works and reality diligently enough. The problem arises
then of how we are able to carry out the comparison. The
most straightforward answer is by intuition.
But appeals to intuition are difficult to handle. The
first reaction is often an ad hominem attack: "Do you
mean to say that you see it as such and all of the rest
don't"? Now it is possible that this situation could hold,
and most philosophers end up saying that vast numbers of
other thinkers are wrong. In order to avoid unnecessary
complications, I will not argue for or against a direct
intuition of reality. Rather, I will take an "even if"
position. I am not sure whether we can have immediate in¬
tuition of things, but even if we do, we cannot avoid frame¬
work pluralism. Direct intuition of reality may help lo¬
cate a realm of discourse but it does not determine the
structure and content of that discourse.
To support this claim it may be argued that a direct
intuition of reality would consist of either a simple or
complex datum. If it is simple, an intuition can provide
no criteria for framework arguments. There is merely the
fact of the datum. If, on the other"hand, the intuition is
complex it may indeed provide some criteria. The complexity
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would "be a relationship or unity that would favour one
framework more than another. But this latter description
of the structure of an immediate intuition appears contra¬
dictory, for how can the intuition he direct and yet complex?
The immediate intuition may he described as synthetic; that
is, not in the sense of Kant's analystic-synthetic distinc¬
tion hut rather it may he synthetic in the sense of his
notion of transcendental synthesis. This type of synthesis
is aimed at producing a unity which is said to he necessary
for any object to he an object. The Kantian transcendental
synthesis does not make one object a house and another a
ship. For these differences we depend on differences in
sense intuitions. But it does make every object (whether it
he a house or a ship) a substance with accidents, an exten¬
sive quantity, and so forth. But even if the structure of
the immediate intuition is like this, we must admit that it
is already being described in the language of a specific
metaphysics, for there are alternative interpretations of
experience. The required synthetic but immediate intuition
thus begs the question of a framework criterion; it cannot
direct our arguments for the one framework because it is
already presented in the context of some other (contingent)
framework.
Again, the idea of a synthetic but direct intuition
of reality may seem to be contradictory for if it is syn¬
thetic it is not truly immediate. I agree that something
is, to say the least, complex with this notion and yet it
also seems that most people who talk of direct access to
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reality do mean something synthetic. They do not claim to
intuit Kant's manifold of sensation, or James' ""blooming,
buzzing confusion". They are not usually talking of the
aesthetic contemplation of sensory qualities for their own
sake. Although this is surely possible, it has even less
connection with frameworks than the intuitions I am dis¬
cussing here. The Zen master may, for instance, perceive
directly a rock. This experience makes use of categoriza¬
tions; it makes use of ordinary language categories and
their ordinary presuppositions. The "rock" is something
that has lain around a long time, is hard to move, can "be
"broken up in certain ways, has such and such texture, etc.
These criteria are framework-neutral. That is, in a non-
philosophical, non-reflective sense, in an everyday sense
that we experience the rock, these criteria are neutral;
they are the source for reflective characterizations (e.g.
extension, mass and so forth). But being framework-neutral
as such is not the answer, it is not the direct intuition of
reality providing form to our everyday experience of the
rock but is rather the problem of how that rock is to be
characterized. If ordinary-language objects and its rules
are open to various framework interpretations when talked
about, they are also open to interpretations when contemplated.
The Zen master's intuition does not settle the case between
Aristotelian and Whiteheadean analyses of the rock. Such
intuitions may, at times, make direct use of metaphysical
frameworks. Aristotle does not contemplate the spheres
and movers merely by staring at points of light in the sky.
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His entire science and metaphysics -enters into determining
the object of his contemplation. This sort of experience
could scarcely be asked to serve as a criterion among
frameworks.
I have said that such experiences "make use of" cate¬
gorizations. This is not the same as affirming them. The
Zen master's contemplation will not be invalidated if the
"rock" turns out to be a stage prop (although his instruc¬
tions to the gardener might be invalidated). Aristotle's
experience remains a sophisticated and valuable human ac¬
tivity even though his astronomy is wrong. Nonetheless,
such experiences do not give us "untouched" reality for
use as a criterion in framework decisions. These exper¬
iences contain either too little categorization ("this rock")
or too much ("spheres and movers"); in either case they
furnish no satisfactory role for a comparison.
And what if the experiences contain no categorization
at all? This, after all, is the usual claim. We are told
of an immediate contact with reality which avoids any syn¬
thesizing activity, dualistic splits, or analysis of its
objects. I have indicated my scepticism about this. But
even presuming it does happen, this is of no help. Tor
if-these were non-synthetic intuitions, they could not tell
us how to synthesize. They would furnish no determinate
rules for deciding between ways of synthesizing. If I am
overwhelmed by the suchness and presence of this rock, I
may have learned a lesson about the subsidiary role of all
frameworks, but the lesson does not tell me to choose.
Whitehead over Aristotle. The Zen master would not approve
my working with him in order to decide between rival meta-
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physics. The usual intent of his training would he to
stop framework construction altogether. If the intuitions
have any influence, it would he to move us away from frame¬
works and toward something like the "alternative program" of
Wittgenstein discussed earlier.
On the other hand, the existence of such intuitions
would he a datum of great importance. Any framework could
he challenged to provide for their possibility. The role
played hy the fact of such intuitions might he crucial,
though no different than therole played hy any other fact,
such as high-energy physics or moral behaviour. I am
suggesting that while the content of such intuitions (syn¬
thetic or not) provides no criterion for framework decisions,
the fact of such intuitions may well he an important guide.
Phenomenological techniques will not provide direct inspec¬
tion of metaphysical necessities.
There is also a more elaborate appeal to intuition
which moves directly to a framework. Phenomenological
techniques are said to produce intuitions of necessary
connections among meanings. No comparison between frame¬
works and reality is needed; we simply look at the meanings
in question, and read off the correct total framework. The
problem is to "simply look". Now I do not deny that such
methods can produce impressive results when used on more
clearly defined local areas, hut I question their use to
arrive at a total framework. This would involve using
phenomenological methods upon such meanings as "thing",
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""being", "relation"-, "existence". Disagreement about the
extent and results of the intuition cast doubts on the access
of such meanings. The method needs some recourse against
producing diverse results. This is found in the various
purifications contained in the phenomenological reductions.
These are supposed to reduce the subject to a pure observer
and his world to a pure phenomenon. Such standards of
purification allow decisions among rival intuitions. Thus
the use of phenomenology against pluralism depends on the
success of the reductions. Without them, our intuitions
are not direct, but depend on many different ways of pre¬
senting and judging the data. If our intuitions always
come from such conditioned viewpoints, they remain contin¬
gent on historical determinations and do not attain the
necessity needed to banish pluralism. Their results can
always be transcended and questioned from some new point
of view. For the same reason, adopting the method and the
reductions must itself be a pure act, without determining
context, or all its results will lack the required necessity.
I will in another section attack the possibility of puri¬
fying the observing subject. If successful, that attack
will also deny the appeal to phenomenological reductions.
Because of the complex relation between frameworks and data,
no appeal to "the facts" can be conclusive against pluralism.
Since a doctrine of intuition does not furnish criteria
for judging frameworks, we must examine other ways to defend
the claim that only one framework is true. Perhaps we should
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"let the data decide". Just as a scientific theory must
fit observations, so a philosophic framework must come to
terms with a great variety of data. The better framework
will be the one which deals with more of the data or deals
with the data more adequately. This principle is compati¬
ble with pluralism; indeed, it will be eagerly affirmed
in the next chapter (although there are difficulties in
giving content to "more adequately"). To turn this into
an argument against pluralism as such, it must be strengthened.
We would have to claim that the data ultimately support
only one framework. I have already shown how complex is
the way frameworks and data are brought together. It would
be convenient if the philosophers were in the position of the
scientist who (supposedly) decided between competing theories
by triumphantly pointing to a meter reading. Unfortunately,
data and frameworks never confront one another immediately.
What would it mean to "confront" a materialist metaphysics
with ordinary talk about minds? Hidden under the metaphor
of "confrontation" is a long process: we must describe
mentalistic talk and show why it is important. This in¬
volves finding rules and local principles, judging what are
the important features and what issues they raise, sugges¬
ting or denying translations into other languages, making
judgments of priority about the interrelations of various
kinds of experience and discourse. All these demand per¬
ception and judgment; none are automatic procedures. There
is room for difference.
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Thus although accounting for data is what frameworks
are all ahout, and although the data are always there before
us, there is no one framework-neutral description of data
ready to he used as a criterion. Only within a defined
philosophical school that devotes itself to clearly agreed-
on issues can we assemble a neutrally described body of
data that furnishes conclusive tests. This does not
happen on the broader philosophical scene.
Still, we do use data in framework argument. By
various methods of analysis and description we discover
local frameworks, identities, distinctions, and necessary
connections among concepts and propositions. These, to¬
gether with observations on things and facts relevant to
philosophical argument, discussions of the context of argu¬
ment and principles, and summaries of historical develop¬
ments, make up a loose class of statements relevant to
framework arguments.
We select from this class of statements and juxtapose
them to framework claims:
Remember Descartes' point that you can think
of half a material object but not half of a
self-consciousness?
How do you square that with the distinction
between ought and is?
What about the political context?
How does your account do justice to religious
language?
But if you say X then you have to conclude
(or presuppose, or deny, or qualify) Y.
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You realize, don't you, that using the concept
A commits you to using the concept B as well?
Your program has resemblances to what the X-teenth
century Y-ists tried to do, and we ail know what
happened to them.
The logical grammar of P's and Q's is different.
A framework has to deal with such data. They can "be
cited as counter-examples, or as instances of the failure
of a program. They can "be imported as additional premisses
which must he admitted and then generate inconsistencies.
They may show disharmony between an affirmation and its
context, or give an air of unreality to a conclusion. On
the other hand, the framework makerhas many ways of dealing
with these "facts". He can accept them and interpret them
in his framework. He can use them as premisses, conclu¬
sions, examples; he can deny them, reinterpret them,
attract the concepts used in their formulation, explain
what they "really mean" or what issues are "really at
stake", find and deny hidden presuppositions, give "correct
analyses", or show "correct priorities". Aside from
strictly internal criticism, this sort of discussion is the
staple of philosophical argument.
I will now consider an example of this appeal to facts
on both sides of a philosophical dispute. In their argu¬
ment over the Meditations, Descartes, Hobbes, and Gassendi
all invoke data which they take to be self-evident and des¬
tructive of the other side's position. Each also tries
to argue away data presented by the other side.
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In his objections Gassendi suggests that dualism
cannot he maintained in view of the obvious affinities
between human and animal behaviour, and the effect of the
body on thought.
You will have to prove at the same time that
the soul of the brutes are incorpeal, viz.
those which think, or, over and above the-
functioning of the external senses, are aware
of something internal, not only while awake,
but when dreaming. Again, you must prove
that this solid body contributes absolutely
nothing to your thinking (though you never
existed without it nor have ever hitherto
had any thought in isolation from it), and
that your thinking is hence independent of it;
so that you can neither be impeded nor dis¬
turbed by the foul and dense vapours or fumes,
which sometimes so afflict the brain.
But I should be loth to be troublesome with
my enquires, or to reflect whether you remem¬
ber what your thoughts were when in the womb,
or in the days, months, and years succeeding
your birth; or, if you replied that you had
forgotten, to ask why this was so, Yet I
suggest that you should remember how obscure,
how meagre, how nearly nonexistent your thought
2
• must have been during those periods of life.
Descartes' reply to this attack illustrated two ways of
dealing with such troublesome facts. He admits the in¬
fluence of the body on the mind, but interprets it according
1
Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes
trans. Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, vol II (Cambridge
University Press, 1912), Objection V, p. 140.
^Ibid., Objection V, p. 141.
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to his framework. The "body is an instrument and "a work¬
man does not get good results as long as he uses a had
instrument". Here Descartes accepts the fact hut inter¬
prets it differently. Second, he dismisses some questions
as out of place.
... since you often demand an argument from
me, when you, 0 flesh, possess none yourself,
and since the 'onus' of the proof presses on
you, we must note that, in philosophizing
correctly, there is no need for us to prove
the falsity of all those things which we do
not admit because we do not know whether they
are true. We have merely to take the greatest
care not to admit as true what we cannot prove
4
to he true.
Descartes then gives a summary of his proof of dualism from
the distinct concepts of mind and matter, and then writes:
But when you add that _I must also prove that the
soul of hrutes are incorporeal, and that solid
matter contributes nothing to thinking, you ...
show that you do not know on whom the onus of
proof lies, . . . I merely say that this is by
no means the place for the consideration of such
5
matters.
[y]our queries about the brutes are not relevant
here, since the mind when communing with itself
can experience the fact that it thinks, but has
no evidence of this kind as to whether or not
the brutes think; it can only come to a con¬
clusion afterwards about this matter by reasoning
a posteriori from their actions. ^
^Ibid., p. 209.
^Ibid., Reply to Objection V, p. 211.
5rbid. , pp. 209-210.
^Ibid., Reply to Objection Y, p. 211.
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Descartes here distinguishes some facts and questions and
types of evidence from others. He uses certain ones to
establish a framework within which he will deal with others.
Descartes is claiming that he has the right first to es¬
tablish his ontological conclusions and then try to deal
with the issues Gassendi brings up. An example of how
he would proceed to deal with them is clear from his reply
to Gassendi's question whether, given dualism, we are al¬
ways thinking. He replies that we are indeed always
thinking, and we cannot remember thoughts from our time in
the womb because memory requires a corporeal trace which
the infant's body was incapable of receiving. This may
not be a happy explanation-tof Gassendi, but it does "save
the phenomena".
The same situation occurs in reverse. Descartes makes
much of the distinction in kind between conception and ima¬
gination. Gassendi wishes to make the distinction one of
degrees of clarity, thus preserving the continuity between
man and animal. Descartes replies that this cannot be done,
and cites facts.
Moreover it is false that the thinking of a
Chiliagon is confused^ for many deductions
can be drawn from it most clearly and dis¬
tinctly, which would not occur if it were
perceived only in a confused manner or, as you
say, merely in respect of the force of the name.
But as a matter of fact we perceive intellec¬
tually the whole figure at the same time al¬
though we are not able to imagine it as a whole
at the same time; which proves that the two
powers of understanding and imagining differ,
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not so much, in respect of more or less, hut
7
as two wholly diverse modes of operation.
And although, when imagination or sensation
is intense (as occurs when the brain is troubled
or disturbed), the mind does not readily find
room for thinking of other matters, yet we ex¬
perience the fact that, when imagination is not
so strong, we often understand something en¬
tirely diverse from it; for example, when we
sleep we perceive that we are dreaming, while
in having the dream we must employ the imagina¬
tion; yet our awareness of the feet that we are
Q
dreaming is an act of the intellect alone.
A debate about what the data are can be conclusive; Des¬
cartes is_ right. Gassendi is wrong. It is, of course,
another matter to go from the distinction to an ontological
dualism, but a distinction is proven and to be dealt with
later.
When Descartes replies to Hobbes the matter of distinc¬
tion between imagination and conception comes up again.
In this case it is Descartes who points to facts to refute
a theory of Hobbes. The issue is whether or not conceiving
can be reduced to the manipulation of language. Hobbes
maintains:
But what shall we now say, if reasoning chance
to be nothing more than the uniting and string¬
ing together of names or designations by the
word is? It will be a consequence of this that
reason gives us no conclusion about the nature
of things, but only about the terms that desig¬
nate them, whether, indeed, or not there is a
7 Ibid., Reply to Objection V, p. 229.
^
Ibid., Reply to Objection Y, p. 212.
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connection (arbitrarily made about their
meanings) according to which we join these
names together. If this be so, as is pos¬
sible, reasoning will depend on names,
names on the imagination, and imagination,
perchance, as I think, on the motion of
the corporeal organs. Thus mind will be.
nothing but the motions in certain parts
9
of an organic body.
And then Descartes asserts that ...
in reasoning we unite not names but the
things signified by the names; and I mar¬
vel that the opposite can occur to anyone.
For who doubts whether a Frenchman and a
German are able to reason in exactly-the
same way about the same things, though they
yet conceive the words in an entirely di¬
verse way? And has not my opponent con¬
demned himself in talking of conventions
arbitrarily made about the meaning of words?
For, if he admits that words signify any¬
thing, why will he not allow our reasonings
to refer to this something that is signi¬
fied, rather than to the words alone?
As the debate stands, Descartes' facts refute Hobbes' claim
that he can adequately translate talk about meanings into
talk about words. A modern nominalist might rush to Hobbes'
defence by disclaiming the notion of convention and giving
a sophisticated account of translation. In doing so, he
would be performing the same interpretation of seemingly
inconvenient data which Descartes performed against Gassendi.
%bid. , Objection IY, p. 65.
10
Ibid., Reply to Objection IY, p. 66.
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A further point worth noting is that Descartes' data
may disprove Hohhes' precise formulations, "but Hohhes'
program of accounting for meaning and reasoning as some
function of language use has "been revived and continued.
Data do not seem to furnish absolute barriers to programs
of framework construction. Consider the distinction of
imagination and conception. We find Hobbes, Gassendi,
Hume, and Leibniz joined in denying any distinction, while
Descartes, Kant, Sellars, Plotinus, and Bergmann affirm
11
it. We must conclude that it can be adapted to a great
variety of programs and frameworks. Similarly, if we
accept as given both the fact of bodily influence on thought
and the distinction between imagination and conception, we
can still go in opposite directions depending on which we
take to be ontologically significant. Descartes accepts
both but takes the distinction to be significant. He is
then committed to interpreting the bodily influence so as
not to have it interfere with his program. Sellars, on
the other hand, takes the materialist road signified here
by the bodily influences. He is then committed to inter¬
preting the distinction between imagination and conception
in such a way that it does not provide unacceptable en¬
tities or actions to mar his ontology. It does not seem
that the distinction, or bodily influence, by themselves,,
settle the issues involved. ' Data do not furnish decisive
arguments against a program, although they may disqualify
a given way of implementing the program. Both points are
important. Although programs can be revived, specific
11
See Albert Levi, Literature, Philosophy and the
Imagination (Indiana University Press, 1962).
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proposed, frameworks, can be disqualified. Taken .jointly,
these two points support the thesis that although pluralism
is unavoidable we can still have reason for framework choice.
Although data cannot be used as a test which will screen
out all frameworks but one, there is another way to attack
pluralism by citing data. This is the claim that all the
data "fit together" into one framework. While I have al¬
ready explained my reservations about the image of "every¬
thing fitting together naturally", there are ways that the
image might seem to fit here.
We obtain local frameworks by various methods I have
grouped as "analysis and descriptions". Is it possible
that these methods by themselves will give us a total
framework, thus sparing us the complex process of judgment
and construction? It might seem that the areas investi¬
gated by local methods would cover the whole field of being,
and account for everything. But what field is being
covered? None of the regional frameworks has a synoptic
view that would either reveal a field of being or know when
it was completely covered. By investigating a given area
we do not necessarily locate that area in a broader con¬
text, unless that context is presupposed, or we have some
Hegelian movement of internal relations among areas.
Consistency tests can be used to disqualify single frame¬
works but not to remove pluralism.
So far I have considered two means of arguing against
pluralism. The conclusion has been that while appeals to
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intuition and data have an important place in deciding among
frameworks, they cannot he used to support the stronger con¬
clusion that only one framework is correct.
I will now consider how consistency tests can he used
in framework arguments. As with the appeal to data, such
tests operate on two levels. We can use them to disqualify
suggested frameworks. This is a valid process hut com¬
patible with pluralism. We can also try to show that
there is in principle only one consistent framework.
The number of suggested frameworks can he reduced by
showing various candidates to he internally inconsistent.
This is effective when the inconsistency is wholly in terms
of a framework's own concepts and categories. If, on the
other hand, the inconsistency results from importing some
principles, the argument is weaker. The real debate he-
comes the status of the imported principle, for example,
the principle of verification used to criticize classical
metaphysics. More subtle versions show up in arguments
between closely related schools, where frameworks differ
only slightly and importation of foreign principles is har¬
der to detect.
Even in the case of outright inner contradiction things
are not as simple as we might wish. Suppose it is true
that A's framework contains a glaring inner inconsistency.
This does disqualify it. But what part of it, what is
"it", that is disqualified? Suppose that A revises his
framework, keeping his leading principles hut changing others
so that the inconsistency is avoided. Has A's framework
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"been rejected and a, new one substituted? Or are we deal¬
ing with a patched-up version of the same framework? The
answer to these questions is a matter of definition, but
the point at stake is that claims of inner inconsistency-
only disqualify the precise formulation used to derive the
inconsistency. I may point out an inconsistency in X's
statement of idealism. I have no right to claim that I
have refuted idealism unless I also claim that the incon¬
sistency is generated by a set of principles which must be
included in any framework which is to bear the name of
idealism. Someone might then produce an almost-^idealistic
framework which would be immune to my attack. This rein¬
forces my view that philosophical programs are very hard
to kill.
Although inconsistency disqualifies specific formula¬
tions, it cannot guarantee that the rejected framework, or
one very like it, will not be resurrected. New suggestions
remain possible, and consistency tests only work on con¬
crete suggestions. Thus there is no way to use such tests
to reduce the plurality of frameworks to unity. Even if
I showed all other known frameworks to be inconsistent,
this would not absolutely vindicate my own, since I could
not guarantee that no new consistent framework would arise.
One way to disqualify a whole program is by finding an
inconsistency in its goal. The identity theory of mind-
body relations sets out to claim an identity and a reduction
at the same time. We are to be shown that mental states
are equivalent to physical states and that only physical state
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language is ontologically correct. That is, we are to
he shown a rel-ation which is both symmetrical and asymmetri¬
cal. This is inconsistent, and it seems that such criti¬
cism is conclusive against all versions of the program
attacked. Yet a modified version of the goal could he
proposed, as in the "disappearance version" proposed hy
12
Richard Rorty where the symmetrical relation is dropped.
If we want an argument against pluralism as such, we
must strengthen our claims. We must hold that there can
in principle he only one consistent framework. This claim
seems refuted hy thepresence of many frameworks, each con¬
sistent as far as we know, hut, like the argument for the
hest of all possible worlds, the argument for one consis¬
tent framework does not need empirical surveys. Hart-
13
shorne's version of this runs as follows. We enlarge
the notion of consistency somewhat, to include "comprehensive
coherence". Metaphysical concepts are necessarily involved
in each other's meanings; they cohere together to form sys¬
tems. Such systems are used to illuminate and unify areas
of experience. There can only he one system which makes
comprehensive sense out of everything because if there were
more than one, there would he an incoherence in reality or
in our knowing, and we can admit neither.
It should he clear that this is no longer an argument
from consistency hut an argument from various principles
about knowing and reality t_o a notion of consistency. The
crucial claims concern the nature of metaphysics, the re-
12
Richard Rorty, "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and
Categories" in Philosophy of Mind ed. Stuart Hampshire (New
York: Harper and Row, 1966J.
1 3̂
Charles Hartshorne, "On Some Criticisms of White¬
head's Philosophy", Philosophical Review 44 (1935)? PP« 324-
344. See pp. 324-325.
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lation between framework principles, the meaning of co¬
herence, the relation of knowing and reality. These are
metacategorial issues. We have no neutral standpoint here;
the argument for one "unique framework depends on taking
sides among frameworks.
My reply in the last paragraph may seem specious.
Perhaps the proponents of the one-unique-consistent-frame-
work are correct. If so, how can I refute them "by showing
that their claims depend upon disputed principles? The
principles may he right; the fact that someone disagrees
with them does not make them wrong. In general, disagree¬
ment does not prove that someone is wrong, hut here disa¬
greement has a special value. I am saying that arguments
on these issues appeal to principles other than mere con¬
sistency, and that these principles need not he shared.
I invoke disagreement to show that in fact they are not
shared, hence they need not he. But the original argu¬
ment claimed to have an a. priori description of the nature
of frameworks.
The proponent of the one-unique-framework can reply
that careful argument would show the disagreement I cite is
resolvable while the other frameworks are wrong. My re¬
ply would he to consider such arguments in detail. I would
try to show that they appeal to principles that need not he
shared, and that whenever he cites a necessary conception
of some relation, there are in fact other conceptions avail¬
able. The existence of the others proves that the sugges¬
ted one is not a priori necessary. Some additional premise
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is needed to assert it as the nature of metaphysical think¬
ing. It seems, then, that no appeal to consistency will
furnish an argument against pluralism unless it is "bol¬
stered "by other principles which are framework-dependent.
As in all the various strategies considered in this chap¬
ter, the problem with anti-pluralistic arguments is to
account for the necessity of the conclusions.
A rationalist discussion of 'the' nature of metaphysics
presumes framework-dependent principles.
I have been discussing various weapons which philoso¬
phers believe can be used to destroy the pluralism of frame¬
works. Although in each case the arguments and techniques
may help us to find our way around in the forest of frame¬
works, there is no way to reduce the forest to a single
tree. I will now consider another strategy. It may seem
that we can take the plurality of frameworks and classify
them into a finite number of types. We would then know
the options on various issues. Once we have the options
set out we can say that they complement each other, or we
can try and decide among them.
Such a process has immense heuristic value. All philo¬
sophers engage in it, and I have no intention of trying to
deny its importance, but like the earlier strategies, it
furnishes at best a way of living with pluralism. To turn
a heuristic organization of options into an anti-pluralism
argument, we would first need some a_ priori principle that
guaranteed the closure of our list. Since we live in his-
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tory, and there are unconceived frameworks which have not
been put forth, we can not arrive at a necessary classifica¬
tion by surveying past frameworks. And here, I would make
the historical claim that philosophy shows a continual
novelty, not an eternal recurrence of the same. It is
true that certain sets of options do occur again and again.
But they do so in different contexts and in the attempt
to answer new questions. In the history of philosophy we
have the rebirth of options and programs, but not fixed
cycles that repeat identically. The very inconclusiveness
of all philosophical revolutions is important evidence here.
Yet even if the past history of philosophy showed astoun¬
ding regularity, that would not be a guarantee for the fu¬
ture. It would not furnish an in principle exclusion of
novelty. Thus no survey of past frameworks can support a
necessary characterization of all possible frameworks.
If we then cannot arrive at a necessary classification by
surveying past frameworks, we need some a_ priori knowledge
of what kinds of frameworks are possible. This necessary
knowledge substitutes for a survey of all possible frame¬
works, which we cannot perform. Only then can we speak
of the options.
Such classification causes no difficulty as long as it
is presented as a revisable historical generalization. When
we try to give it necessity, we run into difficulties. The
easiest way to seek necessity is to link it to a conception
of the nature of reality and of knowledge in general. But
these are framework-dependent concepts. Thus how can we
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tell whether a purported framework that disobeys our classi¬
fication is a counter-example or has been refuted? We
cannot close our classification scheme without knowing the
nature of frameworks.
This is a delicate matter. I cannot argue that we
have no _a priori knowledge about the nature of frameworks
and the set of possible frameworks. The very statement
as well as this whole thesis-argument claims such knowledge.
Yet, I deny that we can base such knowledge about frameworks
on necessary knowledge about "reality in general", "knowledge
in general". Rationalism in its many forms attempts to
do so, but this argues in a circle since such concepts re¬
ceive their content from frameworks.
How then do I Justify my own necessary statements about
frameworks? I will argue this in the next chapter, but the
basic point is straightforward. The statements derive from
an interpretation and description of the task of framework
reconstruction. They are necessary statements in the way
that statements about the rules of chess or "what we do when
we give orders" are necessary. The statements convey in¬
formation because they can be answers to questions like
"What would I do if I took up framework reconstruction?"
and "What are we doing when we work with frameworks?"
Since framework reconstruction, unlike the game of
chess, does not proceed by explicitly formulated rules, my
statements are corrigible interpretations of an activity we
do. They are akin to analyzing a local framework, not to
I
contracting a metaphysics; they are to be Judged and corre.c-
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ted "by more careful analysis and description of the activity
not "by reference to some accepted total framework.
We can compare this with the rationalist approach by
considering an argument of Charles Hartshorne's. In dis¬
cussing determinism, he remarks:
It is not an empirical theory. Rather it
is an assertion of what every empirical -theory
ought to have in common with every other. It is
thus an elucidation of the very concept of
14
natural law, or of causality as such.
Here we do know what the theoretical alternative
is, namely creativity or no creativity, either
enrichment of the definiteness of reality or no
enrichment. We know what the question is, and,
if I am not mistaken, we know the answer. In
15
this knowledge our animality is left behind. ^
There are two issues here. The first concerns Hart¬
shorne 1 s contention that we know what the question is.
Hartshorne feels he has captured the options because there
are only so many ways to relate concepts like "event",
"determination", "sequence", "regularity", "reality". This
may be true, but suppose we do not use these concepts?
Suppose we have a holistic view, or a view that cuts up
nature in different ways, or one that refuses to use con¬
cepts on the level of abstraction Hartshorne demands? Any
marshalling of the options depends on knowing the questions
and the concepts involved. Both his view of frameworks
14
Charles Hartshorne, "Can Man Transcend His Aminal-
ity?", The Monist 55 (1971)? PP» 208-217- See p. 212.
^Ibid., pp. 214-215-
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and. his judgements .among them depend on a priori knowledge
about concepts like "reality in general". There always
remains the possibility of frameworks which do not use
those concepts nor ask those questions, and achieve their
goals some other way. Their mere possibility destroys
the necessity of Hartshorne's conclusion. Still, if one
could not produce such an alternative framework, one might
have to accept Hartshorre's table of options, although
without attributing to it the necessity Hartshorne himself
does. This is an important point: while the mere possi¬
bility of another alternative does destroy the necessity
of Hartshorne's conclusions, it does not destroy the con¬
clusions. Although they cease to be necessary, they may
still be "the best yet", or "the best I have seen". This
chapter is a long polemic against attempts to identify
"the best I have seen" with "The best, period". The quest
for certainty demands the latter, which cannot be obtained.
But if we have the former, none of the arguments in this
chapter say we have to give up.
My second issue with Hartshorne concerns his decision
among the options. He wants -to argue that absolute in-
determinism is absurd.
... mere or absolute indeterminism does not
make sense. "No matter what has happened up
to now, anything may .happen next with equal
probability" — these words can be uttered, but
no animal can act in accordance with what they
seem to say. Just to live is to face the fu¬
ture in terms of the past. A sheer lack of
causal connectedness is pragmatically unreal¬
izable. We are going, to some exbent, to
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predict the. future and regard it in some de¬
gree as already determined.''
What is interesting about this argument is the switch
from the rationalistic "does not make sense" to the prag¬
matic "no animal can act ..." This pragmatic need
is surely real; Hume cites it too, but argues to a dif¬
ferent conclusion. Hartshorne here compares a possible
framework principle (complete indeterminism) with a con¬
dition for our action in the world. He feels the argu¬
ment provides certainty, when all it really yields is a
good reason to accept his conclusion (provided you also
accept the tacit premisses about the relation of knowledge
and action and metaphysics).
Arguing against complete determinism, Hartshorne says
For determinism, what happens is always in
truth the sole possibility; but "sole possi¬
bility" is the same as "necessity". And so
two distinct modal categories are collapsed
into one. (I may seem to be forgetting about
"other possible worlds". But I am not for¬
getting. If real alternatives within nature
are rejected, the concept of possibility be¬
comes an illicit appeal to the supernatural).
It is not observation that protests against
this, but logical analysis. Spinoza showed
on a grand scale the paradoxes which result
from identifying possibility and necessity.
For one thing, not only does the possible
collapse into the necessary, but both are the
same as the actual. It is not hard to show
that with the collapse of conceptual distinc¬
tions all other basic polarities become prob-
17




To this argument the determinist would reply, "So what?
leave us with Spinozistic 'paradoxes' (surely not literal
paradoxes), then so "be it. This only shows how wrong our
ordinary framework is. Let us construct a non-polar
framework". Against an opponent who is willing to surren-
minism, this general argument cannot "be conclusive. In
"both these arguments Hartshorne has claimed to achieve
certainty. In fact he has shown the conclusions he attacks
are untenable relative to other claims, analyses, and prin¬
ciples he will not give up and tries to support elsewhere.
I am not suggesting that Hartshorne has argued badly, only
that he misdescribes what he does. What he said he would
achieve (the question and its answer) is impossible. What
he has actually achieved is typical of good arguments about
frameworks.
Dialectical methods of moving from the plurality to the One
Framework cannot achieve the necessity required to remove
pluralism.
Continuing the discussion of arguments which begin with
a preliminary acceptance of pluralism, I would like to con¬
sider a number of ways in which some reflective process,
loosely called "dialectic", might be used to establish The
One Framework. The same methods can be used in the attempt
to move from local principles to a total framework. My
general critique of all such methods will be that they lack
If all other basic polarities are going to collapse and
1 der all that must in order to hold deter-
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necessity and thus only serve to augment the plurality of
frameworks with some highly sophisticated members.
The word "dialectic" borrows as much from Plato as
from Hegel. In the Republic Plato uses the term to name
the method of thinking and discourse which is to be anony¬
mous and impersonally persuasive, open to all, starting
from hypotheses and working up to the Porms. Hegel's
dialectic is one attempt to produce a method which fills
Plato's criteria.
We might begin by grouping frameworks as alternative
answers to a given question, and using the groupings to
construct aporia in the Aristotelian or Platonic manner.
Such groupings of competing inadequate frameworks would in¬
vite us to move to "a higher level" by some sort of innova¬
tion. We might make the move by denying some common pre¬
supposition of the assembled framework, or by introducing
a distinction, finding a more general principle or a new
way of relating concepts. This Aristotelian mode of pro¬
cedure is an important part of philosophical argument, as
this present chapter is such an exercise. It may indeed
result in a new framework which has many advantages over
the older ones. As a method of discovery it has much to
recommend it. But if it is to be more than a tool, if it
is to remove pluralism, it has to show some necessary move
from the many inadequate to the one adequate framework.
Unless the particular innovation used in the move to a new
level is itself necessary, the innovation remains one from
a field of possible innovations, and the problem of pluralism
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repeats itself on the new level. But to make the move
necessary would require commitments in epistemology or on¬
tology which are themselves matters of framework principles.
These considerations suggest that the most effective
"dialectical" way would he for the philosopher not to make
any innovations at all. He simply lets the inadequacies of
the various frameworks interact with one another and "the
content itself" "builds The One Framework.
This approach is usually associated with Hegel if he
is interpreted as a metaphysician. Without getting into
the morasses of Hegel-interpretation, we can at least assert
that he can he interpreted to he doing something like this
in his History of Philosophy. Other parts of his system
could he seen as a similar immanent movement, from local
principles to a total view. The key to his process is the
principles of determinate negation. It is this which is
supposed to make the transitions among frameworks necessary,
arising not from the will of the philosophers hut from the
content itself.
We usually picture ourselves denying some principles,
then hanging in an indeterminate state while we search to
replace them. Hegel claims this picture is misleading.
To deny principle A is to affirm principle B. There is
no indeterminate state from which we could move various
directions. It is not that the denial of Parmenides leads
to Heraclitus. The denial of Parmenides is_ the assertion
of Heraclitus. Of course the later philosopher's denial
of Parmenides will not make him Heraclitean. This is he-
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cause the process has advanced; the later philosopher is
no longer denying only Parmenides. As the dialectic moves,
it recapitulates itself so that I can and do deny Parmenides,
hut from a different level and in a different context. It
is that context and level which bring about determinate
negation for me.
There is clearly something to the principle of deter¬
minate negation. As a tool of historical analysis it does
uncover patterns that relate different thinkers and periods.
But is it useful for disposing of pluralism? Now it is
true, for instance, that Descartes-Spinoza-Leibniz-Male-
branche-Loeke-Hume run through a set of alternative posi¬
tions on the nature of substance, individuality, and inter¬
action. Given Descartes' definition of substance, both
plurality and interaction becomes questionable. The philo¬
sophers mentioned do present the basic known ways of dealing
with these problems. As a result, in the context of Des¬
cartes' definition, to deny Spinoza may well be to affirm
Leibniz. It is Descartes' definition which raises the
problem and creates the logical space of possible solutions.
Determinate negation works because there is a context which
structures logical space so that not-A does equal B. With¬
out such a context not-A would be indefinite. Without that
antecedent commitment, the denial of Spinoza does not lead
to any definite alternative. It is also necessary that the
options structured by the antecedent commitment be closed,
so that their relations to each other can be settled. (It
is not clear that the Descartes example really supplies such
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a closed set of options. History shows no closed sets of
options for the broadest issues, hut within a restricted
area with enough antecedent commitments there might well
he such closed sets).
Further, the Hegelian must he ready to show that when
the underlying principle which structures the options is
itself rejected, there is yet a larger context-creating
principle which make.s that denial equal to a new affirma¬
tion. And so on to the next level, and the next.
Whether determinate negation is possible reduces to
the questions whether there is a necessary context for all
frameworks, or perhaps a hierarchy of contexts structuring
the lesser and greater transitions, and whether there are
frameworks which are related externally to the dialectical
process. If there were any frameworks which, so to speak,
stood beside the dialectic and observed it from the outside,
then the context-creators within the dialectic would not
have the required universality.
In the second chapter I asserted that there is a common
context for all frameworks. The Hegelian assertion is
similar, but far stronger. It demands a context which
structures the logical space of alternatives so that on
every level to deny A is to affirm B. Ultimately that con¬
text can only be the structure of Spirit itself.
We have to look more closely at the requirement of
closure. For determinate negation to eventuate in the One
Framework, the series of stages it produces must be closed.
If it could bring forth only an endless series of internally
related frameworks, the context-creating principles would not
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have "been strong enough to get determinate negation going
in the first place. For Hegel, closure involves a self-
reflection on the context which generates the determinate
negation. The series does not go on forever "because one
member finally catches up the context into presence, and is
therefore the last. If we interpret Hegel's Logic as an
atemporal presentation of possible frameworks related by
determinate negation, we can see that the closure of the
series is achieved because the last Framework (the Absolute
Idea) is a self-reflection on the process of its own creation.
For this self-reflection on the process of its own
creation to succeed, the subject (reader, observer) must not
be allowed to remain outside. If I remain outside the com¬
pleted series I can transcend the final stage, take a point
of view on it, and put it into a new context. New ques¬
tions, new demands, new frameworks could then arise which
are externally related to the dialectic, and not dealt with
in the series. This is who-t I think does happen. Hegel
attempts to avoid it by a preparatory exercise which mediates
the subject into the process so that we cannot stand outside
it.
The question whether dialectic can be used to eliminate
pluralism reduces to two issues. First: Can a series of
frameworks be constructed which somehow includes all impor¬
tant possibilities, leaves none externally related to itself,
and shows them all to be related by determinate negation in
a way that leads to some closure? (Can something like
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Hegel's Logic "be made to work?) And second: Can there "be
some sort of antecedent purification and mediation of the
"observer" into the process so that he is no longer outside
but is caught up in the dialectic and therefore part of the
final self-reflection? (Can something like Hegel's Phenomen¬
ology be made to work?) In the end the second is the more
important question because it is the purification of the
subject that gives the Logic a place to start as well as a
way to closure.
This discussion of the requirements for a Hegelian
approach shows why less full-bodied "dialectics" will fail
to eliminate pluralism. They involve relationships which
we see, which we look at, and which, therefore, we can
transcend and place in new contexts. They cannot achieve
necessity or closure because they remain processes we ob¬
serve. The Hegelian project depends crucially on whatever
mediation is used to catch the subjectivity of the observer
into the dialectic process. In other words, we ask, can
Hegel's Phenomenology succeed? At this point I can only
register my belief that it cannot. To show this in detail
for the transitions in the Phenomenology itself would be
beyond the present study and, indeed, beyond my ability.
I would use the same basic arguments as in the last few
pages considerations of starting-point, context, neces¬
sity, and closure. In the next chapter I want to argue
against a full self-transparency of subjectivity, which is
a vital part of Hegel's program.
A Hegelian way of summarizing what I have been saying
is that if you distrust immediacy and wish to have a process
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which, will produce a necessary result "by mediation, the pro¬
cess itself must have a guarantee of necessity. But the
guarantee cannot itself "be something immediate. Neither
can it "be a mediated result, or you have a vicious regress.
So you must have a necessary self-mediation from immediacy.
It is just this that I am saying is impossible. There is
no privileged self-reflection. There is only framework
dependent thought.
There are several ways to use transcendental arguments against
pluralism, "but they all beg the question.
I will now consider several ways of using transcenden¬
tal arguments to do away with pluralism. These combine
features and flaws of both the rationalist and the dialec¬
tical attacks on pluralism.
The various metaphysical ways of talking about the
world all presuppose that there is a world to talk about.
An analysis of the conditions (the a priori forms of intui¬
tion, the categories of understanding) that make possible
human experience and knowledge of the world is done by a
method called 'transcendental'. An argument for certain
conditions necessary for experience and knowledge is called
a transcendental argument. Like an empirical argument, it
starts with a fact of experience, but instead of using it
as evidence, the transcendental argument asks what must be
true if this fact is accepted. In such a way it is believed
that we can arrive at a conclusion which retains a connec¬
tion with experience (because it explains "the possibility of
experience) but is itself not contingent in the way empirical
conclusions are.
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In what follows I use a description of transcendental
proofs which is taken from the last sections of Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason; it is a notion introduced in the
discussion of the Analytic of Principles and in the Method¬
ology, although Kant does work with it throughout the
Critique. Since frameworks are sets of propositions we
may say that a transcendental argument seeks to establish
a synthetic _a priori proposition. In Kant's terms, a
transcendental argument provides a "third thing" which links
the subject and predicate of a non-analytic but still neces¬
sary proposition. It does so by referring them to the
possibility of experience or discourse.
Such proof does not show that the given concept (for
instance, of that which happens) leads directly
to another concept (that of a cause); for such
a transition would be a saltus which could not
be Justified. The proof proceeds by showing
that experience itself, and therefore the object
of experience, would be impossible without a
A O
connection of this kind.
A transcendental argument thus involves a relation between
the subject (S) and predicate (P) of a proposition, and the
possibility of experience or of objects of experience (X).
The proof proceeds by showing that (X) is not possible
unless "(S) is (P)" is a necessary proposition.
I will criticize the use of transcendental arguments
in framework matters by pointing out difficulties in giving
adequate content to the concepts (S) and (X). Speaking of
the concept (S), Kant says
^°Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason tran. Norman
Kemp Smith (New York: St. MartinTs Press^ 1968). See
p. 621; A783-B811.
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... we start always from one concept only,
and assert the synthetic condition of the
possibility of the object in accordance with
this concept. Since outside this concept
there is nothing further through which the
object could be determined, there can there¬
fore be only one ground of proof. The proof
can contain nothing more than the determina¬
tion of an object in general in accordance
19
with this one single concept. y
As Kant points out, since (S) determines the object, it
must be unambiguous, or the proof never gets started.
Similarly, since (X) is the touchstone by which we unit
(S) and (P), we cannot have different notions of what
"experience" of the "objects of experience" are, since this
would lead to different transcendental conditions. If we
try to use transcendental arguments to do away with frame¬
work pluralism, we fall into both these errors.
Consider first the attempt to find transcendental con¬
dition for some limited area of experience. Such condition5,
would be local frameworks. As we have seen before, we need
a description that presents an area of experience as the area
for which we seek conditions. Thus, I need a description
of science, or of moral experience, that allows me to say
"Such and such principles are necessary for the possibility
of science (or of morality)". If we start with different
descriptions of what science is, our concept (X) will differ,
and our results will not agree. Even if we do agree on
this basic level, I could still disagree with your extension
of the conditions of science to religion and art as well.
Neither working in local areas nor using them as keys for
19lbid., p. 624; A788-B816.
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a whole framework allows a transcendental argument to over¬
come pluralism.
Since this is the case, perhaps we can establish The
One Framework by finding transcendental conditions for all
data. In this case, our (X) will be "objects in general",
which seems to avoid the problems with describing local
areas. But the concept (X) still has too many possible
contents. If we try to find conditions for all framework
data, we must first agree on how to describe the data, and
the decision how to present and describe it will influence
the results. If you think religious experience is a prime
datum and I think it only a case to be dealt with by psy¬
chology, you will reject any transcendental argument I give
for my framework because you think I have prejudiced my
description of "objects in general" by ruling out an impor¬
tant area. The root of this difficulty is that there is no
neutral, unprejudiced content to the concepts "object",
"experience", "discourse", once we cut them free from speci¬
fic local principles. We can find some clear content to
"objects of quantum mechanics", or "moral discourse". But
"objects in general" or "discourse as such" acquires content
only through frameworks. We have neither intellectual in¬
tuition of necessary connections nor any universal ordinary
language to analyze which uses these concepts on the frame-
A
work level of generality and necessity. Hence, if we ex¬
pect to establish a framework as the condition of using
these concepts, we inevitably argue in a circle. Are the
objects of religious experience part of "objects in general"
or not? This question has to be answered before we canuse
192.
"objects in general" as (X) in a transcendental argument
aimed at frameworks.
. But this question is one of those
we want our argument to answer. Without an answer, there
is no way to decide whether religious objects disprove our
results, or vice versa.
And yet Kant makes an attempt to work from "object of
a cognitive faculty" as his (X), without any framework pre¬
suppositions. In a letter to Christian Garve, he writes:
Absolutely no other science attempts this,
that is, to develop _a priori out of the mere
concept of a cognitive faculty (when that
concept is precisely defined) all the objects,
everything that can be known of them, yes,
even what one is involuntarily constrained
20
to believe about them.
It does seem, however, that Kant's transcendental psychology
and reliance on science as his paradigm mode of experience
do define "objects in general" in a non-neutral way. Or,
in the context of the whole Critical Philosophy, they should
be taken as defining only one area of objects (as opposed
to objects of morality, aesthetics, etc.).
Since we cannot use transcendental arguments to vindicate
one framework at "the expense of all others, we might seek to
establish conditions of thepossibility of all acceptable
frameworks. Pramework candidates could then be judged on
how they embody the general conditions. Por example, we
might conclude that all frameworks must account for some
sort of unity through time if they are to define objects of
knowledge at all. Newtonian causality, or Whiteheadean
prehensions and objective immortality, or Aristotelian act-
PÔ
Immanuel Kant, Philosophical Correspondence: 1759-
1799 ed. and tran. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1967) p. 102.
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potency and the four causes, all would "be acceptable
frameworks under this condition. Indeterminism or a pure
datum theory would not be acceptable. We might then argue
that all frameworks must fit Plato's demand in the Philebus
21
that all thinkable objects be both one and many. This might
lead us to argue for Whitehead and against classical theism,
or for materialism against the Hindu indeterminate pure con¬
sciousness.
The point I want to make against this method is simple
but easily confused. I want to accept principles like
those mentioned, but deny they can be transcendentally es¬
tablished. In the next chapter I want to explore a more
adequate basis for such principles; I will confine my ar¬
gument here to denying their transcendental necessity.
The method of transcendental necessity cannot give
content to its concept (S). I will now offer three des¬
criptions of what (S) might be, and show that from none of
them can we construct a transcendental arguments.
(i) We might say (S) is "any acceptable framework".
But this demands a prior agreement about which frameworks
Plato wanted to explain the shadows on the cave wall.
Any object of experience, a table for example, required ex¬
planation, The universal was arrived at through the par¬
ticular; we are able to come to know the tableness because
we see tables. Thus we can conceive of things as both one
(in the universal) and many (in the particulars). Plato de¬
manded that all thinkable objects must be both one and many.
We are to apply a dialectical treatment to the apparent para¬
dox that "... all things are said to consist of a one and
a many", (Philebus, 16D) and so we are to see how each generic
unity contains within itself a definite number of 'kinds'
mediating between itself and the infinity of particulars into
which it ultimately vanishes. This is the so called 'Phile¬
bus Principles of the One and Many'; it is to be of value as
generalization and analysis for scientific procedures.
See pp. 18-24, sec. 14B - 18D in Plato's Examination of
Pleasure, a translation of the 'Philebus' with introduction
and commentary by E. Hackforth (Cambridge University Press,
1958).
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are acceptable. That settles the question in advance,
and we do not need the transcendental argument. If I
argue from my set of acceptable frameworks to certain trans¬
cendental conditions, I cannot without begging the question
use my results to discredit other frameworks you think accep¬
table.
(ii) We can try to avoid the problems with (i) by
broadening our basis of argument. Here, (S) will be "any
possible framework" and we can hope to use the results to
distinguish real frompseudo-frameworks. But the structure
of this argument is identical with that of (i). If your
conditions say that my framework is not really possible, do
you refute me, or have I provided a counterexample to your
conditions? There is no transcendental way to settle the
issue whether you should have included my framework in the
basis of your argument from the beginning yet that is the
issue we are trying to resolve by the transcendental argu¬
ment .
(iii) The first two attempts show us that we cannot
make headway if we seek the conditions of frameworks them¬
selves. There are too many different versions of what
it is we want transcendental conditions for. Deciding
among those versions is just what the game is about. So,
we might try seeking transcendental conditions for the
objects of any possible framework categories and principles.
Several plausible conditions were mentioned above as examples.
Can they or conditions like them be established transcenden-
tally?
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We "begin with pur new (S), "object of any framework
categories and principles". This is more familiar as the
concept of "being" or "entity as such". Here its content is
to be specified not by one but by any possible framework.
We therefore run into the same problem we had earlier with
"object in general". The concept has a plausible look;
we can generalize from frameworks we know. We can think
of characteristics necessary to objects of Aristotelian
and Whiteheadean frameworks, or of Aristotelian and Spino-
zistic ones. All we have to do is carry this process out
to include any possible framework. But we cannot do this.
As pointed out earlier, there are unconceived frameworks
and we do not have a normative description that lets us know
in advance what kinds of framework are possible. Since we
do not have intellectual intuition of necessary connections
and conditions, no such normative description could be es¬
tablished without circular appeal to just the sort of argu¬
ment we are now considering. We cannot decide whether a
discordant item has been refuted or is a counterexample.
As a result, we do not have the unambiguous determination
of "objects" needed to get the transcendental proof going.
Or, if we do start, we are not working with a neutral con¬
cept (S) and pluralism remains.
The transcendental argument cannot get off the ground
without content for (S). We cannot guarantee any content
for (S) without appeal to a transcendental argument. We
could appeal to some other form of _a priori knowledge about
possible objects and possible frameworks but then we would
not need any transcendental argument.
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I have "been considering ways in which transcendental
arguments fail to deal with framework pluralism. Korner
has raised the stronger objection that they fail in all
contexts. He claims that no such argument can give a
uniqueness proof for its results. Implicit in the quotes
from Kant cited earlier is the claim that only one set of
conditions makes experience possible. Korner claims that
there is no way to show that any set of conditions is the
only one, and he claims to have actual counterexamples to
??
Kant's conclusion. I am in sympathy with this stronger
conclusion (it is another way of saying that there is no
neutral characterization of "objects in general" or "ex¬
perience as such"), but for the present discussion it suf¬
fices that no transcendental argument about metaphysical
frameworks succeeds. Such arguments presuppose a covert
survey or a_ priori knowledge of all possible conditions.
If this were not already presupposed, the argument could
not claim to have the only conditions that make experience
(or frameworks) possible. Since the survey is impossible
and the presupposed knowledge circular, pluralism of con¬
ditions is not excluded.
Arguments such as Strawson's for the primacy of "the frame¬
work of ordinary language" confuse local and total principles,
and interpretation.
In the last sections of this chapter I would like to
consider ordinary language arguments against pluralism,
first in general, then in the Strawsonian form which in¬
volves transcendental arguments.
^ Stephen Korner, "The Impossibility of Transcen¬
dental Deduction", The Monist 5^ (1967), pp. 317-331.
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The "alternative program" discussed in Chapter Three
is the purest ordinary language position. The latter Witt¬
genstein does not argue for an "ordinary language framework";
he condemns the whole framework enterprise. Other views
try to adopt a middle course hy championing the primacy
of an ordinary framework. Because they have already come
halfway "by admitting frameworks at all, their positions tend
to he unstable.
It is often assumed in ordinary language circles that
metaphysical frameworks arise either from misunderstandings
of language, or from a mixed-up language, or from the colli¬
sion of language areas. If it could he proven that ordinary
language avoids these problems, there would he no purpose
in constructing new frameworks. This claim can he made in
two ways. It is one thing to say with Wittgenstein that
we are misguided to try and interpret ordinary language at
all, because it stands all right without a framework. It
is different to argue that new frameworks should not he con¬
structed because the ordinary language framework is all
right as it stands. The second approach assumes that or¬
dinary discourse has a framework which can he challenged and
defended.
In particular, J. L. Austin conceives the central task
of philosophy as the careful elucidation of the forms and
concepts of ordinary language (as opposed to the language
of philosophers, not to that of poets or scientists or meta¬
physicians). He claims that it is "only common prudence"
for anyone embarking on any kind of philosophical investi¬
gation, even one that might eventually involve the creation
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of a special technical vocabulary, to besin with an examina¬
tion of the resources of the terminology already at their
disposal. The clarification of ordinary language is thus
the "begin-all" of any philosophical investigation. However,
Austin does not think; that ordinary language is sacrosant;
but he certainly thinks it unlikely that hopelessly muddled
uses of language can survive very long and feels that they
are more likely to occur in rather specialized and infrequent¬
ly used areas of our vocabulary. In general, then, he main¬
tains that the conceptual scheme of ordinary language is ade¬
quate, and that we have no need of another. This is why
the revisionary metaphysician is someone "with whom we do
not wish to quarrel, but whom we do not need to follow".
And so Austin states his aphorism that "ordinary language
is the first word", and his claim that "our common stock of
words" will prove more sound and subtle "than any that you
or I are likely to think up in our armchairs of an after-
.,23noon."
The "first word" is crucial datum for framework-inter¬
pretation. But Austin's claim was that such interpretation
is not needed; if we could lay it out in detail, we would
see that the ordinary language framework serve our goals
with far more adequacy and subtlety than anything we might
construct. If we understood ordinary language fully, we
would not feel the need for odd frameworks. This claim is
often verified: ordinary language talk about time is far
more nuanced and insightful than the regimented versions
metaphysicians have produced. But the claim is often erron-
23
J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses", Philosophical
Papers ed. J. 0. Urmson"and G. J. Warnock (Oxford University
Press, 1970), pp. 175-204; see p. 185-
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eous: ordinary language talk about science and scientific
entities is usually far from "all right". Ordinary langu¬
age is all right where it stands — but there are other areas
frameworks must deal with, and an ordinary language frame¬
work totters when it is simply transposed to those areas.
A switch in the meaning of "ordinary language" happens
somewhere between the late Wittgenstein and Strawson. For
Wittgenstein, "ordinary language" is a type of language:
that which arises out of the practice of a shared form of
life. The various language-games that comprise this type
form a motley; they have no unified categorial structure.
The resulting diversity causes no difficulty because it is
treated according to the "alternative program" discussed in
Chapter Three. For Strawson, on the other hand, "ordinary
language" is a specific language with a detailed categorial
structure. It is opposed to other specific languages, such
as those of sense datum theory or Leibnizian metaphysics.
These collide with one another; Strawson sets out to prove
the primacy of the ordinary categories. For Wittgenstein
such a problem could never arise.
In this study I have accepted the Wittgensteinian notion
that ordinary language is a type, a motley, and has no over¬
all framework. Where I differ from him is in claiming
that such languages can be interpreted in a framework, for
purposes which legitimate the practice of framework-recon¬
struction. I am now arguing against the idea of "the or¬
dinary language framework." Austin's claim that ordinary
language is de_ facto correct opens the door to many challen¬
ges, which Strawson tries to meet. He claims other frame-
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works may "be constructed, "but they are either incoherent
with or parasitic upon the ordinary framework, whose neces¬
sary primacy is shown hy a variety of transcendental argu¬
ments.
My opinion is that the necessity of Strawson's results,
where genuine, has to he separated from the framework he con¬
structs. He provides us with analyses of necessary connec¬
tions, for instance, the dependence of identification of
particulars on the framework of material bodies. He also
provides us with a metaphysics which incorporates these re¬
sults as framework principles. I want to argue that the
unshakable result (presuming it so) is not a framework, and
that the framework is quite shakable. To put the matter in
his terms, Strawson cannot maintain the claim that his des¬
criptive metaphysics is only the analysis of concepts carried
out on a larger scale.
I am concerned with the structure of Strawson's argu¬
ment, so I will presume that his analyses of.ordinary langu¬
age are sound. Even if they are not, an argument of the
same structure could still he attempted with better analyses,
and it is this style of argument that I think invalid.
Strawson provides us with connections among concepts,
and relations among types of particulars. Presuming this
an accurate description of ordinary language, the results
cannot he ignored or denied, hut they can he interpreted.
In this they are no different than the Cartesian distinction
of conception and imagination, or the point mentioned earlier
that self-consciousness is not divisible as are material ob¬
jects. Descartes goes on to argue from these to dualism,
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but his argument depends on principles besides the concep¬
tual clarification itself. So too for Strawson's analyses;
though he can make them into a framework, his framework is
no closer to them than is a Leibnizian framework which in¬
terprets them in the light of a different ontology. Leib¬
niz refuses Strawson's principle that ontological dependence
is in the same order as dependence in identification. Simi¬
larly a Hegelian or an extreme atomist could deal with Straw-
son's analyses in their own ways. My point is that in no
case need his findings be denied, but only interpreted
differently. Under the guise of extended analysis, Straw-
son provides both analysis and interpretation.
I want to show, then, that Strawson's framework is an
interpretation and not a simple transcription of the analy¬
ses he has performed. Consider the category of "person".
Strawson claims that his category of persons is fundamental
to all discussion of an reference to the self. He argues
from the conditions for identifying an "owner of experience",
the individual, capable of receiving two types of predicates.
Strawson begins with the observation that we are able
to get about in the world because we can identify and reiden-
tify material objects; such things or 'particulars' are
basic to our conceptual scheme of identification. The idea
of ourselves, however, is distinct from that of a material
object; there is a contrast betwem persons and things. If
our ideas were only of what we experience, and if we ex¬
perience only material bodies, then we could never derive
the idea of that which has these ideas. But since we do
have these ideas, we are not simply material bodies. In
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order to "be able to- make the distinction between objective
particulars and our experiences of them, and so be able to
ascribe experience as states of consciousness to ourselves and
to others, Strawson argues that we must presuppose as logi¬
cally primitive the concept of a person. There is, then,
a special primacy for "persons". For unless we employ
this concept as primitive we are not able to identify sub¬
jects for the ascription of experiences. Persons are a
subclass of material objects, for Strawson, and the ability
of the category of persons to provide suitably individuated
subjects for ascribing conscious states to depends on the
identifiability of material bodies.
To help argue for the distinction between persons and
things Strawson suggests that many of the terms which are
correctly applicable to material bodies are also, and accord¬
ing to the same criteria, correctly applicable to ourselves
as persons. These are called "M-predicates: and they in¬
clude things like 'weighs 10 stone', 'is in the drawing-
24
room' and so on. There is then a second class of terms,
all the other predicates we apply to persons. These are
called "P-predicates" and they include things like 'is
smiling', 'is going for a walk', as well as things like 'is
in pain', 'is thinking hard', 'believes in God' and so on.
Strawson argues that the complex concept of "person" is not
build up from more primitive simpler concepts such as "a
consciousness" or "a human body", but rather these simpler
concepts are abstracted from the logically primitive con¬
cept of a person.
24
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Strawson- maintains a relation of dependence in iden¬
tification: the category of material hody has a specific
25
primacy, an "ontological priority", over that of persons.
But is it necessary that the concept of the self he para¬
sitic upon the Strawsonian notion of a person? I suggest
not; I will show that Strawson's analysis of the' conditions
of the concept "owner of experience" can he accepted without
prejudice to other analyses starting from different concepts.
Whitehead, for instance, argues that experience needs no
owner; that is, there may he concepts of the self which do
not rely on a thing-ontology. Strawson's conclusion from
his analysis is not the only possible interpretation.
Once again, this is his argument:
(a) The "owner of experience" can only he iden¬
tified hy reference to bodies and should he
conceptualized as a Strawsonian "person".
(h) All other concepts of the self or of con¬
sciousness cannot he directly used in iden¬
tifying references.
Therefore:
(c) The proper way to categorize the self is
as a "person".
Granted the two premisses, the conclusion demands a further
premise linking proper categorization and criteria in iden¬
tification. Strawson provides such a premise with a trans-
categorial principle: namely the ontological priority ex¬
plained above, a dependence of one being on another in the
same order of dependence as that for identification and re¬
ference. And this comes from the correct idea that a frame-
25
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work cannot arbitrarily disrupt the necessary relations among
concepts on some level of discourse. But it remains possi¬
ble that the entire level of persons, the identification ac¬
tivity of M-predicates and P-predicates, could itself he
interpreted in an alternative way, perhaps as a level con¬
taining Leibnizian monads. The necessary relations Straw-
son indicates need only be accepted as data, not as frame¬
work principles. Since the second premise does not have
to be granted, Strawson's argument fails to have the neces¬
sity he desires.
There is a further point about this argument. Premise
(b) contains an appeal to a survey of all possible modes of
conceptualizing the self. This is the problem with trans¬
cendental arguments I argued earlier. In this case we can
weaken the premise and say "all other known concepts of the
self or of consciousness cannot be directly used in identi¬
fying reference".
Even the weakened form of premise (b) > is suspect. If
we chanore our concept of a particular, might we not find
other ways of referring? Por example, let us consider the
alternative that Leibniz constructs. The Leibnizian meta¬
physical unit is the "monad"; it has an autonomous life,
it is unextended, active, indivisible; it is a teleological
substance ideally related in a system of pre-established har¬
mony. Monads are the entities that provide the conditions
that make possible the world as we experience it; as such,
they are basis for understanding and knowledge. Now God
can refer to them without referring to phenomena; God can
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thus refer to these, as primary particulars, and this stems
from the feature that in Leibniz1s metaphysics these monads
are serviceable explanatory entities. In Strawson's inter¬
pretation of Leibniz, monads are to replace both material
bodies and persons as the primary particulars; monads are
the only legitimate logical objects. But only God can
make independent identifying references to monads; only by
God's "complete concepts" (the recognition of the total
structure of a monad, out of space and time) can monads be
directly referred to. But to explain the world as we ex¬
perience it, not as it is known to God, we do not need to
share God's knowledge, according to Leibniz. Let me ex¬
plain, then, how Leibniz's definition of an "individual" in
terms of its "complete notion" and his argument against in-
discernibles furnishes an alternate account of individuation
and reference.
Strawson realizes this, and attacks Leibniz in the
"Monads" chapter of Individuals.
The individuals of the system are particulars.
But they are particulars who can only by the
grace of God be, even theoretically, identi-
fyingly referred to. Tor even if it is_ true
that there is a uniquely applicable description
for every individual, or, in other words, that
no two particular consciousnesses have the same
point of view, that it is true is not a matter
of logical necessity, but of the free choice of
a God who does not care for reduplication with¬
out difference. And, since demonstrative ex¬
pressions can have no application to the real
world of non-spatial, non-temporal monads, even,
the theoretical possibility of identifying re¬






This choice-, then, appears to preserve the
character of the ontology of monads as an
ontology of particulars, but destroys the
logical integrity of the system. For it
makes the possibility of individuation rest
28
upon a theological principle.
Now this view of Strawson's, I want to argue, is a serious
misunderstanding of Leibniz. The "theological" aspects
are what give "integrity" to the whole system; they are
not ad hoc devices to ftame a monadic ontology. Leibniz's
God is not an omniscient Book of Common Prayer Deity brought
in to save a leaky system. Leibniz's project is to show
that reality is totally intelligible and yet not necessary
(as it is for Spinoza). Since our world is a selection
from among possibilities we can evaluate it, praise God for
it, and even find room for freedom despite total intelligi¬
bility. God is brought in everywhere in the system. All
the key metaphysical notions depend on God for their content
and exemplification. Only by changing your notion of in¬
telligibility, that is, only by having already rejected Leib¬
niz, can you make Strawson's distinction separating the monadic
ontology from the doctrine of God. There may be problems
with Leibniz's system, and difficulties with his project as
a whole, but Strawson's procedure will not find them because
it begs the question.
Strawson's second criticism is more telling.
Finally — though this is the kind of criticism
which may well be held to be irrelevant to such
metaphysical systems — it could not possibly be
the primary conceptual scheme of any non-divine
monad. For, in order to be contemplated as a




that the contemptator should attach sense to
the idea of distinguishing individual subjects
of states of consciousness. We have already-
discussed the conditions of the possibility
of this idea, and they clearly do not allow
that the primary concept of such a subject
29
should be the concept of a Leibnizian monad. y
Even assuming that Strawson is correct when he says that
we need to use the Strawsonian "person" - concept to make
identifying references in ordinary language, this argument
does not succeed. It depends on two of Strawson's princi¬
ples: the transcategorial principle that 'ontological
dependence of one being on another is in the same order of
dependence as dependence for identification and reference',
and the metacategorial principle that 'an ontology which
could be taken seriously only by God is not to count as a
7Q
possible ontology. The transcategorial principle has al¬
ready been discussed. Rejecting it means rejecting the
idea that our primary conceptual scheme necessarily tells
you anything about reality. Leibniz would grant with ease
Strawson's contention that we cannot use "complete notions"
to individuals and refer to particulars. We exist in
space and time. But God uses "complete notions", and his
"primary concepts" do tell us about reality. Using the
above metacategorial principle, Strawson would reject this
rationalist claim. Leibniz would agree that we cannot use
God's concepts to refer, because we lack God's mode of know¬
ledge. But, and this is the core of rationalism, we have a





suggested, for purposes of explaining the world as we ex¬
perience it, Leibniz does not have to be able to use God's
language to make references; he has only to be able to
describe its ontology. We have the ability to analyze
the necessary relations among concepts and to perceive
first principles. This enables us to know something about
God's conceptual schemes, and so about reality. By doing
so, in Leibniz's system, we get a guarantee of our ordinary
modes of knowledge and reference to particulars. The ra¬
tionalist would accept Strawson's claim but refusehis con¬
clusion; the two positions differ in their metacategorial
principles. To reject Leibniz because he does not hold
Strawson's metacategorial principle ("In ontology which
could be taken seriously only by God is not to count as a
31
possible ontology.") is again to beg the question. This
happens even if we accept Strawson's analyses of ordinary
language. We thus see that Strawson is really giving
analyses and interpretations.
A second example can be gleaned from Strawson's dis¬
cussion of "formal concepts". At the end of The Bounds
of Sense, he proposes that:
There are a number of concepts which we might
call "formal concepts" and which share certain
features at least analogous to some of the
features ascribed by Kant to pure categories.
They include such concepts as the following:
identity, existence, class and class-membership,
32
property, relation, individual, unity, totality.
These concepts are connected by "perfectly general deductive
connections belonging to formal logic." They are unusual
^ Idem.
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"because they are never used alone, "but are always applied
or exemplified in the process of using other concepts for
which we must have empirical criteria. Just as Kant
restricts the categories to possible experience, Strawson
restricts the application of formal concepts to those ob¬
jects to which other concepts can be empirically 'applied.
Strawson's analogue to Kant's thinking the thing-in-itself
(but not knowing it) is his claim that we cannot dogmatically
limit where new empirical concepts will allow us to extend
our formal concepts. What is interesting now are the types
of extension of the formal concepts Strawson envisages.
(a) The discovery of new properties of objects
(analogous to our developing a new sense
organ).
(b) The discovery of new objects (analogous to
developing a new scientific theory).
(c) The postulation of unobservable entities
(under certain conditions).
(d) "We have ... no reason to deny a_ priori
the possibility of different kinds of
revelation of objective reality for which
we have no easy analogy like that of a new
sense organ or a new scientific theory.
(And of course no reason to affirm it either)."
(e) ". . . perhaps we can ... be said to extend
our knowledge of the world by learning to
see it afresh, tq extend or modify our
classifications and descriptions, in ways
and directions with which natural science
has little to do."
33
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This is an impressive list, and it provides for a
modest pluralism "based on new theories and the creation of
new language-games. The allowable pluralism would he held
in check by the requirement that whatever is developed be
in systematic connection with the ordinary language frame¬
work.
To admit this modest conception is simply to
reject the dogmatic denial of the possibility
of knowledge of new types of individual, pro¬
perty, and relation, new applications of the
34
concept of identity.v
The striking thing about this "modes conception" is that
it presupposes that we have only one concept of individual,
property, relation, identity, and the rest. What Strawson
wants to keep open is the possibility of new applications
of these concepts. This overlooks the possibility of new
formations of concepts.
No doubt we can construct frameworks using Strawson's
concepts and varying the list of entities involved. But
the truly revolutionary and important reconstruction comes
when the concepts themselves change. This happens in the
history of philosophy, as well as in the existence of
different systems of logic today. Strawson's use of his
concepts is only one interpretation among many, and not a
simple transcription of ordinary language. He is presup¬
posing a whole list of meta- and transcategorial principles
that define these concepts. What we see Strawson doing is
what becomes of metaphysics when these concepts are taken
for granted and the main topic of discussion becomes the




From the time of the positivists and of Moore's reac¬
tion to MacTaggart, the analytic tradition has tended to
see metaphysical frameworks as matters of addition and sub¬
traction of classes of entities. This is clear from the
way problems are often phrased in terms of whether we should
add or subtract entities from the ordinary list of "real
beings". First we deny some ordinary entities, say material
objects, then we try to construct a framework that gets
along without them and still does what ordinary language
does. Or we first add new entities, say subsistent pro¬
positions, and try to construct a framework using the richer
resources.
This view of frameworks tends to exclude a great deal
of what has been traditionally called metaphysics, and it
impoverishes the function of reflective frameworks. Most
of the important variations on the one-many problem are
washed out, as are considerations of alternative transcate-
gorial principles. Discussion focuses exclusively on
categorial principles, and metaphysics becomes the study
of ontic commitment.
And so there is more to metaphysics than lists. For
example, Whitehead's metaphysics is best seen as a change
of concepts and principles about individuality, relation,
unity and multiplicity. It is misinterpreted if it is
seen only as a wholesale exchange of one list of entities
for another odder list. Whitehead does not set out to
explain mathematics, religion, and art by using a new list
of basic individuals, but by using a new concept of what
individuality is. It is this creation of new concepts and
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principles that makes frameworks illuminating. They can
lead us to see the familiar in new lights as the results
of new conditions and modes of unity. If the notion of
individuality remains unchanged, it is relatively unillum-
inating to know that the repertory of individuals can "be
expanded or contracted, Just as it is relativelyuunimportant
for Newton's theory how many planets there are. This must
"be decided, "but it is not the most vital question.
Strawson claims that his particular formal concepts
have the hacking of ordinary language. I have already
argued that ordinary language in the Wittgensteinian sense
has no overall framework; its conditions and presuppositions
are more humdrum and practical. Even presuming Strawson
could show that the Oxford bus driver uses a framework made
up of Strawsonian formal concepts, all that would be shown
is the actual use of a framework. Any necessity would have
to be obtained by a transcendental argument, and this cannot
be done.
Strawson's rejoinder would be that only these concepts
make coherent experience possible. My reply to this claim
involves a distinction. I have already granted that there
may be local frameworks which are necessary for coherent
discourse of certain types. Recall the example of "George
is an individual" mentioned at the beginning of Chapter
Three. If this is what Strawson means, I agree with him.
But then he has no right to attack Leibniz. As I showed
earlier, the necessity of affirming "George is an individual"
does not prejudge the question of metaphysical interpretation.
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Neither 'George is an individual" nor. its criteria involve
framework concepts. There is no immediate and necessary
move from "George is an individual" to "individual" as a
formal concept valid for all entities. On this level,
Strawson's conclusions about coherence are challenged by
historical counterexamples. Modes of unity and coherence
are what different frameworks are all about.
I have argued, in effect, that Strawson cannot prove
his framework is a pure description of ordinary language,
and as a result the distinction between descriptive and
revisionary metaphysics collapses. Strawson is caught in
a tension between "descriptive metaphysics" and Wittgenstein.
The more he insists on describing the whole grand framework
of ordinary language, the more vulnerable he becomes to
attacks on the neutrality of his description. On the other
hand, the more he contents himself with pointing out analy¬
ses and giving the structure of various language games like-
identifying persons, the more he tends to fragment ordinary
language into the motley of techniques and purposes and
framework-parts Wittgenstein claims it is. This loses the
generality and necessity Strawson wants for his results.
In my presentation of his views, I may have pushed Strawson
further away from Wittgenstein than he really stands. It
remains true, however, that the tendencies which lead away
from Wittgenstein are just those which allow Strawson to
"overcome" the pluralism of frameworks. I have argued
that Strawson's "necessary framework of ordinary language"
is an unhappy mixture of several strands: (a) analysis of
ordinary language, which may be necessary but serves as data,
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not as framework; (b) a framework which, is an interpre¬
tation "but not necessary; and (c) the real necessity and
primacy of ordinary language, in its own way and for its own
purposes, which are not those of framework reconstruction.
There is no continuity between "analysis of concepts" and
"descriptive metaphysics". The word "descriptive" hides
the gulf in status between local and total frameworks.
Once we reject the notion of "descriptive metaphysics"
we must also reject the notion of "revisionary metaphysics",
since it wrongly suggests that there already exists a des-
cribable metaphysics of ordinary language.
Thus, as far as I have examined, there is no way to remove
the plurality of frameworks.
I have been considering a variety of attempts to eli¬
minate pluralism. In each case we have found that legiti¬
mate ways of dealing with individual frameworks have been
developed into invalid arguments against pluralism, or for
The One Framework. Either such arguments make covert
appeal to the survey of all possible frameworks, or they
invoke framework-dependent principles while claiming not
to, or they presuppose unguaranteed meta-rules. I am not
claiming to have refuted all possible ways of trying to
reach The One Framework. For my own arguments, I cannot do
so, but only dealwith attempts as they arise. The same
reasons that forbid a knockdown argument against pluralism
also forbid such an argument for it. It may be that there
is a way of obtaining _a priori knowledge about concepts
like "objects in general", or "experience in general". What
attempts I know of this however fail; any successful attempt
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would have to meet the various arguments in this chapter.
There may "be a way, hut pluralism has "been the perennial
situation of philosophy and each successive revolution pro¬
claiming the method only adds to the plurality.
On the other hand, we must he clear ahout what the
conclusion entails. The pluralism of frameworks means
that we cannot give absolute a_ priori arguments for one
framework, that there are always new modes of unity pos-
e
sihle and no way toprclude them. It does not mean scepti¬
cism or extreme relativism. We cannot conclude that all
frameworks are equal, or that any one will do, or that our
proper stance is neutrality. If I have reasons for hold¬
ing a framework, pluralism does not say I must give them
up. it only says that they are always challengeable from
unforeseen points of view. This fact does not by itself
constitute a challenge to my framework, but it does destroy
any claims that no other framework is even possible.
Although further possibilities are always open, I can
still choose from among the possibilities that I know. The
pluralist can draw conclusions and hold them with more grace
than the anti-pluralA because he does not pretend to have
excluded all others. He merely thinks his are the best he
has seen so far. Affirming pluralism does not mean the
end of metaphysical argument. Indeed, it may be the very
motive for metaphysics. It means getting do^s to work
with the issues, instead of producing a_ priori arguments
which settle the matter from above. And from a personal
side, affirming pluralism makes life interesting.
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We reach this .optimistic conclusion "because nothing
in the argument so far forces us to conclude that we cannot
have good reasons for preferring one framework to another.
The next chapter will examine this claim; I will argue
that we can have reasons for holding frameworks, and I
will discuss the nature of those reasons.
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Chapter Five
REASON ANN THE EXTENT OP FRAMEWORKS
We can find reasons for preferring; one framework over another
"by considering; criteria derived from the goals of framework
reconstruction.
In Chapter Three I defended the legitimacy of meta¬
physical frameworks as a way of fulfilling certain goals.
In Chapter Four I argued that pluralism of frameworks is
inevitable. Taken together, these conclusions threaten
a reductio ad absurdum of the whole enterprise. For if
we never get to The Framework, how can we fulfil our goals?
Without the certainty that we can reach our goals, why
even try? Reconstruction only makes sense then if we can
have reasons for preferring one framework over another.
We need some basis for judging which frameworks are
better than others. This is not a need for some a_ priori
judgment on all frameworks; rather, we are seeking the
criteria for framework reconstruction, the motives and
values of the metaphysical activity. Reasons for prefer¬
ring one thing to another might be conceived as links from
some larger accepted context of the particular item being
considered. And without repeating the problem in a regres¬
sive argument, we can see that there are no longer concep¬
tual structures to provide a context for metaphysical frame¬
works; thus it seems that our search would stop here with
arbitrary choice or brute receptivity. But this line of
thought mistakenly supposes that the larger context must be
another set of concepts and rules, instead of purposes and
goals.
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We have already seen that the task of framework re¬
construction cannot "be avoided "by a. priori arguments. It
remains a task of interpreting data and seeking unifying
principles. It is something we do to reach certain goals.
If a framework does not fulfil those goals it does not do
the job we want it to do. We design small vehicles to get
us from place to place over medium distances and speeds.
Normally they need wheels. This need is not an arbitrary
restriction on our design or a traditional practice we
blindly accept. There is no transcendental or mysterious
necessity involved. An immobile car-like thing is not a
car because it does not do what we want a car to do. We
can treat it as a failed car, a sculpture, a small house,
an outdoor storage closet, but not as a vehicle.
One thing we ask of a metaphysics is that it provides
an account of the possibility of the unity of entities
through time. If a suggested set of principles has no
way of doing so, we will treat it as a bad attempt, an
aesthetic object, or an interesting formal exercise — but
not as a successful framework. It does not do what we
want a framework to do.
It is important to see that this leaves open how a
framework accounts for unity through time. Cur vehicles
must be mobile, but they move by wheels, treads, ground-
effect fans, runners, etc. Similarly, many different
ontologies seem to account for unity through time.
The analogy can carry us one step further. A vehicle
is not just something mobile; it must be relatively inex-
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pensive (which rules out ground-effect machines) and not
tear up the highways (which rules out treads). Out of the
material and techniques at hand,, we create a vehicle to
meet a cluster of such intersecting purposes. Likewise
our frameworks must meet two interlocking sets of criteria:
our combined purposes and the data we interpret.
In Chapter Three I discussed a number of goals for
framework reconstruction. They included (a) unifying data
to settle conflicts about what is real, possible, or impor¬
tant. Such conflicts arise among data in one's own ex¬
perience, between individuals, and between groups. (b)
Using the unifying function to provide a basis for deeper
and larger communities. (c) Criticizing one's self or
community in terms of consistency, harmony, and the rele¬
vance of various areas to each other. (d) Meeting time:
keeping our structures of thought and action adequate in
the face of change and novelty.
As they stand, these goals provide criteria. They
also give rise to other principles. For instance, the
goal of unification can give us the Philebus principle re¬
ferred to earlier: treat every entity as both one and
many. The goals of unification and meeting time combine
to support the principle that a framework should give an
account of the possibility of the unity of an entity through
time. The goal of self-criticism demands that frameworks
be consistent and communicable and that they contain self-
reflective principles. We often use this criterion against
the kind of "philosophy" found in some popular magazines.
Unification and self-criticism together recommend the hard-
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to-define values, sometimes called "aesthetic", such a sim¬
plicity, elegance, fruitfulness, harmony, flexibility, clari¬
ty, and the like. Speaking of these, John Findlay remarks:
"like all values they lie in very varied directions, and
there are often relations of practical antinomy among them."
We have a series of norms, "but this does not mean they will
all recommend the same conclusion. Judgment is required,
because the criteria we have mentioned, and others which can
be derived from our goals, function in the way Thomas Kuhn
describes when talking about the reasons for choosing a
scientific theory.
... such reasons constitute values to be used
in making choices rather than rules of choice.
Scientists who share them may nevertheless make
different choices in the same concrete situa¬
tion. Two factors are deeply involved. First,
in many concrete situations, different values,
though all constitutive of good reason, dic¬
tate different conclusions, different choices.
In such cases of value-conflict (e.g. one
theory is simpler but the other more accurate)
the relative weight placed on different values
by different individuals can play a decisive
role in individual choice. More important,
though scientists share these values and must
continue to do so if science is to survive;
they do not all apply them in the same way.
Simplicity, scope, fruitfulness, and even accu¬
racy can be judged quite differently (which is
not to say they may be judged arbitrarily) by
different people. Again, they may differ in
their conclusions without violating any accep-
2
ted rule.
John Findlay, The Transcendence of the Cave (London;
Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 54.
2
Thomas Kuhn., "Reflections on my Critics", in Criticism
and the Growth of Knowledge ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave
(Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 231-278. See p. 262.
221.
We can find reasons for preferring one metaphysical framework
over another from what it means to "deal with" framework data.
The other great source of framework-criteria is the
data we interpret. Because data are structured indepen¬
dently of any framework they can provide norms. "Dealing
with the data" is an abbreviation for the task of accounting
for an immense variety of concrete structures. Although
data can "be reinterpreted, they are not intellectual prime
matter. There is such a thing as "going too far". Par-
menides went too far when he simply denied the existence
of change. Plato deals with change rather than dismissing
it; he is more adequate than Parmenides, even if his theory
of change is itself less adequate than that of Aristotle.
And if in fact Plato is more adequate than Parmenides,
we have a criterion which can he used all through philosophy,
at least in a general way. Por example, if quantum mecha¬
nics is an important datum, a framework can he challenged
to account for it or to explain why it does not have to.
Another form of adequacy is the ability of a framework
to account for important data. This includes not only
those data which an individual or community deem important,
hut also the omnipresent problems like permanence and
change, qualitative individuality, interaction and connec¬
tion. These are found in every realm of experience and
discourse. Given our goals of unity and self-criticism,
we would not tolerate a "framework", which accounted for
change or causality as an afterthought from principles de-
designed to account for dreams or a religious symbol. One
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mark of the "bad philosopher is the inability to see which
questions should come first. "Consider the numerous Anglo-
American thinkers who spend their time trimming the edges
of 'if' and 'hut' without making any forays into the world
to see what is truly iffy and butty about the world."
I have spoken so far of judging whether a framework
avoids data or goes too far in dealing with them. We also
judge a framework's ability to deal with varied data; with
religion and politics, art and history, qualitative indi¬
viduality and the practices of B. B. Skinner. Certain
Eastern philosophies seem to do justice to mystical ex¬
perience, but they have few resources to deal with other
areas such as the physical sciences.
What distinguishes metaphysical frameworks from other
forms of philosophical and symbolic unification of experience
is the use of the concept of "entity as such" and of trans-
categorial principles. The criteria I have mentioned seem
a natural consequence of employing such principles for the
purpose of unifying and criticizing data. The goal and
the means dictate the criteria. These specific criteria
have no mysterious, absolute status. Their necessity is
hypothetical. If we want to unify by means of framework
principles, these are the criteria we will find ourselves
using, since they are nothing but reflections of the goals
we seek.
This then covers the general answer to the question
"What are the reasons for preferring one framework to another?"
And the criteria have been found in the context of goals and
purposes for framework reconstruction. The actual list of
criteria is not strikingly novel. As it stands, however,
3
A personal comment made to me by Jeffrey Eeiman,
Professorof Philosophy, the American University, Washington, D„C0
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our answer is incomplete. There is much to add to make
it adequate. In doing so I will uncover the roots of the
dichotomy "arbitrary choice versus "brute receptivity". It
will also he seen more clearly what it means to speak of
the context of an activity.
The possibility remains that any arbitrary framework could
interpret the criteria to .justify itself.
At the end of the third chapter I asked if there could
be any norms that would survive pluralism and give us
reasons for preferring one framework to another. The norms
for comparing and judging frameworkswere then found in the
goals of framework reconstruction. But how can we know
when those purposes are fulfilled? Bor example, how can
we distinguish really "accounting for the possibility of
the unity of an entity through time" from appearing to do
so or believing or declaring that we have done so? A meta¬
physical numerologist might claim he accounts for that
unity by assigning numbers to each kind of entity, and
pointing to mystical correspondences among the integers
connected with temporal entities. And why not? This can
be put in terms of some neo-pythagorean transcategorial
principles and spelled out according to our framework ru¬
bric. Presuming it avoids internal problems, why isn't
it as good an account as Aristotle's? If all we have to do
to fulfil the criterion is give an account, does not this
fill the requirements? Any reasons you might cite to show
it doesn't are purely reflections on your own framework.
The problem is clear. Any framework-constructor seems
able to explain away or deny any norms by which we might
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show his claimed account or "dealing with the data" is
inadequate. This means that "giving an account" reduces
perilously close to "saying anything you want". If any
way of declaring we have fulfilled the criteria is to count
as actually filling them, our criteria are shown up as shams,
and framework reconstruction is an arbitrary activity.
We have "been relying on the idea that criteria for an
activity can "be obtained from its context and goals. The
present objection is based on the presupposition that the
thinker can define for himself how the goals are to be
fulfilled. He can interpret them in his framework so that
there is no distinction between really fulfilling them and
appearing to do so, since there remains no independent or
uninterpreted context to serve as background for such a
judgment.
This objection challenges us to spell out the context
of framework reconstruction in a way that gives more definite-
ness to its goals. The further determinations of the goals
must be such that they cannot be defined arbitrarily to fit
any framework at all. Such further determinations exist
but they are not the same for all thinkers. This then
places an additional burden on us: to show that this new
pluralism is not destructive of rationality. .
To avoid interpreting criteria from within the framework to
justify itself we need to add to the goals further deter¬
minations which cannot be interpreted arbitrarily.
An answer to the objection can be approached by con¬
sidering the idea that while there must be some context
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for framework reconstruction, there need not he any par¬
ticular context. We can distance ourselves from and in¬
terpret "by our framework any determinations of our context,
hut not all of them at once. This suggested approach
to an answer may he inadequate, hut the reasons for its
inadequacy will hring us to the heart of the problem.
The analogy with the reconstruction of a ship ex-
4
presses this point well. Consider that we are on a ship
sailing under way. We cannot dismantle the entire ship,
hut we can repair or replace any particular part. Wo item
is sacred, hut that does not imply that everything can he
repaired at once. While we repair one part of the ship
we rely on the others we are not repairing.
This analogy is often cited against a Cartesian uni¬
versal douht. We do not need a sacred guarantee for some
particular part of the ship in order to move at all. Ques¬
tioning need not he a search for absolute foundations. I
agree with these points and the analogy seems appropriate
for making them.
4
The ship analogy is often quoted m arguments against
total scepticism; it suggests that since some knowledge is
used to- examine other knowledge then any plan to criticize
all knowledge at once becomes paradoxical. The analogy
originated with Otto Weurath and was more recently used by
Quine. Reference to this can he found in Ivan Soil's An
Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics (University of Chicago
Press, 1969), pp. 76-77-
On this same point Hegel writes: "But the examina¬
tion of knowledge can only he carried out by an act of know¬
ledge ... to seek to know before we know is as absurd as
the wise resolution of Scholasticus, not to venture into the
water until he had learned to swim." G. W. P. Hegel, The -
Logic of Hegel tran. from 'The Encyclopedia of the Philoso¬
phical Science' by William Wallace (Oxford University Press,
1972), p. 17.
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But here I would like to change the analogy slightly
to see if the "anytut not all at once" move it embodies
helps to answer the objection demanding further determina¬
tions for framework goals. Can things we are not now
questioning give us criteria for our present questions?
Does the rest of the ship tell us how to remodel the part
we are now working on? It cannot be so. Provided we
take long enough doing it and go through enough intermediate
steps, we can remodel the whole ship any way we choose. If
we can in truth change anything, then no currently unques¬
tioned context can be normative. It can at most be a
challenged to our ingenuity.
There is a deep reason behind this failure. We can
approach it by asking "Who is planning the changes on the
ship?" Imagine one solitary officer, late at night in his
cabin, making the decisions for the next: day's work. He is
the villain of our framework-dilemma, and the source of the
objection we are considering. He can order any part of
the ship to be changed. What criteria does he use to de¬
cide which orders to give?
The present state of the ship provides no norms for him
because he can order it all changed, although he must do so
by clever stages. He seems an unmoved mover with the whole
context under his control. While he cannot effect his
changes in an arbitrary order, his overall plan can be
chosen at random. This arbitrariness is built into the
"any but not all at once". There is nothing in his context
that cannot be eventually brought into the foreground and
willed to be different. As a result, once he settles
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problems of internal consistency, there is no difference
between his actually making this ship beautiful and his de¬
claring that he has done so. We must not be misled by
introducing our own judging eye into the analogy. To get
the force of the image we must take his seat, not stand by
his side like an invisible critic. According to the ob¬
jection we are considering, when we work with frameworks
we are in his seat. There is no invisible narrator or
judge with "the true view" whether or not the ship is
beautiful, whether or not our framework really accounts
for unity through time.
But of course this serenely Detached Planner is a fic¬
tion. On any real ship an officer would be guided by ob¬
vious norms. He would repair parts of the ship whose mal¬
function threatened the purpose of its voyage, whether that
was to carry wheat or oil, to sail the tropics or the
North Atlantic. As presented the ship is a philosophic
Plying Dutchman, forever "on the way". In order to pre¬
tend our planner is in total control, we have removed any
overall purpose for his voyage. We have allowed him to
decide what continuity (if any) will link the various changes
he orders. This is the fiction; any real ship is going
somewhere definite, with a definite cargo. The officer
only facilitates this goal; he has no sovereign arbitrari¬
ness. There exists some particular definite context, an
activity which gives him guidance because he is already in¬
volved in it, because it makes him what he is, a planner on
this voyage.
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I have ridden the ship analogy long enough. The point
is that the serenely Detached Constructor is equally a
fiction. The objection that there is nn way to judge
whether we have fulfilled our framework goals depends on
being able to detach ourselves from our entire context (at
once or in parts, it makes no difference). If there is
any particular activity we are always already involved in,
then we do not have the sovereign power required to avoid
all norms. There are determinations which make us what
we are, and working with frameworks remains something we
do.
An adequate account of non-arbitrary determinations must
deny our presumed ability to detach ourselves from all
context.
I shall now discuss the possibility of purifying our
subjectivity. This is not an idle question. Only by
presupposing a purely detached subjectivity can thinkers
claim there are no norms for framework choice.
We have seen from the ship analogy that to have no
norms would mean being free of all determining context, or,
what amounts to the same thing, being able to absorb all
context' into an interpretation. The objection that we can
have no way to tell if we really fulfil our framework goals
pictures us as faced with a demand to choose or evaluate,
but not already involved (or, still involved) in an activity
that furnishes norms. This is inconsistent: if it is true
that we are so detached, how can x^e be faced with a demand
to choose? Such a demand must come from a determining
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context or an activity already under way. If we are faced
with a genuine demand to choose, we will have a hasis for
norms. If framework construction is a genuine activity,
it cannot exist as a tension "between a real demand and a
lack of criteria.
framework construction seems to put us in this pre¬
dicament because it involves objectivizing our rules. By
looking at local frameworks as local and by envisioning
various possible total views, we take structures of rules
which we usually just follow, and see them as located among
other possibilities.
We constantly use this process of objectivization.
for instance, we can detach today's weather from what
surrounds us generally, and consider what other conditions
of temperature, clouds, air pressure, and precipitation
might have occurred. To do this we must have an idea
"weather" which contrasts with other continuing states
around us like "climate", "scenery", "state of health",
"season of the year". We also need various sets of con¬
trasting predicates such as cloudy-partially cloudy-clear,
hot-warm-cool-cold, etc. These combine to define various
possible weather conditions. finally we must be able to
consider today's weather as related to the space of possi¬
bilities defined by the predicates.
To objectivize a framework, we must have a description
of a local or total structure which makes it a distinguish¬
able whole. We also need a space set up by various modal
predicates, and various possible sets of relations and trans-
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lation rules among different sets of principles and objects.
Then we must explicitly consider the framework in relation
to that space of possibilities. Thus we consider various
possible priorities and relationships; we ask if its prin¬
ciples are those for "being as such", if talk about its
entities should be translated into that of another level,
etc.
When we discuss the possible weather states there is
a larger context we do not question: the evidence and
criteria for describing the weather. With frameworks
everything becomes questionable because of the peculiar
appearance/reality distinction mentioned in Chapter Three.
If I appeal to some norm to justify my account of the re¬
lation of science and common sense, you can always reply
"Is that really the norm to use?" and "What does it rest
upon?" Framework questioning seems to have no clearcut
place to stop. If we carry the questioning out all the
way, no structure will be left standing as a norm. . All
will be seen to need further reasons. We will be forced
to set up one arbitrary structure as our final context.
Or, if we do not carry the questioning out all the way, we
will have norms that are merely received, and operate only
because we are unaware of their possible contingency.
Clearly we do objectivize rules and conceptual struc¬
tures. But does this become so epidemic? Can we carry
this process out all the way and objectivize everything?
We will be led astray if this question makes us concentrate
on the objects of the framework questioning instead of the
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act itself. Is it. part of some activity that is already
going on? Is there an operative context for my present act
of questioning? If so, it will have norms. The objection
we are considering presupposes that I can become an unin-
volved subjectivity, a pure observing eye for which all
activities, goals, and contexts are objects among other
possible objects. But all this is not possible!
Recall that most philosophical representatives of
pure subjectivity (transcendental egos, idealist minds,
and in some conceptions, God) have been a-temporal, and had
the whole world for the object they transcend or constitute.
This is appropriate, since a totally pure subjectivity
must see everything at once, or else it would have a point
of view which could only result from a determining context,
and with that context would come norms. But how could I
take on such a role? I can understand what it means to
objectivize some limited issue. Thus, in order to write
a memograph on voting behaviour I might deliberately ob¬
jectivize my own reactions and opinions. But I would do
this as part of a larger purposive activity. What would
total detachment mean? How would I make sure my present
act of objectivization was not already involved in some
activity that gave me criteria? My present act is one of
a sequence, not an isolated atomic doing. Part of its
content is its relation to a specific past and future, to
a specific context and an overall activity. By what se¬
quence of such acts could I arrive at a pure state? What
route would I follow? Which would be the last determina¬
tion I objectivized? Pure detachment would demand a dis-
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continuity I cannot- perform. And if I found myself sudden¬
ly in the pure state, what then? How would I get hack
into the stream of sequential action and reasons? Would
I arbitrarily pick an activity to join? Or would I just
become inattentive and slip back into a context — but which
one?
There is no determinate transition in either direction
linking such an indeterminate pure state with our sequential
determinations. This is why a purely detached subject
would have no norms. It is also why we can never take on
that role. But if we cannot take it on, neither can the
sequential activity of framework reconstruction put us
into it. It may seem that some detached pure "I" object-
ivizes norms and rules, or results from such objectivization.
But this questioning is done by the everyday responsible
"I". My actions remain; my actions, intended within all the
complicated strivings and history of my life and community.
Self-reflection can make me aware of these complications,
but it does not disengage me from them or prevent my acts
(even my acts of questioning) from having personal, politi¬
cal, and cultural consequences. Now does self-reflection
alter after the fact that my questioning is done for a
purpose which arises out of those strivings: to reconcile
science and religion, to assure the triumph of materialism,
to defend my cultural values, or whatever. I detach my¬
self for _a reason — that is to say, I am still attached.
"Purifying my subjectivity" is not itself a pure act.
The picture of ourselves as totally pure subjects
arises because we take the idea of detachment too far, and
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imagine we could carry it out "all the way". We also
imagine we could survey all possible frameworks. But the
pure subject who sees all local and total rules as possibly
different, without presupposing any operative context for
doing so, would have to see the rules in terms of (in the
logical space of) The One Framework, or of all possible
frameworks. The same faulty notion of subjectivity is at
the root of these errors.
We are already determined by activities and strivings which
cannot be changed by fiat and which give the required
definiteness to our goals.
In the past pages I have argued that the picture of
a totally pure, context-free subjectivity cannot be applied
to us. This allows us to answer the objection I have been
considering. As they were stated at the beginning of this
chapter the goals of framework reconstruction proved too
indefinite to furnish us with norms. Something about us
provides their further determinations. We consider some
types of data more important, and allow their interpreta¬
tions to set the tone for others. When push comes to
shove, we prefer their claims. We may feel logic is cru¬
cial, or philosophy of science, or religion. We may value
common sense, or not. We may think political and social
philosophy is prime business-or a matter for the application
of principles gained elsewhere. We mayhave a taste for
hierarchy, or for reduction, for richness or frugality.
This will influence what transcategorial principles seem
obvious or possible, and which options will be live, which
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dead. And these kinds of preferences are indicated when
we appeal to "our intuitions" to justify an overall program.
The other "ultimate structures" I spoke of at the end of
the first chapter may at times play a determining role here;
that is, an influence of our most general categories, our
most general categories which can reinterpret data, our most
general rules for conceptual thinking, and our given frame¬
work from which (and only which) we can deal with other
frameworks. In addition, we may have particular ways of
asking philosophic questions.
An even more persuasive influence is found in the Greek
idea that "wonder" is the "beginning of philosophy. Onthis
point Heidegger writes:
Plato says (Theatet, 155 d): "Por this is
especially the pathos (emotion) of a philosopher,
to he astonished. For there is no other begin¬
ning of philosophia than this."
The pathos of astonishment thus does not simply
stand at the beginning of philosophy, as for
example, the washing of his hands precedes the
surgeon's operation. Astonishment carries
and pervades philosophy.
... astonishment ... pervades every step
of philosophy.
In astonishment we restrain ourselves. We step
back, as it were, from being, from the fact that
it is as it is and not otherwise ... Of a very
different sort ^than astonishment^ is that
tuning which made thinking decide to ask in a
new way the traditional question of what being
is, in so far as it is, and thus begin a new
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era in philosophy. In his Meditations
Descartes does not ask only, and does not ask
first, ti to on, what heing is, in so far as
it is. Descartes asks what that heing is that
is true heing in the sense of the ens certum.
Dor Descartes, the essence of certitudo has
changed in the meanwhile, for in the Middle
Ages certitudo does not signify certainty hut
the fixed deliminatation of a heing in that
which it is . . . . Out of the attunement to
this certitudo the language of Descartes ob¬
tains the determination of a /clear and dis¬
tinct perceiving/. The tuning of douht is
the positive acquiescence in certainty. Hence¬
forth, certainty becomes the determining form
of truth. The tuning of confidence to the
absolute certainty of knowledge which is
attainable at all times is pathos and thus .
. . the beginning of modern philosophy.^
These varying preferences and basic approaches run
deeper than an individual's distinctive gestures or a com¬
munity's local accent. They are strivings we find our¬
selves involved in. It may seem odd to call a preference
for hierarchy a "striving" since I cannot spend a free
half-hour "preferring hierarchy over reduction". Yet I
do prefer hierarchy and try to realize it in many ways,
^Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy? tran. William
Kluback and Jean Wilde (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc.,
1958). See pp. 79, 81, 83, 85-89. Heidegger maintains that
philosophical concepts must be grasped to be understood:
this is possible only if the mind is attuned or disposed for
the grasping of the idea. The term "tuning" implies this
disposition.
"It is not how things are in the world that is mys¬
tical, but that it exists". Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus tran. D. P. Pears and B. F. McGuinnes
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 149, # 6.44.
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although the striving shows up only as a modification of
other activities. It is fundamental enough to appear in
my philosophy, in my artistic taste, in how I arrange my
room or teach school, and in how I act when I want to he
different and so hecome aggressively anti-hierarchical.
Such determinations can he shared. Indeed, some of
the deepest cultural honds are shared strivings for a cer¬
tain mode of unity in different areas of life. The deter¬
minations we are speaking of are not all rules that tell
members of a given language or cultural community "what to
do". They are not all enforced under pain of having our
actions unreciprocated or met with incomprehension (as are
the rules for making statements or giving orders). If I
do not correspond to the cultural preference for hierarchy,
I am not out of communication, although I may get arrested.
Such determinations do not tell us "what to do" hut rather
"how we do it". This was the fault with the earlier des¬
cription of framework goals. It was accurate enough
ahout "what we do" hut gave no information ahout how the
goals are specified. In a real situation, I always seek
unity respecting some data and modes of unity more than
others, favouring particular modes of self-criticism and
definite attitudes towards time. Without these further
determinations, there is no goal we can intend, although
an intended goal can he described abstractly without men¬
tioning the additional determination.
Since these determinations frequently pervade other
activities and have no special location of their own, we
have to gather them in by interpreting the results of the
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other activities. .This task is often carried out more
hy critics and students of culture than "by philosophers.
It is a hermeneutic task. This is even true for the indi¬
vidual or community seeking to discover its own determina¬
tions. The strivings are too pervasive to he easily in¬
spected; the determinations are part of the "basic projects
that structure an individual's or community's intentional
space.
An adequate account of these determinations would in¬
volve a theory of subjectivity which would answer such ques¬
tions as
Are these pervasive strivings derived from or
antecedent to a multiplicity of smaller strivings?
How are individual determinations related to
intersuhjective ones?
How are these determinations related to the
material factors and institutional patterns that
seem both their effect and their cause?
How do such determinations change?
We do not need a full theory of subjectivity here; our
question concerned only the existence of such determinations.
The appropriate theory seems to me one which sees subjec¬
tivity as a process with a formal structure of its own
(self-reflection, intentionality). This formal process
has goals that can be described with equal abstractness
(unity, temporality, self-acceptance, grounding). Both the
goals of framework reconstruction and those of the "alterna¬
tive program" can be seen as more concrete versions of
these abstract goals. However, the formal process of sub-
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jectivity does not exists as such. Concrete subjects exist
with contingent historical determinations to give them place
and shape. And it is only in some such contingent situa¬
tion that a subject can exist. Without such determinations,
subjects do not exist at all.
The most important fact about these determinations is
that they cannot be changed by fiat. I cannot wish away
my interest in hierarchical structures and my feeling that
philosophy ought to use them. I can resolve not to give in
to the feeling; I can begin arguing differently. But
this would not be sincere. Intellectual options and
preferences which define us have a deep personal level.
Even if we view them as afflictions, they hang on. We
cannot decree them gone. All we can do is to keep putting
ourselves in circumstances that may bring about a change,
and hope to wake some morning to find that we have a new
basic feeling. The alteration takes place behind our
backs, when we are not looking. Whether it comes by a
sudden conversion or a long growth, we cannot say we
brought it about simply through an act of will. We do
not give these feelings to ourselves; we cannot take them
away. We find ourselves with them. Indeed, we find
ourselves with them; they give us content and shape.
fit
When we perform the difficult interpretation that lets
us formulate our own fundamental determinations, we see
them as contingent, opposed to other possibilities which
"we" might have been. We can also explain them and study
their causes. But objectivizing these fundamental deter-
239.
minations has an odd result. Even while I see my taste
for hierarchy as contingent, I may he comparing it with
other possible tastes in order to rank them hierarchically.
I do not escape my determinations and becomes a detached
pure "I". The force of these fundamental determinations
does not reside in perceived necessity or presumed unique¬
ness. They can be perceived as contingent selections
from many possibilities, and still retain their force.
They derive their impact from shaping my subjectivity. They
give "me" form and definiteness; they give my actions a
point. Without them my goals would be too abstract to
be intended. As a result, the moves used to construct
frameworks ("put it in a larger context", "see it as one among
many other possibilities", "link it with principles to account
for its possibility") have no effect on the power of these
determinations. Nor can a framework interpretation make
them different from what they are, or define them in some
arbitrary way. They are operative even when they are seen
as objects, because thqyprovide the point for the whole
enterprise of objectivization. Thus our framework goals
do have more content than just "unity" of "self-criticism".
If we were to have no strivings, no fundamental deter¬
minations to give additional definiteness to our goals, then
we would have no norms for choosing one framework over
another. There could be no motive for the framework we
end up with. Neither would we have any real reason to
bother choosing a framework at all. In such a pointless
exercise, arbitrariness or brute receptivity would seem to
be the options. This can happen when we are not engaged in
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the game and only go through the motions of an activity
we see no point to. In such a case it is not surprising
that we have no criteria.
Although the determinations are not the same for all men,
this does not mean we must mistrust our reasons for frame¬
work choice or give up self-criticism.
Although I have answered the original objection, I am
not yet finished because the objection might be rephrased
to take account of my answer.
Granted that we never find ourselves hanging
suspended between options with no norms for
choice, because then we wouldn't really be
under a demand to choose.
Granted too that we have fundamental strivings
and determinations which give us norms and
determine our goals more concretely.
Still, these strivings and determinations
are contingent. The norms and reasons
that result from them can be challenged.
Why then should I credit them as good reasons?
To answer this we must look more closely at the pro¬
cess of self-criticism. It is a mistake to give up a
reason because it could be challenged, although we have no
particular concrete challenge to face. This whole chapter
is an argument that the possibility of being challenged is
not itself a challenge. (Only if we presuppose it is, or
think we have excluded all possible challenges, does plura¬
lism offer insurmountable difficulties). We are now in a
better position to see why this is not a challenge. Since
we can always reflect on our fundamental determinations and
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see them as contingent, we can always ask of our reasons
"are they really good reasons?" We can ask this even
when we have no specific challenge in mind. If we do,
it is true that : .nt we will have no criteria to help us
answer the question. This is because we really haven't
asked any questions. Just as we have no criteria for de¬
ciding it, we have no reason to ask it. Doubt needs a
ground. When something specific (a new scientific theory,
a puzzle about perception) challenges our reasons, then we
ask a real question and have criteria. Self-reflection is
something we do and it must have a point or it becomes an
empty ritual. What does happen is that we take the case
as it is for us.
As shown earlier, even locating fundamental deter¬
minations is difficult since they are too pervasive for
direct inspection. We come to know them by an interpre¬
tation of our activities that leads us to see a given de¬
termination as a unity. The process is similar to un¬
covering an unreflective framework, and has the same re¬
sults: what we find words to name we see as potentially
questionable. This is the first requirement for self-
criticism, but it is not enough. A potential question is
not a question, and we cannot decree it into actuality. We
need some striving against which we can measure the alterna¬
tives, some concern already present (although perhaps Just
discovered reflectively) which makes us take seriously a
question like "Does hierarchy or reduction better realize
my goal of . . . ?" That is, we need some fundamental de-
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termination which gives a point to the question. Self-
criticism is not a pure act.
Fundamental determinations are similar to Plato's
notion of eros — the driving force of life aspiring to the
absolute Good, the motive underlying education, fine art
and philosophy. The Sophists claimed there was no way to
measure different systems of norms against one another.
Plato points out that since we strive for the Good, through
the Forms, it makes sense to ask what system of norms best
fulfils this striving. Eros makes the question possible,
makes us take it seriously, and furnishes criteria. Fur¬
thermore, eros is no casual desire; it makes us what we
are. To really ask a question about norms is to have come
in touchwith a deeper striving than we knew we had. Ack¬
nowledging eros is an act of faithfulness to ourselves,
an admission that the question touches something important
to us. Without this appeal to eros, questioning becomes
a destructive and pointless game.
Platonic eros was to be one and the same in all men.
Fundamental determinations as we have described them are
many and contingent. It remains true that discovering
them involves self-knowledge and the honesty to admit that
we do find ourselves with definite basic concerns. If
self-criticism is not to be an empty ritual and not just
supposing a case, it must get in touch with a striving that
allows us to see other fundamental determinations and their
alternatives as means to a deeper goal. But determinations
vary. There is no unique deepest striving. We are not
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so unified in ourselves that there need "be a linear ordering
of our desires according to depth, nor need the ordering "be
the same in various individuals and groups. Empirical re¬
search and careful interpretation might discover just how
much sharing there is between individuals and communities;
what is important is that in principle there is no harrier
to pluralism. Self-knowledge and self-criticism may end
with different fundamental determinations and no common
eros to judge that plurality.
This ultimate pluralism must he accepted, although
with severe qualifications. After all, as long as we see
the diverse determinations as a multiplicity that asks for
judgment, we have already unified them in terms of some
striving. We would not see as a problem totally diverse
determinations unrelated to any goal.
We can go further. There is a point of view from
which all fundamental determinations can he seen as related
to one set of goals. The last few pages have spoken from
that point of view, a theory of the formal process of sub¬
jectivity which sees these determinations as necessary for
the existence of concrete subjects. Unfortunately, the
formal goals of subjectivity are themselves too abstract to
furnish decision procedure, but they do provide a unified
description of the role fundamental determinations play.
This point of view results from an interpretation of
our activities. We have no intellectual intuition, even
of ourselves. A theory of subjectivity remains just a
theory, not the luminous presence of subjectivity to itself,
or a transcendental structure grasped in its necessity.
Giving content to "subjectivity as such" is open to the
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same difficulties as giving content to "object as such"
or ""being as such". We cannot guarantee a content for
the concept; we cannot legislate a content; we must, in
the end, simply take the case that is before us and be con¬
tent without necessity.
Thus, although we can find some norms for criticizing
frameworks, there are no ultimate norms for judging funda¬
mental determinations. We find ourselves in activities
and strivings which we can criticize only because of further
determinations which we may or may not be aware of and which
could have been different. It seems that pluralism has
cheated us out of our Socratic right to be fully self-cri¬
tical. Without a secure place to stand, we cannot examine
our lives.
On the contrary, that is all we can examine. We have
no detached point of view that sees all possible determina¬
tions and delivers God's necessary judgment. Though we
must stay where we are, is that not room enough? We can
find out where we are and speak it. We can criticize our
thought or our community in the name of deeper strivings than
it ordinarily knows, or strivings that it denies and represses.
We can seek and take our stand with the basic determinations
that constitute us and our society and with the unrealized
possibilities these determinations open up. What we cannot
do is be self-founding, totally guaranteed — this is one
of our most dangerous illusions, one that cuts us off from
our own rich possibilities. Of course, pluralism tells us
that there are other determinations and other possibilities.
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But they are not ours, nor can we strip ourselves naked to
put them on. Why should we even try? The question is not
ours — unless the others are already in harmony with stri¬
vings which, perhaps, we did not know we had. There is
always more to learn, and more to be, but this does not
require us to become as Gods, knowing The Good and Evil,
seeing all possibilities and judging by absolute detached
standards.
Our power of questioning and framework construction cannot
be thought of as a pure force restricted by an outside context.
The objection that we can have no reasons (or no "good
reasons") for framework choice envisions our ability to
question and objectivize as a pure indeterminate power which
will be restricted by structures and determinations. And
this I have suggested is a dangerous epistemological myth.
The pure subjectivity I have been considering bears a
striking resemblance to the Cartesian God whose will decides
what is to be true and good. For instance, "eternal truths"
are dependent on God; for Descartes there is the logical
and metaphysical possibility that God could have made 2 plus
2 equal 5- Such a divine chooser is indeed detached; he
has no context to deal with and hence needs no criteria.
Further, he is self-moving, having and needing no outside
determinations to action. His will is a pure structure¬
less, contentless, self-moving power from which all deter¬
minations result.
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We, however, are not totally creative. We are with
things in time, we have "bodies and histories. We are al¬
ready in contexts which we did not create and which we
cannot totally transcend. If, in this situation, we
think of ourselves as possessing some pure indeterminate
self-moving power (of construction, questioning, transcen¬
ding, or whatever) we can only regard our context and given
determinations as restrictions or alien forces. A pure
indeterminate power is thinkable only outside any context,
in a case where all relevant determinations result from
its action. If we persist in picturing such a power in a
context, there will be no determinate way to relate the
two. The context will be a brute force pushing against
the power, and the power will be arbitrary, with no norms
for dealing with the context.
When we envision ourselves having some pure indeter¬
minate power, we see fundamental determinations as forces
impinging on us. But who then are "we"? Pure subject¬
ivity? We do not give ourselves these determinations;
we find ourselves with a shape. Without a shape there
would be no selves to find, there would be no "we" to look
for ourselves. Nor are we self-moving; we find our¬
selves already on the move in a definite direction. That
motion is_ us, not some foreign pressures on a self which
is naturally static or naturally self-moving. In some
important ways Wittgenstein's writings bring us out of the
illusion of such pure empty spaces and back home to that
shape and that motion which is us.
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We must conceive of a power (intellect, rationale)
that exists only in and through given determinations.
Platonic eros is not restricted hy the determinations of
the Forms it attains. It is the eros for those Forms;
the Forms make it possible. Kantian finite reason is not
"hemmed in" "by the structures that make it possible. Without
the structures there would be no objectivity, no possible
knowledge.^1 Scientific inquiry is thus said to be "limited"
to objects of sense perception; however, within the con¬
ditions of this limitation lies the structure of and there¬
by the possibility for genuine knowledge. I borrow this
epistemic optimism from Kant. The following pattern is
also Kant's: framework reconstruction is a synthetic ac¬
tivity, but there is no Ideal Synthesis it approaches. All
synthesis is a mark of finitude and temporality.
Because the power behind framework reconstruction is
not indeterminate or self-moving, we cannot exercise it
It is Kant's belief that reason and thought struc¬
tures what sense intuition reports. Thought alone cannot
know an object without an intermediary; that is, thought
cannot know the thing itself without conditioning charac¬
teristics. For Kant any object to be known must conform
to the constitutional requirements of the knower; it is
not the concept that must conform to the object but rather
that the object known must be characterized by the concept.
This revolutionary approach in epistemology defined for Kant
a new and powerful analysis of cognitive powers. Man's
ability to understand was both limited and expanded: restric¬
ted to a dependence upon the given, man could know only ex¬
perience; but because it was then possible to have knowledge
of experience, man could develop true science and thus know
just what can and cannot be subjected to valid scientific
inquiry. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Season tran.
Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p.65, B-34.
I borrow from Kant the optimistic view about the struc¬
turing of experience limiting but thereby making knowledge
possible. Unlike him, however, I am arguing for a plurality
of possible knowledge structures, different world-views,
sciences and metaphysics.
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arbitrarily. We cannot give a point to actions that have
none. Nor can we deny point or cogency to reasons that
have it. Thus we cannot refuse a conclusion just because
we know it could be challenged. We have reasons for pre¬
ferring one framework over another.
As Wittgenstein points out, the giving of reasons
must come to an end.'7 Yet we are not left hanging, for
the asking of real questions goes no further. Not because
questions are arbitrarily cut off, nor because further
questions would be nonsense. We can envision places for
further questions. Only we cannot decree those places
filled, as we cannot guarantee them forever empty.
Pluralism and rationality are both expressions of our
finitude.
I have thus far argued for the viability of pluralism
for metaphysical systems by reconciling pluralism and ra¬
tionality. We can affirm there is no One Framework and
still have reasons for choosing one framework over another.
The dichotomy I began with, "either arbitrary choice or
brute receptivity", has been shown to depend on a false
notion of subjectivity. It presupposes the pure subject,
empty of any determinations, surveying possibilities and
putting itself in motion to choose. Opposing this false
description, I have emphasized human finitude. We are
always in a context and already in motion; we do not possess
the pure view that would be required to remove pluralism.
^See for instance =## 188, 192 and 204 in Ludwig
Wittgenstein, On Certainty ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H.
von Wright, tran. Denis Paul and G. E. N. Anscombe (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1969).
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Yet, for the same reasons, we always have norms for frame¬
work choice. We find ourselves already determined "by
goals, preferences, and strivings which we cannot change
"by fiat. We do not arbitrarily choose our fundamental
determinations, nor do we question them arbitrarily.
Self-criticism comes from finding a deeper motion that
gives us real alternatives, not from an empty ritual ques¬
tioning whether our reasons are good enough.
It may seem that this solution avoids "arbitrariness"
only to fall into "brute receptivity". True, it is not
frameworks that we brutely receive, but we seem at the
mercy of fundamental determinations that "put us in
motion". Our preferences, our goals, even our self-cri¬
ticism seem determined from outside. Can this be "ration¬
ality? "
In a way this objection (or at least "observation") must
be granted. We are receptive — we are not God. Still,
the objection misleads by raising the picture of outside
forces impinging on an inner zone of freedom. The objec¬
tion presupposes that "we" exist in some pure state and then
receive an imprint from without. And this, I argued, was
a false view of subjectivity. We do not accept or receive
fundamental determinations; there is no "we" to accept them.
They make us what we are. There is no place outside them
where "we" wait to be put in motion. To be a subject is
to be involved in concrete determinations and forms of life
which give a point to our choices and decisions.
When we view ourselves as pure empty subjects separated
from all context, we seem forced to give ourselves arbitra-
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rily chosen determinations. When we view ourselves as
pure empty subjects placed in a context, we seem forced to
receive determinations. Both pictures are false, and for
the same reason. Pluralism and rationality come together,
because they are both expressions of our finitude.
The interplay of local principles and reflective totaliza¬
tion make it possible for us to become aware of our frame¬
works and criticize them.
Although we may be determined by unreflective local
and total frameworks, we can become aware of them and self¬
consciously reconstruct them. How then is this possible?
As I have pointed out, the purely detached subject
and the totally imprisoned subject are two sides of the
same myth that separates our subjectivity from any given
determinations. My answer then is that we can become
aware of our frameworks because of the differences between
local and total frameworks, and the fact that ordinary
language has no total framework. Although we are already
in a situation, already involved in activities and stri¬
vings, that situation and those strivings are not unified.
Ordinary language is a motley of areas with no necessary
built-in total view. Our fundamental determinations move
us in conflicting directions. Any articulated totalization
is an achieved synthesis, not a given prison. Whether we
make it ourselves or have it handed down to us, it contains
potential disorder, since it is a balance of various areas,
strivings, and priorities. The fragmentation of our situa-
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tion together with the synthetic character of any totality
allows us to "become aware of unreflective views and criti¬
cize them. There are goals and strivings in us other than
those our framework emphasizes, other judgments of what is
important, other areas with claims to priority. These make
it possible for us to envision alternatives and so objec-
tivize our frameworks.
At the same time, trying to create a reflective total¬
ization helps us become aware of local areas as_ local, and
so escape the prisons they can become when over extended
into totalities. We can break their spell by bringing
them in contact with one another "or criticizing them in
terms of a more articulated view of the whole. Although
this description applies to our situation with regard to
conceptual frameworks and metaphysics I suspect similar
fragmentation and totalization could be found in the case
of social and political frameworks. The situations are
not completely parallel, however, because social and poli¬
tical structures are related in more complex ways to what
I have called fundamental determinations of subjectivity.
None of what I've just said means that becoming self-
reflective is easy. It demands imagination and fortunate
circumstances to find the word or description that lets us
objectivize a hitherto unreflective part of ourselves or
our society. But what makes this possible is the inter¬
play of local fragmentation and reflective totalization
each working to increase our awareness and keep the other
from imprisoning us. We do not need to be outside all
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frameworks in order to "be self-aware and critical.
The "Pure Subject" and his "One framework" function as a
regulative ideal.
In the last two sections we have seen how rational
reconstruction is possible, as pluralism and rationality-
come together, both expressions of human finitude. If
everything fits so neatly together, why, we may ask, does
the illusion of the pure subject arise at all? Is it a
vast mistake, or does it have some status, for the idea
of a pure subject is a perennial error?
The notion of a pure subject and its corollary of
the One Framework can be described to function in human
experience as a "regulative ideal". It is an "ideal" in
that it reaches beyond any particular point of view, and
it claims to be free from any subjective determination as
well as being applicable to all of reality. It is "regu¬
lative" in Eawl's sense that it is used to codify or regu¬
late behaviour, experience, phenomena, etc. whose meanings
can be understood prior to or independent of the ideal.
The regulative ideal is thus to act as a rule to organize
empirical data.
My basic thesis about metaphysical knowledge is that
philosophy cannot be transcendental, that there can be no
philosophical knowledge independent of human nature and the
human situation in general. I have suggested how the mode
of inquiry sketches in advance the context of meaning in
which the inquiry will move, and thus I've suggested that
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cognition is essentially finite. This context of meaning,
however, changes as we critically objectivize our framework
in the activity of reconstruction. I have thus argued
against man transcending himself in any complete, detached
sense. If philosophy must remain ethnocentric then the
ideal of a pure subject is not needed; indeed, there is no
pure subject or One Framework to be found.
We cannot appeal to the pure subject or the One Frame¬
work either to banish pluralism in principle or for a usable
standard of rationality. We fall into error when we openly
or implicitly claim this point of view and renounce the
awareness that further questions are possible. This is
not the awareness that we might have failed to follow the
rules of our language or given an inappropriate response
from among those available to describe some situation.
Rather, it is the awareness that new questions could make us
change that whole set of possible responses. To speak a
language perfectly is not to speak a perfect language.
The pure point of view is an impossibility, an incon¬
sistent notion; it is detached yet choosing, independent
yet determined, self-moving yet influenced by other things
to reflect their determinations faithfully. My description
of the norms for framework choice amounts to replacing this
rationalistic pure subject with a pragmatic one, the inde¬
finitely expandable community trying to better its knowledge
and language. Taken as an "achieved community with per¬
fect knowledge", this too is an inconsistent ideal. Since
we cannot arrive at a state where further questions can be
excluded in principle, there can be no guaranteed perfect
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language. Either as the view of the pure subject or as
the perfect language of the ultimate community, the regula¬
tive ideal cannot "be achieved, for it presupposes that we
are finite enough to need a point of view or a language,
"but are not subject to these inevitable limitations.
Instead of appealing to some unavailable divine norm, or
to the suspect guarantee of rationalism or transcendental
philosophy, I have emphasized our own historical process
of questioning and comparing alternatives in the light of
our experience and our goals. The theoretical failing of
the regulative ideal is helpful, however, because it gives
us a direction and a task of not taking our present langu¬
age and framework for granted as perfect. It tells us to
examine the conditions and presuppositions of our knowledge
and seek more total, less idiosyncratic approaches. In
theory, then, we are left 'in the middle' in good Platonic
fashion: neither fully Being (playing the role of the
pure subject, enjoying The One Eramework) nor fully Non-
Being (scepticism, no reason for framework choice).
There is always a difference between a theory and its
practice. In science, history, literary criticism and
even philosophy, without some discrepancy a theory would
not provide a structure or purpose in its application. In
the case of the regulative ideal of a pure subject, this
difference is crucial. The regulative ideal has an im¬
portant function, for it can be seen as the psychological
desire for life in a stable world. Its perennial occurrence
is the result of this authentic and immediate need — a regula-
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tive ideal directs the constructive energies of our lives.
In practice, it is expressed in local areas and is acted on
as a form of knowledge, "but not itself asserted as absolute
knowledge. The theoretical inconsistency is not important
because of this limited and merely temporal application.
Ve do not want to live a schizophrenic life, where
one set of experiences do not relate to another. The regu¬
lative ideal is our first response to the immediate state of
experience reaching beyond itself. We have a practical
need to unify our world of experience and action. Basically,
this desire is instinctual; it is the desire for survival.
In the pursuit of our practical aims of survival, we are
likely to meet situations in which we will encounter diffi¬
culties. These new difficulties will inform us of our
ignorance, of the inadequacy of our present knowledge to
achieve our practical aims. There is, then, a genuine
but practical need for an expanded or comprehensive view
of experience and the world we live in. The regulative
ideal is thus an expression of our desire to live in one
world, a world of fixed meanings. It is the desire for a
world in which we can act reasonably in.
If the dialogue of philosophy described in the beginning
of my thesis can be seen as the continual search for know¬
ledge and wisdom, the path or direction of this dialogue is,
in part, an interpretation of its past history. The search
for truth is the motive for critical valuation and revision,
and it is the method of metaphysical reconstruction. The
present state of philosophical knowledge, however, will
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someday itself "be part of this history .and interpretation.
Thus the direction of the search for truth is forever chang¬
ing. Criticism is the objectivization of concepts. Over¬
emphasis on objectivization neglects the subjective deter¬
minations and so we often think of our knowledge out of
context, as "really real" or as the truth. If as I main¬
tain in my thesis-argument that we must accept human fini-
tude not as a limit but as a means to metaphysical knowledge,
then the critical appraisal of pluralism is part of this
knowledge. Although the pure subject and the One Framework
are inconsistent and unreachable, this criticism reminds us
that we are uniquely human; unrealistic, it nevertheless
serves us as a regulative ideal of our studies, forever
pushing us beyond our present visions.
The present discussion may seem to violate the restrictions
finitude imposes, but its description of the activity of
framework reconstruction is no more and no less neutral
than any other datum.
We must now face a problem about this argument as a
whole. Is the existence of my thesis-argument a counter-
8
example of its conclusions? This objection can be urged in
three ways: (a) What is the status of the thesis-argument?
Is it a neutral meta-discourse about framework disputes?
If so, it contradicts what was said earlier about the im¬
possibility of such a neutral stance. (b) Are the criteria
to be used in Judging the thesis-argument themselves frame-
g
Self-refutation is different from self-contradic-
tory. Consider the sentence: "It is impossible to use the
words 'impossible' and 'English' together in an English sen¬
tence." There is no contradiction here, but the sentence
provides a counter-example to itself. See Joseph Boyle,
"Self-Referential Inconsistency, Inevitable Falsity and
Metaphysical Argumentation", Metaphilosophy 3 (1972), pp. 25-4-2.
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work dependent? And (c) Are paradoxes of self-reference in¬
volved in talk about all frameworks? (I will try to show how
the principles of the earlier discussions can provide general
answers to these questions).
In response to the first question, we can affirm that
the thesis-argument is not neutral between frameworks, but
neither is it the presentation of one more framework. Re¬
call the basic principles of the whole discussion: al¬
though frameworks speak about everything, they are not
absolute. There are activities which do not owe their
origin or determination to frameworks. My thesis-argu¬
ment is an example of the other main philosophical activity:
analysis and description applied, in this case, to framework
reconstruction itself. Like any philosophic analysis, it
provides data that frameworks must deal with. These data
are neutral in the sense that they are not described in
terms of some one metaphysics. But they are not neutral
in the further sense of being equally amenable to all frame¬
works. Even given the complexities of its relation to
frameworks, data will still lead in certain directions.
If it did not do this, it would have no value as evidence
for or against frameworks. The thesis-argument here is
not unique in this respect.
It is worthwhile glancing at the bias that results from
my thesis-argument. Eor the most part, it bears on meta-
categorial principles. Since these principles are often
shared among many frameworks, the bias is not towards a
specific framework but towards a cluster sharing common
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methods. We saw e.arlier that these principles deal with
the relation of framework-categories and principles in
general to reality in general. The description given in
my thesis-argument tends to go against the picture of that
relation given in rationalist and transcendental philosophy.
Chapters Two and Three can he seen as arguments and data
supporting a more pragmatic and constructivist picture.
If frameworks act as I have described them, then it is
difficult to maintain a non-historical view of ontological
categories, or any simple theory of their correspondence
with unique "laws of reality", "deep structures", "trans¬
cendental conditions", and the like.
The thesis-argument has less clear-cut leanings among
categorial and transcategorial principles, hut it is not
totally neutral. Although it asserts no metaphysical prin¬
ciples, it uses many local principles which tend to support
certain metaphysics. For example, the process description
of subjectivity given in the earlier part of this chapter
would he hard to account for if persons are taken as primary
entities of a substance ontology. The theory of subject¬
ivity fits better into a process metaphysics (Hegelian or
Whiteheadian) or a metaphysics where persons are dependent
particulars. I have not generalized the local principles
governing subjectivity into any of these claims but they
could be used as evidence for such frameworks. Similarly,
my principle that there is no determinate closed field of
possible frameworks, that further new modes of cognitive
unity are always possible, could be generalized into a
Whiteheadian view of the emergence of new ontological modes
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of unity and possibility. It may, however, "be suggested
that this assertion of the permanent possibility of new
modes of cognitive unity hides an empirical presupposition
that human culture will produce continual novelty. To some
extent it does, although put more accurately what it pre¬
supposes is that in principle nothing bars the emergence
of such novelty. But what if researches like those of
Chomsky or Levi-Strauss were to prove somehow that the
human modes of cognitive unification were finite and or¬
ganized according to some general scheme? This would not
lead to a unique metaphysics, but it might give us an em¬
pirically supported tableau of the only possible framework-
types which escaped most of the objections I raised in
Chapter Pour. However, unless the theory also gave some
way of relating and ranking frameworks it would only limit
pluralism, not destroy it; none of my conclusions depend
on there being an unlimited number of frameworks or of
fundamental determinations.
Thus my analysis and description ends up fitting most
conveniently into certain types of frameworks. This need
not be special pleading. If you say it is, you must pro¬
duce a different analysis that tries to avoid the pitfall.
Then we will argue which is the better analysis. This
argument could not be totally separated from framework con¬
siderations, but neither is it wholly their creature. If
it were, philosophy would be much easier than it is.
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My thesis-argument is to "be ;judged by the criteria we use
to interpret human activities as meaningful wholes, i.e.
as activities within frameworks.
These last remarks raise the second main problem to
face. How do we "argue which is the better analysis" when
we are talking of framework reconstruction itself? What
are the criteria of truth and evidence for the description
found in my thesis-argument?
There is a dilemma here. If the criteria for accep¬
ting the description are themselves framework-dependent,
then we are in danger of having as many descriptions as
there are frameworks. Since the description includes the
norms for accepting frameworks, this would lead to a plural¬
ity of self-enclosed, self-justifying frameworks. We would
be back on our fictional ship. A Hegelian or transcenden¬
tal approach could accept that the criteria are framework-
dependent, but try to show that there was only one such
self-enclosed circle. Since I-have rejected that approach,
we have to break the circle by appealing to something given.
Yet if we appeal to independently given criteria, we face
questions like "Are they guaranteed?" and "What are the
criteria for your criteria?"
If analysis and description did not have their own
criteria, they would be useless as data. Our problem
would be solved if we could claim that there are criteria
which are simply given to disciplined intuition. This
would dispose of the troublesome questions. But as I
indicated earlier, the problems of access to such presumed
intuitions seem to me insuperable.
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To the earlier question "What are the criteria for
framework choice?" the last three chapters responded hy
claiming there was an activity of framework construction
with discernible goals and a certain structure. Criteria
for frameworks were drawn from this activity. The thesis-
argument is "basically a description of that activity, to¬
gether with arguments against various misconceptions and
false pictures that distort or hinder it. Now we want
criteria for that description.
And that description is not a verbatim report of
sample arguments. No tapes or transcripts of philosophers'
discussions will by themselves tell us "what they are doing".
The reports need not contain the context of shared rules
and goals which make the reported activity what it is.
Although, since the discussions in question are philosophical,
they may contain attempts to formulate those rules and goals,
gust as we have done in this study. When we set out to
describe the overall activity, we undertake the reflective
task of interpreting a form-of-life. We should judge the
descriptions by the ordinary criteria for such interpreta¬
tions, such as accuracy, adequacy, ability to make a whole
out of the various parts, and all the usual criteria for
interpreting human activities as meaningful wholes. We
constantly make such interpretations of individual and
community activities. Exactly how we perform the inter¬
pretation is a matter of dispute today. It is very hard
to describe how we are able to respond to questions like
"When do we native speakers of English ask whether an
action is 'voluntary' or not?" or "What does praying
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five times a day mean to Muslims?" But we do answer them.
Some philosophers appeal to privileged access and intuition,
some talk of hermeneutics, others try to stay behaviourists.
My only claim has been that such interpretations are not
always self-evident. We can be acting according to rules
that we would have difficulty formulating; and we may
often end up with corrigible interpretations. But however
the issue is resolved, it is not our present problem. It
is enough for us to lead the question about criteria back
to the fact that we do interpret activities in meaningful
frameworks, even if that fact has no accepted analysis at
present.
If these criteria are something given, as I claim,
then the challenge mentioned earlier does appear... We might
be faced with alternative sets of criteria and have to choose
among them. The objection could be put as follows.
Perhaps the 'usual criteria' you speak of
are only one possible set out of many. Per¬
haps they are not shared, and different philo¬
sophers appeal to radically different criteria.
Since these criteria influence the description
of the norms for framework choice, if you want
to avoid the plurality of self-enclosed, self-
legislating frameworks you spoke of above, you
will need a further set of criteria to decide
among these new alternatives.
Normally a dispute over criteria takes place in a lar¬
ger context of ordinary language and shared goals. Without
this context it would not be a dispute and to settle it we
must draw norms from the accepted context. But what if we
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differed radically .on the criteria for interpreting ac¬
tivities within frameworks? The criteria in question
are not philosophical theses. They are part of who we
are and how we live; they help make our community a
community and make us a "we". If I and another person
differ radically on such criteria, we will "be unable to
communicate, let alone share an activity as complex as
philosophical argument about criteria. If our criteria
are _S£ diverse, we may not even notice each other as ra¬
tional beings — may not form a "we" in any sense. The
objection presupposes that we can differ radically and
still communicate enough to compare criteria and raise
the question which to accept. Without such communication
there are no concrete alternatives to challenge our pre¬
sent criteria, hence the objection is empty. With such
communication, we already share too much for the objection
to have force. Yet, I repeat, what we share need not be
an identical language, set of concepts or practices. I
am not arguing, however, that there cannot be different
criteria in these fundamental matters, or that the "we"
formed by different rational beings might not be of vary¬
ing depths; but I am denying that "we" can be faced with
real alternatives which demand a real choice which goes
beyond the extent to which "we" have been able to share
goals and criteria.
The overall discussion of my thesis-argument does not in¬
volve fatal paradoxes of self-reference.
The third question about the thesis argument involves
issues of self-reference. Some of my principles and con-
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elusions threaten to destroy themselves "by generating
paradoxes. For example, I have made claims about all
frameworks and described the structure of framework recon¬
struction. If I have used a metaphysical framework in
referring to all frameworks, there may be a vicious para¬
doxes of self-reference involved in what I have said.
However, I do not think that the basic task of my thesis
arguments generates paradoxes.
As an interpretation of an area of language, the thesis
describes a local framework, in this case, that of doing
metaphysics. The description itself makes no assertions
about all entities — it does not affirm any metaphysical
principles. Like any description of a local framework,
this one can become data for a variety of metaphysics:
an ontological account of the results of my thesis-argument
would be a separate activity which could be performed in
a number of ways. However it would be done, there can
still be some agreement on the local goals and moves of
framework reconstruction, since, as I pointed out above,
the criteria for judging such a description are not frame-
work-dependent .
Paradoxes of self-reference might occur in another
fashion. Just as a general theory of literature may guide
my approach to a given poem, so I may be guided by general
principles about reality and knowledge when I interpret
the activity of framework reconstruction. As I pointed
out in Chapter Pour, you cannot derive necessary knowledge
about frameworks from such general principles, since the
principles are framework-dependent. However, an interpre-
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tation might "be guided "by such principles. They could in¬
fluence the selection of interpretative hypotheses, without
themselves "being asserted as premisses or evidence. It is
the interpretations which are measured against the data
and asserted. If different general principles suggest
rival interpretations, comparison with the data may lead
us to favour one interpretation. That, in turn, will lend
credence to the general principles which suggested it. But
the interpretation does not depend for its validity on a
prior assertion of those principles.
I do not "believe that the last two paragraphs exhaust
the ways in which paradoxes might he generated out of talk
about frameworks, but they do show that the task of my
thesis-argument is not itself destructively paradoxical.
A careful formulation might well uncover problems which
would have to be handled by a hierarchy of meta-language or
a similar device. On the other hand, I cannot rid myself
of the feeling that we do not need such devices in the na¬
tural language which we use to interpret our activities, if
that language is taken as a self-reflective process rather
than as a series of discrete stages with discontinuous
changes of rules and vocabularies. For, I think, we inter¬
pret any closed and completely specified language to our¬
selves in a language which shares the self-reflective quali¬
ties of the process of subjectivity as such, and never puts
its full weight down on a single closed set of rules and
categories such as would be needed to generate paradoxes.
Thus the description in my thesis-argument of philosophy
stays within the limits it sets down.
There is a pervasive feeling "behind, the objections
I have been considering. In one way or another, they
accuse the thesis-argument of falsifying itself by speaking
from beyond the limits it proclaims. In a way, they all
restate Hegel's objection to Kant: to draw a limit is
already to be beyond it. However, it is legitimate to
draw limits "from the inside" if what we are walling out
is an illusion people have taken as real. Such limits
wall nothing out — there is nothing beyond except the regu¬
lative ideals. The limits we draw picture the contours
of what we do, and contrast them with false self-images.
I have tried to give an interpretation of how we construct
and judge frameworks, and compared it with false pictures
stemming from the ideal of the pure subject. In doing so,
I have not claimed to be speaking with the authority of that
pure subject. My statements are meant to fall under the
restrictions they announce. My thesis-argument makes no
claim to be a neutral meta-discourse above the strife of
conflicting philosophies. Now it is true that it envisions
framework reconstruction as a whole, and tries to tell us
what we do when we philosophize. But what my thesis-argu¬
ment describes is something above the strife of conflicting
philosophies, viz. the structure of shared purposes and
goals which make that conflict possible. And this may in¬
deed transcend your or my philosophy. But what we share
is an activity, not an incorrigible description of that
activity. Interpretations of what philosophy is about are
not privileged; they are with us amid the strife and shouting.
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Appendix
THE ORDINARY-LANGUAGE ARGUMENT, CRITICISM OR ONGOING
LINGUISTIC PRACTICES, AND THE BOUNDARIES AND LIMITS
OE CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES
Introduction.
In the Appendix I criticize certain notions which
underly the theory of conceptual framework autonomy. In
general, my arguments support my previous conclusions about
the viability of criticism for metaphysical systems.
As discussed in my first chapter, "Relativity and
Understanding", there is a popular theme in contemporary
philosophy whose central notion is that linguistic discourse
is logically divided into numerous categories, both intra-
cultural as with science, religion and morality, and inter-
cultural as with comparative religions and anthropological
studies. In this view it is claimed that an unbridgeable
logical gulf exists between these various categories, so
that it makes no sense to speak of evaluating or criticizing
any of them — for this, the argument runs, would involve the
use of irrelevant criteria from outside the particular con¬
ceptual framework in question.
I will first show that the Wittgensteinian view that
ordinary language is "all right" as it is does not amount
to the claim that ongoing linguistic practices cannot be
criticized. Specifically, I will argue that there may
indeed be inherent confusions, inconsistencies and even
contradictions in an established mode of discourse. I will
then argue that various discourses are not as distinctly
divided into categories as the defenders of the autonomy
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theory would claim; and thereby it is possible to make
critical evaluations of different conceptual frameworks.
I will then show it is a mistaken idea that rationality
and inference have wholly different and unique meanings in
different modes of discourse. For this would mean that a
reasoned inference in one mode of discourse would be unin¬
telligible in terms of others, and thereby there would be
no basis for claiming it a reasoned inference.
The autonomy of discourse thesis.
Many followers of Wittgenstein have supposed that his
work has established the general validity of the claim that
ordinary language is always "all right" as it is. They
believe, that is to say, that the very fact that such a
practice is ongoing shows that it is free of fundamental
errors or confusions. In two sections of Chapter Three,
I discussed this, the 'alternative program' - the view
ascribed to Wittgenstein that common sense, as embodied
in ordinary language, should be used as the standard for
adjudicating philosophical disputes. It was argued in
this view that ordinary language works effectively in
getting its job done, and that ordinary language was free
from philosophical paradoxes and problems. Emphasis is
on the active and ongoing linguistic practice. As part
of a lived language game, any correctly made comment in that
situation was described as being in order as it was. The
meaning of an utterance, according to Wittgenstein's view,
is properly understood when seen only in this context.
There is no theoretical or transcendental sense which goes
beyond the practical area of the linguistic activity.
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This autonomy of an internal consistency and meaning
or sense applies to all ongoing linguistic practices. For
example, philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein's argu¬
ments here hold that religious language is substantially
in order simply because it is a well-established practice,
widely engaged in by a large number of people over a long
period of time. D. Z. Phillips is one who has frequently
made this claim.
The criteria of what can sensibly be said of
God are to be found within the religious tra¬
dition. ... They are given by religious
discourse itself. Philosophy can claim
justifiably to show what is meaningful in
religion only if it is prepared to examine
religious concepts in the context from which
1
they derive their meaning.
It follows from this position that the role of philo¬
sophical criticism is limited in certain important ways.
Philosophers have often thought to expose religious language,
or certain parts of it, as meaningless — as wholly without
sense. But if, as Phillips claims, the concepts of re¬
ligion derive their meaning from their own context, then
the philosophers can hope for no such wholesale refutations.
For the very fact that religious language is used, and has
been used for a long time, demonstrates that its concepts
do have meaning. At most the philosopher can tidy up minor
D. Z. Phillips, Religion and Understanding (New
York: MacMillan, 1967;, p. 68. For a criticism of the
autonomy view of religion see: Gerald Downing, "Games,
Families, the Public, and Religion", Philosophy 47 (1972),
pp. 38-54- and James King, "Fideism and Rationality", New
Scholasticism 49 (1975): PP- 4-31-4-50.
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misunderstandings around the edges of religious language.
There is no possibility of fundamental criticism which gets
at the very heart of religious language.
Of course, the same claim is made for other areas of
discourse beside religion. Peter Winch, as we have seen,
has claimed that primitive beliefs in magic enjoy a similar
immunity from criticism.
It is my purpose in the Appendix to attack in detail
this claim. I will show that the mere fact that a prac¬
tice is ongoing does not prove it free of errors, confu¬
sions or contradictions. Any or all of these may be found
in a linguistic practice; the only way of learning whether
they are present is by close examination and analysis.
There is not an a_ priori guarantee that none can exist, and
there is no guarantee of autonomy or isolation from external
criticism. I will show, rather, that coherence of a linguis¬
tic practice is not an all-or-nothing question: incoherences
may be present without bringing the mode of discourse to a
halt, and so it may not be inferred that there are none in
a continuing practice.
I will approach this task by first examining some argu¬
ments offered by those who believe that ongoing linguistic
practices cannot appropriately be criticized. I hope to
establish that their arguments are misconceived, and that
they have misinterpreted the important thrusts of Wittgen¬
stein's work. Second, I will examine some of the passages
in Wittgenstein's published works which have been taken to
show that linguistic practices are immune from fundamental
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criticism, and offer alternative interpretations which,
avoid this unfortunate conclusion. Finally, I will con¬
sider some hypothetical examples which illustrate the na¬
ture of some of the possible infelicities which may occur
in ordinary, ongoing modes of discourse.
Philosophy and the reform of language.
One philosopher who has felt deeply the problem of
2
linguistic self-sufficiency is Helen Hervey. Hervey be¬
lieves that Wittgenstein's theory of 'meaning as use'
commits him to the view that ordinary language is beyond
the power of philosophy to modify; and yet, she notes,
Wittgenstein by no means always heeded his own renunciation
of linguistic reform. "... the Philosophical Investiga¬
tions is devoted to the attempt to show just where, in
Wittgenstein's opinion, ordinary ways of speaking are like-
3
ly to give rise to mistaken conceptions." That is, be¬
lieves Hervey, Wittgenstein did attempt reform and critic-
cism of ordinary language despite his repeated disavowals.
Typically, she says, Wittgenstein adopted a behaviourist,
anti-dualist approach; and yet, "... dualism lurks in
the background of ordinary language."^ One of his major
concerns is the sort of problem that arises when language
is "idling". But, asks Hervey, "... if words can be
used wrongly, or misused, then can it be maintained ...
2
Helen Hervey, "The Problem of the Modal Language-




Ibid. , p. 39-6.
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
tran. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: MacMillan, 1970), =#= 1327
(Citations to Wittgenstein's works refer to the numbered para¬
graphs into which they are divided).
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that every sentence., even the vaguest sentence, is in per¬
fect order?
Indeed it does seem often that Wittgenstein denies
that he intends any reform of ordinary language. In
Philosophical Investigations #124 Wittgenstein says:
"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use
of language; it can in the end only describe it. ...
It leaves everything as it is." And yet it is true that
one of his major concerns was to clear up confusions of
language, not all of which result from philosophers' mis¬
use of words. The former strain, claiming that philosophy
cannot 'interfere', is the "basis for the conviction that
Wittgenstein rules out any criticism of ongoing practices.
But as Hervey notes, the latter strain, the necessity for
removing confusion which actually arises, is also important.
It is my claim that in these passages Wittgenstein does
not endorse everything which is> said or could he said in
ordinary language. Rather, he is repudiating the view that
ordinary language needs to he replaced across the hoard, as
inadequate for its purposes. He is denying that what is
required is some general reform which would substitute an
artificial, or formal, or systematic language for our cus¬
tomary speech. Certainly Wittgenstein tried to clear up
mistake, confusions, incoherences, and outright contradic¬
tions that sometimes arise in ordinary speech. His point
in these disputed passages was that no wholesale replace¬
ment of ordinary language with something else could accom¬
plish this purpose.
James Carney has taken roughly this position; he says
Wittgenstein "... devotes much ... of his time showing
6
Hervey, op_. cit. , p. 341.
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where aspects of ordinary language have misled people and
7
have thus given rise to conceptual confusion." The
vagueness of our ordinary language arises not from any im¬
perfection of our language, says Carney, "but rather from
the indeterminate number and complexity of human purposes.
Since we are such very complicated and unpredictable sorts
of beings, no conceptual structure could be developed in
advance that would be guaranteed to serve all our possible
needs. And so " . . . giving words strict rules is un¬
necessary, for our sentences in their ordinary context make
O
sense without such rules." An ideal language would be
beside the point, and that is all Wittgenstein meant.
Hervey, however, remains unpersuaded by this. In a
reply to Carney, she repeats her claim that there is a
9
fundamental incoherence in Wittgenstein's thought. For
if ordinary language is often or even occasionally wrong
or misleading, then the technique of seeking philosophical
10
enlightenment in it is "at least open to question." And
in any case, she says, when we study ordinary language
philosophically, we are doing more than just describing it.
"We are criticizing, suggesting, innovating, and I consider
that Wittgenstein was often in fact engaged in such activi-
t.11ties."
7
James Carney, "Is Wittgenstein Impaled on Miss
Hervey's Dilemma?" Philosophy 36 (1961), pp. 167-170.
®Ibid., p. 170.
9
Helen Hervey, "A Reply to Dr. Carney s Challenge",
Philosophy 38 (1963), pp. 170-175-
10Ibid., p. 172.
11
Ibid., p. 175. For an argument that Wittgenstein's
philosophy is more than descriptive, and is in fact construc¬
tion, see Mark Headlee, "Wittgenstein's Philosophy: Old and
Hew", Dialogue 15 (1973), pp. 39-/b4-.
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The latter point, of course, is my own argument: Witt¬
genstein certainly did criticze, innovate, and suggest chan¬
ges in some ways of speaking which are customary. It is
obvious from reading Wittgenstein's work that, if he ever
meant to reject the possibility of changing ordinary lang¬
uage, he did not always heed his own advice. But I deny
Hervey's claim that there is an incoherence; and later in
this Appendix I will show how some of these passages can
be construed in the manner I have suggested — i.e. that
they do not constitute any general endorsement of every
part of every ongoing linguistic practice.
I believe Hervey fails to distinguish between overall
adequacy, and adequacy for a specific purpose. Her point
is that language is not rendered generally inadequate just
because there is always vagueness and the possibility of
confusion. Vagueness may cause problems in some cases,
and then it can be dealt with specifically. My point
is that, although ordinary language is adequate in general,
there can always be these specific problems which require
attention. Vagueness, ambiguity, incoherence, and contra¬
diction may be occasionally found within this generally
adequate ordinary language. Borderline cases continually
arise; and as soon as new concepts are defined to take
care of the borderline cases, new cases will be found which
are on the borderlines of the new concepts„ Our language
functions despite all this.
We are concerned here more with confusion than with
vagueness. More, that is to say, with questions about the
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general operation of concepts than about the boundaries be¬
tween adjacent ones. And here, too, our language generally
functions well; problems can usually be dealt with specifi¬
cally when they arise. Wittgenstein's method is to examine
carefully the ways in which we speak in order to cast light
on concepts. The goal of this examination is to' clarify
the function of particular concepts, not to eliminate all
confusion from the language. It is true that there can be no
general insurance against future problems; but it is impos¬
sible and useful to clarify specific confusions and incoher¬
ences.
Such confusions can and do arise within ordinary
language, as well as from the philosophical attempt to
understand. It is not required for ordinary purposes that
language always run without a hitch; it is enough that
(most of the time) it runs. When language breaks down,
12
and we do not "know our way about", then it is the philo¬
sopher's job to find the problem and correct it. When
Wittgenstein said that ordinary language is all right as
it is, his point is this: its occasional failures do not
vitiate its usefulness, either for ordinary purposes or
12
Wittgenstein, op cit., #123. In discussing Witt¬
genstein's alternative program, it was explained that philo¬
sophy has no business reforming language; philosophy was to
leave everything as it was. This did not mean that language
cannot be changed, but only that such changes must arise from
concrete needs of the language users and not from abstract re¬
flection about the nature of language. The philosopher's job
then was to describe language in its everyday workings, and in
doing so assemble reminders so that the actual pattern of uses
is made clear to us. In emphasizing the linguistic activity
Wittgenstein is not reducing the meaning of language to an iso¬
lated speech act, a psycho-physical behaviour or even to the
medium of speech itself. What is stressed is rather the pur¬
poses embodied within the language activity, as expressed in
the linguistic community. It is this area that is alright as
it stands, for it rests on no further theoretical or transcen¬
dental ground. But there is, of course, the possibility of
making mistakes in following the rules of a language game;
our judgments can be mistaken, and as such we can form false
beliefs. Beliefs, facts, mistaken and incorrect usage is dis-
cussed_in_a section below, "Criticism of belief and the im-
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for philosophy. There is no need to seek a general Justi¬
fication for language, or a general replacement of ordinary
by constructed language. Ordinary language is, in general,
sufficient for its purposes; "but this does not mean that
nothing can ever go wrong within it.
Although incomplete ordinary language is in general adequate.
Many philosophers who have "been impressed with Witt¬
genstein' s later work have failed to recognize the impor¬
tance of this distinction between the specific and the
general. Wittgenstein did much to inspire the shift in
emphasis from formal artificial languages to the study of
natural languages; perhaps his followers were so caught
up in the need to defend ordinary language that they felt
they must defend every specific remark in it, not merely
its general adequacy. One who appeared to do this is
13
Alice Ambrose. Ambrose argues that ordinary language
is not, in any philosophically important sense, inadequate
to do its Job. True, there are some Jobs it cannot do;
but that is not a valid criticism, so long as it does its
own. Arithmetic cannot do some of the Jobs of higher
mathematics, but it is not for that reason an inadequate
arithmetic: it is altogether sufficient for the everyday
purposes to which it is put, namely counting sheep, balan¬
cing checkbooks, etc. Its incompleteness is not like that
of a deck of cards from which some are missing; it is more
like playing a different game, for example one in which the
1 3^Alice Ambrose, "The Problems of Linguistic Inade¬
quacy", Essays in Analysis (New York: Humanities Press, 1966).
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14
Jokers are not used. Again, a road map may show no
details of surrounding mountains, and so he useless to a
mountain climber; but it may be a perfectly good road map
nonetheless. In mathematics a notion is sometimes found
inadequate for some purpose, and a new one is introduced.
But "... there was no . . . inadequacy before the need
was felt which prompted introducing a more useful notion.
A symbolism cannot be inadequate so long as it does the
15
work it was designed to do."
Now this is all unobjectionable so long as it is taken
in the way in which it was meant. Ambrose is quite correct
in defending ordinary language against those who would re¬
place it, wholesale, by something else. Nothing would be
accomplished by this even if it could be done. But there
is a danger here, arising from the fact that nothing is
said to distinguish the defence of the general adequacy of
ordinary language fromlhe defence of each specific part of
it. In showing that there is no use trying to replace
ordinary language by something else, perhaps a constructed
language, Ambrose might be taken to hold that there is
never anything wrong with any part of ordinary language.
Her analogy with arithmetic might seem to suggest that it
is never in order for a philosopher to suggest emendations
to ordinary language — that ordinary language accomplishes
all its purposes, and so can never be properly criticized.





of arithmetic, and it is usually notdifficult to tell what
is arithmetic and what is not. On the other hand, as Witt¬
genstein has shown, the uses of language are very multi¬
farious. Language does not have just one purpose, or even
a determinate number of distinct purposes. New purposes
arise, and sometimes the language is not adequate to accom¬
plish them without revision; for the ways in which language
can fail are as multifarious as the ways in which it can
succeed. Ordinary language constantly changes; and philo¬
sophical analysis is one of the reasons for change, "because
philosophers are on the alert for problems.
When Wittgenstein says ordinary language is all right
as it is, he does not mean that nothing ever goes wrong with
it. He means that when problems arise the solution is to
seek particular corrections. His point is that whatever
changes are made, it will still be ordinary — not a formal —
language that serves our ends.
Ambrose is correct in saying that ordinary language
neither requires nor is capable of systematic additions
that will make it complete. But the fact that no systema¬
tic correction is possible does not mean that no correction
of any sort is possible.
Linguistic behaviour precedes rules and justification.
A more satisfactory account of 'linguistic self-suffic¬
iency' is given by J. B. M. Hunter."1^ What Wittgenstein
meant to claim, says Hunter, was that language stands alone,
16
Jo B. M. Hunter, "Wittgenstein's Theory of Linguis¬
tic Self-Sufficiency", Dialogue 6 (1967), pp. 367-378.
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requiring no theoretical, general justification or explana¬
tion. Linguistic "behaviour precedes the rules we attrihte
to it; a person may use a word correctly (in fact we ty¬
pically do) without having in mind any sort of explicit
17
rule. But Hunter then draws the distinction between
self-sufficiency and perfection. He writes:
It is important to understand . .. that
Wittgenstein is not saying that", everything
that anyone says is always perfectly in¬
telligible, and that there is never a need
for explanation or interpretation ... but
only that we do not always, or even typically,
need explanations of what people say, not
interpret their remarks to ourselves as they
say them, and we do not generally learn to
use a word by learning a rule for its use,
nor know a rule concerning tin use of words
which we use perfectly competently. The
normal thing is for what we say to be under¬
stood: when this fails we explain, inter-
y\ g
pret, define ...
Language does not rest on a theoretical justification, nor
is any general justification of it possible. Explanation
and justification occur within language, and they deal
with particular cases.
It is failure to recognize this, I believe-, that has
led some philosophers to suppose that no criticism of an
ongoing linguistic practice can even be valid. It is
possible to emphasize the importance of ordinary language,
and yet remain critical of its occasional shortcomings.
^ Wittgenstein, op. cit. , # 82.
Hunter, op cit. , pp. 370-371.
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Wittgenstein's remarks on linguistic- self-sufficiency.
In the previous section I discussed some mistaken
interpretations of Wittgenstein's view of ordinary language.
Wow I will examine some of the passages which are taken to
support this erroneous interpretation; I will show that it
is not necessary, or even plausible, to construe Wittgen¬
stein as saying that everything which is said in ordinary
language is all right as it is. -Thus I hope to show that
criticism of existing linguistic practices cannot he ruled
out _a priori, and that external criticism is possible.
Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations says:
On the one hand it is clear that every sentence
in our language 'is in order as it is'. That
is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not
yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a
perfect language awaited construction by us.
— On the other hand it seems clear that where
there is sense there must be perfect order.
— So there must be perfect order in the
19
vaguest sentence. y
It is easy to see how some might think this an endorsement
of every sentence that occurs in ordinary language. But let
us look more closely at the context. Por here Wittgenstein
is rejecting his earlier view that there is an "utterly
20
simple" structure of thought. In response to his earlier
argument he now stresses that every sentence must have a
"quite unexceptionable sense". This means, I take it, that
there is nothing wrong with its sense; its sense is not de¬
ficient in some way because of a failure to achieve perfec-
Wittgenstein, op cit., # 98.
20 Ibid., £ 97.
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tion. For "we are.not striving after an ideal." A sentence
does not take its sense from logic, seen as the "a priori
21
order of the world." This notion of logic as a picture
of the world is in fact the target which this whole section
of the Investigations aims to destroy.
What Wittgenstein is contrasting here is not correctly
and incorrectly used sentences in ordinary language; rather,
it is ordinary language and ideal language. That this is
the point is clear from a comparison with a passage in the
Blue Book.
It is wrong to say that in philosophy we con¬
sider an ideal language as opposed to our
ordinary one. For this makes it appear as
though we thought we 'could improve on ordinary
language. But ordinary language is all right.
Whenever we make up 'ideal languages' it is not
in order to replace our ordinary language hy
them; hut just to remove some trouble caused
in someone's mind hy thinking that he has got
22
hold of the exact use of a common word.
Wittgenstein here is warning of the temptation to suppose
that language must he "utterly simple", and "of the purest
23
crystal", and without "empirical cloudiness or uncertainty."
This temptation is very strong, hut it must he avoided,
for "when we helieve that we must find that order, must find
the ideal, in our actual language, we become dissatisfied
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What we must do is to " . . . see that we must stick to the
subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and
25
imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties." ^ We
must see that "... the crystalline purity of logic was,
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a require-
ment." "We see that what we call 'sentence' and 'language'
has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family
27
of structures more or less related to one another."
All this, I think, shows that Wittgenstein was not
speaking at all of the possibility of misuse of ordinary
language. The argument is wholly addressed to ridding
ourselves of a mistaken picture of language and logic. Its
28
thrust is to urge us not to advance theories, but rather
to ask ourselves, "... is the word ever actually used in
29
this way in the language-game which is its original home." y
If Wittgenstein had intended to deny the possibility of mis¬
takes, misuses, or confusions in functioning practices he
would surely have said more on the subject than a single
ambiguous sentence.
The same argument is further advanced in Philosophical
Investigations #124, another passage often cited in support
of the claim that ordinary language is immune from criticism.
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the
actual use of language; it can in the end
only describe it.
Por it cannot give it any foundation either.
It leaves everything as it is.







mathematical discovery can advance it. A
1 leading problem of mathematical logic' is
for us a problem of mathematics like any
other.3^
This means, I take it, that philosophy cannot interfere
with the use of ordinary language in general; philosophy
cannot replace the language which is used by another, more
suited to the problems of philosophy — nor can it support
ordinary language, either. No wholesale replacement of
the language which is used is possible, and no justification
of it is necessary. Wittgenstein is arguing here that
philosophy must give up delusions of grandeur, its ambition
to offer theories which will explain the general use of
language; for language is the primary phenomenon, and the
best the philosopher can do is study it closely. "What
we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to
31
their everyday use.""^
But this does not mean at all that philosophy does
nothing.
The results of philosophy are the uncovering
of one or another piece of plain nonsense and
of bumps that the understanding has got by
running its head up against the limits of
language. These bumps make us see the value
32
of the discovery.
In order to get clear about the meanings- of the words we use
we must look closely at the ways in which we use them; we
must discover what went wrong when we are "entangled in our






... are, of course, not empirical problems
they are solved, rather, by looking into the
workings of our language, and that in such
a way as to make us recognize those workings:
in despite of an urge to misunderstand them.
The problems are solved, not by giving new
information, but by arranging what we have
always known. Philosophy is a battle
against the bewitchment of our intelligence
XlL
by means of language.
When Wittgenstein says that philosophy cannot "interfere"
with the actual use of language, then, he is not supposing
that the philosopher has nothing to say. Rather, what
the philosopher has to say is not at all what many have
thought. What the philosopher has to offer is a close
examination of the "workings of our language, and that
in such a way as to make us recognize those workings."
Another passage in the Investigations which has often
been taken to mean that ordinary language is immune to cri¬
ticism is ^ 654: "Our mistake is to look for an explana¬
tion where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-
phenomenon', That is, where we ought to have said:
35
this language-game is played." But again the context
does not support that interpretation, for Wittgenstein here
is not talking about all language-games whatsoever, but of
a particular one: psychological expressions. He is trying
here to break the hold of another tempting picture, namely
the notion that such expressions are depictions of inner
states of affairs. We are tempted to suppose that when





is a particular process going on in my mind, namely the
process of intending to do so-and-so." In order to show
that this is wrong, Wittgenstein here offers several exam¬
ples. "What is the natural expression of an intention? —
Look at a cat when it stalks a "bird; or a "beast when it
36
wants to escape." The concept of intention is grounded
in certain sorts of "behaviour in certain contexts; when
we look at the cat we do not ask ourselves what processes
are occurring in its head. Even if we were interested
in feline "brain physiology no information ahout the cat's
head would give us a "better understanding of its intention
to spring at the "bird. The intention-behaviour is itself
the "proto-phenomenon". That is, it does not require, and
is not susceptible of, explanation in terms of some other
phenomenon. "The question is not one of explaining a
language-game "by means of our experiences, "but of noting
37
a language-game."
Wittgenstein continues: "We say a dog is afraid his
master will heat him; hut not, he is afraid his master
38
will heat him tomorrow? Why not?" The reason we do
not say this is that a dog, having no language, is incap¬
able of behaviour which would express fear of being beaten
tomorrow. What is basic to the concept is the expression,
not any feeling in the dog's head. And if one is forced
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the main thing one -guesses is just the context — not any-
39
thing ahout the inner states of those involved.
The whole context shows that Wittgenstein iS" attacking
a particular view of mental words — a view which seeks to
explain them in terms of descriptions of inner processes
or states. He shows that no such descriptions could play
the necessary roles in our language; and so, in this par¬
ticular case, what we should say is, "This language-game
is played." He does not say, and there is no hint that
he means, that we can never say any more ahout any ongoing
language-game; he is making a particular point, and some
have mistakenly taken him to he making a general one.
Again, if it were his purpose to claim that linguistic
practices are immune from criticism he would have done more
than merely offer this one remark in passing.
The view that the ordinary workings of language are
flawless is obviously correlated with the view that all
philosophical problems are created by philosophers them¬
selves and their "metaphysical use of words." That is,
some have believed that Wittgenstein meant that problems
only arise when philosophers or others use words in tech¬
nical senses foreign to their native language-games; if
they had only left ordinary language to its own devices
all would have been well. But this is not Wittgenstein's
view; it is true that philosophers have frequently been
guilty of this, and have paid the price in confusion; but
use of words in odd ways is not limited to philosophers;
philosophical problems can arise anywhere.
39Ibid. , #652.
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The problems arising through a misinterpre¬
tation of our forms of language have the charac¬
ter of depth. They are deep disquietudes;
their roots are as deep in us as the forms of
our language and their significance is as
40
great as the importance of our language.
So confusions are not always the results of "bad philosophy,
of metaphysical flights of fancy. Our language is shot
through with potential problems; there is a built-in
danger of misusing language in the ways that produce
philosophical problems. If ordinary speech in everyday
life were beyond the reach of philosophical criticism,
what would be the source of these "deep disquietudes?"
There would be no misinterpretation of language to give
rise to problems in the first place. The philosopher's
job involves both prevention and correction of linguistic
confusion.
In this section I have tried to rebut the claim that
Wittgenstein repudiated all attempts to change language in
any way. Instead I have argued that the passages which
have been so interpreted were really addressed to other
problems entirely. So far as Wittgenstein is concerned,
it is often appropriate and necessary to suggest remedies
for specific confusions of language.
Criticism of an ongoing linguistic practice: Azande and
witchcraft.
In the previous sections I have shown that those who
claim ongoing linguistic practices cannot rationally be
criticized have not proved their case. There is, there-
40Ibid. , #111.
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fore, no theoretical reason why we should not examine such
practices for conflicts, confusions, and incoherences;
there is no a_ priori guarantee that linguistic practices
will he free of them. I will now examine some actual
examples of practices which do or could exhibit such in¬
coherences ; thus I hope to cast light on the sorts of
problems which philosophers might profitably seek to cor¬
rect.
Peter Winch has claimed strongly that the practices
of witchcraft and magic among the West African Azande is in
41
perfect order. However false, irrational, and contra¬
dictory it may seem to us, says Winch, it is in order be¬
cause it operates according to the Zande criteria of truth,
rationality, and coherence; since it does in fact operate
perfectly well, any criticism we Western, scientifically-
oriented observers may make is irrelevant. Por evaluating
Zande practices, argues Winch, the only relevant criteria
are the criteria employed by the Azande; to impose our
criteria of rationality or coherence on them is to make
a conceptual error. This is because the meaning of the
terms and concepts of the Azande is determined, as it must
be, by their use of them; and thus because of the internal
relationship of concept and context, the concepts exist
autonomously, free from outside criticism. And since the
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First I must emphasize that I have so far
done little more than note the fact, conclu¬
sively established by Evans-Pritchard, that
the Azande do in faGt conduct their affairs
to their own satisfaction in this way and are
4?
at a loss when forced to abandon the practice.
Obviously this is the same claim with which we have been
dealing with — the claim that an ongoing, functioning
linguistic practice is self-justifying, and cannot sensi-
4
bly be criticized by criteria other than its own.
I have several comments to make about this claim of
Winch's. First, it is important that he seriously mis¬
represents the situation among the Azande; according to
his own primary source, Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, the
Zande practices do not function quite so well as Winch
43
imagines.
Winch bases his argument on the fact that the Azande
do not choose to abandon their beliefs in witchcraft and
magic, even when challenged by outsiders. They seem to
find this method of life entirely satisfactory, and dismiss
alternatives as lightly as we might dismiss a West African
who tried to convert us to their beliefs. But, and this
is crucial, there are problems with the Zande practices.
A major theme of Evans-Pritchard's book is the effort to
explain just how it is that the Azande come to terms with
these logical difficulties. In brief, they simply do not
inquire into the problems, they ignore the inconsistencies,
44
they "have no theoretical interest in the subject."
^Ibid., p. 311.
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For example, the Azande believe that every human death
is the result of witchcraft or magic, they have no concept
of death as resulting from natural causes. ^ Witchcraft
is practiced only by those who are hereditary witches;
these have within their abdominal cavities a strange stuff
called "witchcraft substance". Witches are regarded as
wicked, and their evil is much feared; no Zande ever con¬
fesses to being a witch. Aside from post-mortem examina¬
tion of a person's body, the only method of identifying
witches is by use of the so-called "poison oracle" (in¬
volving feeding poison to fowl and observing their behav¬
iour) which governs most major decisions of Zande life.
Since no Zande will willingly admit that a relative is
a witch, when a kinsman dies he concludes that the death
is necessarily the result of witchcraft. Zande tradition
requires that reparation be made, by monetary compensation
paid by the witch or his clan, or by killing the witch
directly or by magic. At the time of Evans-Fritchard's
observations the Azande were under British rules, and murder
was prohibited; so magical killing was considered the most
honourable form of vengeance.^
But, as I have noted, the Azande never admit to being
witches, or to having a witch in the family. So a Zande
dies, and his clan practices magic to take the life of the
witch who killed him (as identified by the poison oracle);
but when the latter dies, as eventually he must, (the Azande
seem in no hurry about these things) his frie nds and clan
suppose that his death was in turn due to wicked witchcraft
Ibid. , pp. 26-28.
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by person or persons unknown. They then ask the oracle
to identify the witch guilty of their kinsman's death, and
attempt magicaLvengeance in their turn, and so on.
Now, it is clear that the same death is being regarded
in very different ways by different Azande: when A dies
his clansmen attempt the magical assassination of B, who
supposedly killed him by witchcraft; but of course B's
family regard him as an innocent victim of the witchcraft
of C_. This fact is concealed from public view because
the Azande do not reveal the identity of the witch who
killed their kinsman. Thus the conflicting views do not
come to light.
The conflict is not entirely hidden, however, because
the prince of the district must be notified of all magical
vengeance taken on witches, and of the mystical information
concerning every death. Thus the prince must know that
the death of any one of his subjects is simultaneously re¬
garded by his relations as the result of some other's
witchcraft, and by another clan as the outcome of their
magical vengeance for the death of their relative. Evans-
Pritchard reports,
. Princes must be aware of the contradiction be¬
cause they know the outcome of every death in
their province. When I asked Prince Gangura
how he accepted the death of a man both as the
action of vengeance-magic and of witchcraft he
smiled and admitted that all was not well with
the present day system.^
So it turns out on closer inspection that Zande practices
are subject to Just the sort of problems we might expect;
47 Ibid., p. 28.
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those who possess all the information recognize exactly
the conflicts which we recognize. The Azande, then, do
not, as Winch claims, have such different criteria that
there can "be no communication. All that can be said is
that their failure to deal rationally with their concept
of witchcraft does not lead to immediate problems, and that
it has been retained. And that, after all, is easily
understandable if witches are not real. There is nothing
here to support Winch's claim that what is irrational for
us is rational for the Azande.
Another problem concerns the Zande belief about inheri¬
tance of witchcraft-substance. The Azande believe that
all witches and only witches have witchcraft-substance in
their bodies. Moreover, all the same-gender descendents
of witches are also witches; thus all the sons, grandsons,
etc. of a male witch are witches, and all the daughters,
granddaughters, etc. of a female witch are also witches.
Now it appears obvious that either all members of a clan
have witchcraft substance in their bodies, or none do. And
so if it is found when the body of one clan member is examined
after death, it would follow that all living members of the
same clan are witches. But the Azande do not draw this
conclusion; and they do not consider that the coherence of
their system is compromised when no witchcraft substance is
found in the body of the son of a male witch. Moreover,
says Winch, the Azande are perfectly justified in not
drawing this conclusion, for it is only to us sophisticated
philosophers that this conclusion logically follows. It
does not follow for the Azande because logical inference is
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rooted in linguistic practices, and the Zande practices
do not involve this particular inference.
But again Winch misrepresents the Zande situation.
It is true that the Azande are not troubled by the argument.
They do not see the argument as sufficient to make them
abandon their beliefs about the nature of witchcraft;
their practice continues. But it is not true that it is
somehow outside their conceptual scope. They are perfect¬
ly capable of comprehending its significance, and of employ¬
ing it themselves when it suits their purposes. Evans-
Pritchard says that sometimes a Zande who is accused of
witchcraft will cite in his defence the fact that the bodies
of members of his clan have been examined after death,
and been found free of witchcraft substance. Therefore,
the defence runs, I must not be a witch. This argument
may be offered even though there have been other members
of the clan who have been conclusively convicted of witch¬
craft.^® It is not that, as Winch claims, the Azande reason
in some manner fundamentally different from our way; it is
rather that they sometimes choose not to reason at all on
this subject.
In his defence of the Azande, Winch seems a bit confused
as to his purpose. He defends their right not to be logi¬
cal, if they wish, regarding their mystical beliefs. But
this is not the same as showing that they are being logical,
in a manner different from our logic. It is the latter
which Winch requires to support his argument that criteria
of rationality are grounded in each linguistic practice and
48Ibid., pp. 123-124 and 126.
294.
•uncriticizable from- outside it. And yet the Zande practice
continues. It contains incoherences that lead to mistakes
of fact, such as expecting witchcraft substance where none
is to be found; and it contains others that lead to out¬
right contradictions, such as believing that a death occurs
for two mutually exclusive reasons. Some Azande recognize
these problems some of "the time; some concede that there
are conflicts which they do not know how to resolve. But
their mystical mode of discourse continues to function more
or less successfully, most of the time. Obviously it is
possible, then, for an ongoing linguistic practice to be
in partial disorder; so we cannot infer a priori that all
such practices are wholly coherent.
Criticism of beliefs and the importance of data.
Let us now consider the question from a slightly
different angle, by looking at changes within a particular
language, and a more familiar one. In Europe in the Middle
Ages the belief that the earth is flat was perfectable
respectable; scholars were aware that some of the ancients
had believed in a round earth, for various reasons, and
doubtless some shared that belief. But most men, even
educated men, were content to rely on the "obvious" evi¬
dence of the senses that the earth is approximately flat.
And in that day and age this mistake was harmless: no one
was able to circumnavigate the globe, and probably no one
much cared to.
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It is true, there was some evidence to the contrary
at hand; observant sailors always knew that the mast of an
approaching ship appeared over the horizon before its hull;
but the implication was not considered. And of course
travellers were aware of the change in elevation of the
stars as they travelled north or south; this knowledge
was even used as a method of primitive navigation. But it
was not generally remarked that "this would be inexplicable
if the surface of the earth were flat.
Now, it is not that these men's conceptual powers were
unequal to the task of understanding the shape of the earth.
Their language was perfectly capable of expressing the dif¬
ference between a plate-shaped object and one shaped like
a ball. They were not fools, nor was their language so
very much less developed than our own.
The point is that the incoherence of their belief was
not drawn to their attention by circumstances; it made no
difference that most men had false beliefs about the shape
of the planet; because no one had any occasion to do any¬
thing about it. The mistake was not so much a logical as
a sociological one; it was easy to overlook the reasons
for believing that the earth is spherical because nothing
in the milieu brought them into prominence. Even the
fact, if known, that Eratosthenes of Alexandria had cal¬
culated the diameter of the earth fairly accurately, using
impeccable geometrical and astronomical methods, was not
sufficient to break the hold of the "obvious" flatness of
the earth.
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In these circumstances, I want to say, it was not
irrational to "believe the earth flat; it was rather a
failure to engage the ratiocinative process at all. The
reasons against believing the earth flat were not recog¬
nized; reasons for that "belief seemed unnecessary; and
the incoherence did not come to the surface. Wittgen¬
stein remarks on such a point: "It is a fact of experience
that human heings alter their concepts, exchange them for
others when they learn new facts; when in this way what
was formerly important to them become unimportant, and
vice verse.
By contrast, for an educated man of today to believe
the earth flat would be wholly irrational. The question
cannot be stifled; it is in the ambience in a world of
intercontinental passenger airplane flights. And one who
is aware of the facts cannot rationally deny their conse¬
quences: the earth is, roughly, spherical. The earth has
^ Wittgenstein, Zettel, # 352. The disagreement
between Columbus and a fifteenth-century geographer about
the shape of the earth involves mistaken usage of language,
i.e. they disagreed on the facts, not the meaning of words.
In contrast, incorrect usage might be found in a disa¬
greement with the question of whether a whale is a fish.
Here one person is at least using the word "fish" with a
different intention, and thereby incorrectly using language
(as it is ordinarily used).
To maintain the above distinction between mistaken and
incorrect usage we must accept the notion of consistency
argued for earlier. If correct language is said to be
synonymous with ordinary language then the following could
be set forth. The fifteenth-century geographer spoke as
most others did at that time about the earth being flat,
and thus if to use a word correctly is to use it as most
others do, then Columbus used language incorrectly. We
don't accept this, of course, because we maintain consis¬
tency or coherence in a context extending beyond the immed¬
iate or local area of belief and practice.
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no edge, and that fact is incompatible with its "being
flat. The reasons for "believing that the earth is round
are good ones, and overwhelmingly so.
They are not reasons of a new and unique character.
They are not reasons which would have been incomprehensible
to a medieval man; if he could have had them before them
he could have drawn the same conclusions as we do. And
in fact he did, as we have seen, have some of them before
him. His belief was not irrational, but — and this is
the point — it was not correct, either. The belief in
the flatness of the earth led to no unfortunate consequen¬
ces at that time; but that is not enough to make it a
true belief. The incompatibility of this belief with
the indisputable facts was exposed when astronomical ob¬
servation became more sophisticated and systematic; and
more dramatically when man sailed around the world. The
old belief had to be abandoned.
The significance of all this for the present argument
is this: the conceptual connections between facts, evi¬
dence, beliefs, reasons, etc. are many and various. It
simply will not do to say, as Winch does, that criteria
lie wholly within a particular linguistic practice; and
that therefore no criticism based on other criteria is
relevant. The medievals failed to recognize that certain
facts were evidence for the roundness of the earth, but that
does not mean that those facts were any the less conclusive
evidence — either forthe medievals or for us. Nor does the
failure of the Azande to take seriously that incoherences
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in their "beliefs about magic mean that they are not real
incoherences.
To illustrate the latter point, let us consider a
hypothetical case in which the Zande witchcraft beliefs
face problems similar to those which confronted the flat-
earth theory. As we have seen, the Azande have no theore¬
tical interest in the problems inherent in their witch¬
craft beliefs; but circumstances might arise which would
focus attention on those problems, circumstances in which
interest in them would be practical, not merely theoretical.^
Suppose that crop failure became so common as to seriously
endanger the Azande's very existence; this would in all
likelihood be attributed to an increase in malicious witch¬
craft. So protecting themselves against witchcraft might
become so important that the Azande would have to adopt
new methods; they might be forced to try to expel all
witches from their midst, instead of combatting each indi¬
vidual case of witchcraft as it comes up. What would
they do? They could not apply their present beliefs about
the inheritance of witchcraft substance.
The impossibility- does not lie in the formal contra¬
dictions which might be written down by a logician; it has
nothing to do with the form "P and not-P". It is an alto¬
gether practical impossibility. For suppose that the Azande
decided to banish from their country all witches; whom
would they banish? When the body of X is examined after
his death, witchcraft substance is found. When the body
^Wittgenstein, Remarks, Part II, #83' "It is -
I should like to say — for practical, not for theoretical
purposes, that the disorder is avoided."
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of Y, X's paternal uncle was examined, no witchcraft sub¬
stance was present. So on the evidence of Y, X cannot be
a witch; but there was witchcraft substance in his body.
And on the evidence of X, I must be a witch; yet none was
found in him. In the happier days when the Azande could
afford to wait until a witch caused trouble before dealing
with him, this kind of contradiction was shrugged off,
according to Evans-Pritchard. But now more effective
methods are required if the Azande are to survive, and
what can they do? They have what they formerly regarded
as absolutely conclusive proof that all the relatives
through the male line of X are witches, and equally conclu¬
sive proof that none of them can be a witch. And there is
no way that the Azande can both banish and not banish the
same man. The previously unnoticed incoherence has been
brought to the surface; whatever rationalization the Azande
might concoct to explain away the breakdown of the practice,
the conflict cannot be resolved. Action is required, and
with their present beliefs they cannot tell what to do.
Now, it might be said that I am distorting the Azande
conceptual structure by speaking of "conclusive proof", and
"logical incoherence" at all. But this objection would miss
the point. It is true that the Azande do not have the con¬
cept of evidence, and conclusive proof, in just the same
way as we do. But they certainly draw conclusions, make
inferences, and reason about the world around them. They
know what it is for something to be a good reason, or a
poor reason, or no reason at all. And in their present
scheme they have what they believe are the best of reasons
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for thinking that these people are witches, at the same
time they have equally good reasons for exonerating them.
This kind of contradiction is not something derived from
the philosophy of science; it is an entirely everyday
matter.
A second possible objection is that the Azahde could
find some way of getting around the problem without resol¬
ving the contradiction. For example, they might arbi¬
trarily adopt the rule that the first instance is the only
one to be considered, and any future conflicting evidence
will be disregarded. This is wrong for two reasons. In
the first place, this is still a revision of their original
conceptual scheme: the decision to ignore all future evi¬
dence was neither explicit nor implicit in their practices
concerning witchcraft. It was formerly believed that when
a witch was discovered his whole clan was ipso facto impli¬
cated; and since the presence of witchcraft substance was
taken to be a necessary and sufficient condition of a per¬
son's being a witch, it followed that it would be present
in all the other members of his clan. The possibility of
conflicts between the witchcraft-substance criterion and the
beliefs about inheritance was not provided for. We do not
provide for the possibility that two people who know arith¬
metic will do the same problem and rep'eatedly get different
answers; if this happened, and the mistake could not be
found, our concept of arithmetic would be different. Like¬
wise, if the Azande adopted the custom of ignoring all cases
after the first they would also be changing their previous
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concept. So even if they did this, it would support my
argument that their concepts required modification.
Second, it is frivolous to suppose that the Azande
will adopt my such ad hoc convention. They "believe that
the identification of witches is of utmost importance to
their welfare; they are using every means at their dis¬
posal to learn who the witches are, and exile them; this
is the whole point of what they are doing. And so they
cannot afford to simply ignore the conflicting evidence;
to dismiss it would not "be taking the question seriously.
Doctors sometimes find conflicting evidence as to whether
a tumor is malignant; hut they do not ignore it; on the
contrary, they try to find out which is correct, because
they need desperately to know. It is fundamental to the
concept of evidence that it is not ignored when the question
at issue is important. Any such stipulation would again
he a modification of the previously satisfactory beliefs.
Notice that this argument is not predicated on any
assumption that witches do not exist, or that the Azande
are confused or mistaken in their beliefs that their beliefs
are affected by witches. But suppose "that witches do exist,
in gust the form that the Azande believe. "Would the Azande
then be incapable of dealing with the situation adequately?
That is to say that if witches were a real danger in our way
of understanding the evidence and its threat, in a material
sense, then the Azande would soon be forced into realizing
the errors in their practice. They would be deceiving
themselves by arguing against the presence of witchcraft
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substance when it was in fact there, on their own terms,
or the opposite, depending on what criteria was used. If
the belief about inheritance of witchcraft is true, then
the evidence of the witchcraft substance cannot be retained.
Or if witchcraft substance is taken to be the fundamental
proof, then the belief about the pattern of inheritance
must be revised or abandoned. If witches are a danger,
as thus explained, then the Azande must develop a better
method of dealing with them.
Of course, I do not suppose that the problems which
are attributed to witches by the Azande are in fact caused
by witchcraft. On the contrary, I even suggest that one
important reason why the incoherence in Azande belief has
not yet led to difficulties is precisely that witches are
not a real threat, and therefore effective means of dealing
with them are not required. But the significant thing is
that the beliefs are incoherent, as practiced and expounded
by the Azande, whether witches are real or not.
Ironically, Winch's own defence of the Azande practice
seems to involve the assumption that witches are not real.
As I noted earlier, Winch defends the right of the Azande
not to be rational in this area, saying that they simply
do not follow the implications of their beliefs to their
logical conclusion. But defending the Azande in this way
suggests that Winch does not 'believe that the Azande are
right about witches at all. In effect Winch is saying,
"The Azande practice is perfectly in order because they can
get away with it; and of course we know they will continue
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to get away with, it; and of course we know they will con¬
tinue to get away with it, for witches are imaginary."
A failure to "be rational needs no defence, if it leads to
no problems. And if it does lead to problems, no defence
is possible. If Winch believed that there was a real
possibility that the Azande might be seriously threatened
by witchcraft, their failure to deal rationally with it
would loom larger in his mind.
The conclusion, I believe, is inescapable: a social
or linguistic practice can exist even though it contains
incoherences, so long as those incoherences do not lead
to serious and immediate practical problems. Therefore
it cannot be said that in this sense ordinary language is
always in order as it is.
In the next section I argue that there are not radi¬
cally different ways of reasoning. If the concepts we
studied were limited to local areas of meaning, my argument
for possible incoherence would not be founded simply by
there being no immediate problem in practice. What I have
suggested above is an _a priori element in understanding, an
assumption needed by both the alien framework and our own
to establish any mode of discourse. We must assume a basic
consistency of logic, otherwise we would find no signifi¬
cant relation of belief, practice or concept. Without
general assumptions about reality and rationality, we
could not identify beliefs, practices and concepts as well
as translate or interpret them.
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From the previous discussion we have seen the possibility
of criticism and revision of ongoing linguistic practices;
this is possible because there are not radically different
ways of reasoning.
The previous discussion examined one alleged conse¬
quence of the notion that meaning is given by use., namely
the belief that any ongoing linguistic practice must be
in order exactly as it is. There is another misinterpre¬
tation of this important insight of Wittgenstein's. It is
widely agreed that the meaning of concepts is closely inter¬
woven with the practices that surround their application;
and so it is often thought that reasoning, inferring,
counting, calculating, etc. are relative to the ways in
which they are used. Therefore, the argument runs, the
particular ways in which we reason, infer, count, and cal¬
culate are not the only possible ways; some other society,
for example, could easily have different, and fundamentally
different ways of doing these things, so long as their
other practices were also correspondingly different from
ours. That is, they could count according to a different
sequence, and so arithmetical calculations based on that
sequence and their methods would be just as valid ways of
counting and calculating as ours.
As we have seen, this conviction has been expressed by
Winch, among others: he argues that the Azande are per¬
fectly within their logical rights when they draw different
conclusions than we do. We say that their beliefs about
witchcraft-substance are incoherent, because those beliefs
may entail that all members of a clan be witches, and also
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entail that they all not he witches. But when we say this
we are applying our own criteria of rationality, says Winch;
and the only criteria which are relevant to evaluating the
Azande are their criteria of rationality. Since the Zande
criteria do not result in their drawing the same conclusions,
they must he different from ours; hut, thinks Winch, they
are equally valid.
Of course I dispute this claim; I do not agree that
it is intelligible to speak of radically different modes
of reasoning from our own, or radically different patterns
of calculating, etc. But I do not deny that the concepts
of reasoning, counting, calculating, etc. have intimate
logical interconnections among themselves and with other
concepts and activities. On the contrary, I helieve that
these interconnections are of the first importance if we
are to understand rightly what role all these concepts
actually play. And it is these very interconnections
among our concepts which render senseless the supposition
that it is possible to reason in fundamentally different
ways. Wow this is not to deny that people in various
times and places have had very different thoughts, beliefs,
and reasons; what I deny is that they differ from us
radically in form. Let me make this clear.
In the Muslim world the customs of marriage are very
different from those in Christendom; a man may have four
wives, and divorce them rather easily. Likewise, in
feudal times, when a vassal was ordered to go to war by
his liege lord, that was a good reason for him to go; it
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was his duty. G. E. M. Anscombe, in Intention gives the
example of a doomed Nazi who elects to spend his last hour
killing Jews.^ In each of these cases we might say, in
one sense, that we do not understand why these people act
as they do, for their reasons would not persuade us to
act that way.
But in another sense we can understand quite readily;
without "being a Muslim, or a vassal, or a Nazi, we can
understand that it is appropriate "behaviour for them. It
is not moral for a Nazi to kill Jews; hut it is consistent
and, in that sense, comprehensible. It is not irrational
for a Nazi to spend his last hour killing Jews; if there
is irrationality involved, it is in being a Nazi in the
first place. The argument about the appropriateness of
the action must be shifted up one level; for, given that
a person is a Nazi, then killing Jews is indicated.
In another connection, Wittgenstein asks whether a
52
man brings up his children because he has found it pays.
Of course not, in the usual case; yet we can easily ima¬
gine someone doing so. If there were a market for well-
educated slaves, we could understand a man's rearing chil¬
dren for this reason; his actions would be revolting and
reprehensible, but not, in this sense, incomprehensible.
But suppose we are able to show him, by carefully marshalled
facts and figures, that his operation could not make a
profit; that costs were so high, and prices so low, that
he could not in the long run come out ahead. And suppose
51
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he did not dispute nun figures, hut continued to say that
he would rear children for profit. He agrees with all we
have to say ahout the profit and loss situation; he admits
that he cannot make money; yet he does not accept this as
a reason for abandoning the operation. This would be a
radical departure from our ways of reasoning; if a
person cannot be brought to see that the impossibility
of making a profit counts decisively against engaging in
an activity for the purpose of making a profit, then we
cannot understand him. It is no use in this case to say
that he is 'reasoning differently'; we should not say that
he is reasoning at all.
And so it is this type of divergence I deny; it is
not possible that someone could reason in ways which we could
not learn to understand, given enough information. If some¬
one is reasoning, then we can follow his reasoning, or can
come to follow it; if we cannot, then we have no right to
call it 'reasoning'.
If internal criticism of an ongoing linguistic practice
is possible and if from.this we have seen that radically
different modes of reason are not possible either, a further
tenet of the autonomy theory of conceptual schemes is seen
to weaken; viz., we can now argue against the belief that
language is divided into.numerous logically discrete concep¬
tual schemes. The notion of disparate conceptual schemes
suggests a similarity between language, ongoing modes of
discourse, and formal deductive systems —a mathematical
model with explicit rules of inference, where consistency is
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an all or nothing affair. I will now argue that such a
view is a false abstraction from the working dynamics of
conceptual schemes.
Some evidence must "be admitted.
I have shown how Peter Winch was mistaken in his
defence of some of the practices of the Azande. The Azande
have certain beliefs about witchcraft; as they themselves
explain it, all witches and only witches have a certain
readily recognizable substance within their bodies. Yet
the conspicuous absence of this substance in those identi¬
fied as witches by other criteria is not taken as signifi¬
cance: that is, it is not taken to count against the be¬
lief that the person is a witch. We are tempted to say
that the Azande hold an irrational belief, but Winch denies
this; his argument can be paraphrased as follows:
It is true that to us, i.e. members of Western
culture, that this seems to count against the
rationality of the Azande practice. But this
is only because we are applying our criteria
of rationality; according to Zande criteria
the presence or absence of this substance is
clearly not important at all. What appears
to be a contradiction, properly viewed, rather
shows the difference between the way the Azande
operate with the concept of an object and our
own way. So the Zahde practice is perfectly
in order, bizarre though it seems to us.
Against all this I claim that the concept of an object is
not a matter of choice. If we accept Evans-Pritchard1s
account of the Azande — that is, if we accept that these
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people do in fact "believe that all and only witches have
this substance in their bodies — then we can not deny that
its presence or absence is evidence relevant to the identi¬
fication of witches.
For establishing the presence or absence of objects
is a very fundamental part of language; any pattern of
behaviour which did not involve it would be unintelligible
to us. In the normal case the Azande identify and locate
objects in just the same ways as we do: it certainly makes
a difference to a hungry Zande whether there is food in his
bowl or not; and he is just as able as we to tell whether
it is there. If it were otherwise, if the Azande consist¬
ently failed to distinguish between the presence and absence
of objects, we would find their behaviour incomprehensible;
Evans-Pritchard could not have attempted to interpret their
beliefs and translate their language into English.
Wittgenstein says, "What is a telling ground for some¬
thing is not anything I_ decide. What is a telling
ground for believing something is built into the language:
both the particular grounds for particular beliefs, and the
general notion of a telling ground. That the Zande lang¬
uage operates intelligibly with the concept of an object
is appar.ent from the very fact that Evans-Pritchard was
able to understand their talk of objects; he was able to
translate into English their words for everyday objects, and
also their word for witchcraft substance. So when it is
said that the Azande believe all and only witches have this
substance in their bodies, it follows logically that its
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty ed. and tran. G.
E. M. Anscombe (New York: J. and J. Harper, 1969), #271.
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presence or absence- is important.
In saying that this is "logically" necessary, I am
following Wittgenstein's usage. He states:
What counts as an adequate test of a statement
belongs to logic. It belongs to the descrip¬
tion of the language-game.^
So is the hypothesis possible, that all the
things around us don't exist? Would that not
be like the hypothesis of our having miscal¬
culated in all our calculations? ^5
Doubt gradually loses its sense. This lang¬
uage-game just is like that.
And everything descriptive of a language-
game is part of logic.
Wittgenstein's point here, I take it, is the one I'm stress¬
ing. Conceptual schemes, or language-games, cannot operate
in just any way that can be imagined; and the description
of the ways in which they can and cannot operate is one of
the functions of logic.
The characteristics of the language of objects include
being able to tell, usually, whether a given object is
present or not; and also what this presence or absence
licences us to infer. It will not do simply to say that
the Zande concept of objects is different, in this one
point: for to say this would merely be to question Evans-
Pritchard's statement about the Zande beliefs. It makes
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and only witches, and yet its presence or absence does not
make a difference. What counts as evidence is not a matter
of free choice; and this is evidence.
Ordinary language is not a formal system.
Defenders of a strict autonomy theory of conceptual
schemes speak as though a linguistic practice or mode of
discourse is either wholly coherent, or wholly incoherent.
This is a confusion and seems to have its roots in an im¬
plicitly mathematical model of language. And this view
is associated with the idea that ongoing linguistic prac¬
tices are always and necessarily coherent: if a practice
continues to function, so the argument runs, there can "be
nothing wrong with it. Obviously, it cannot be wholly
confused and without sense; therefore it must be alto¬
gether in order. Thus the relativists think it is not
worthwhile to examine such functioning practices to see
whether there might not be hidden incoherences.
Here the coherence of modes of linguistic discourse
is being construed on the model of consistency within a
deductive system. It is of great importance to mathema¬
ticians and logicians whether a contradiction — any contra¬
diction — can be deduced from the premisses of a system.
If one can, then stern measures are required to set it
right; it is intolerable that it be allowed to stand with
a contradiction as anything and everything follows with
such premisses.
But is not the situation different in ordinary, non-
systematic language? It is possible for incoherences to
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exist 'unnoticed, without the practice heing thereby des¬
troyed. Failure to recognize the significance of the
evidence that the earth is round was unimportant in the
Middle Ages; there was no need to take account of it, and
so the incoherence did no harm. Only when more accurate
geographical knowledge was required for practical' reasons
did it become necessary to question the "obvious" flatness
of the earth. Likewise, I have outlined a hypothetical
case in which the incoherence in the Azande's beliefs about
witchcraft substance would surface; in such circumstances
the contradictions, previously unnoticed and unimportant,
would present problems, and would have to be solved by
modifying the beliefs in one way or another.
So it is not the case that practices are either wholly
coherent, without logical problems, or else wholly inco¬
herent and without sense. Incoherences can exist in any
of the concepts of a practice; they can be peripheral
and trivial, or central and crucial. In the former case,
minor modification can be made to straighten out the diffi¬
culties, while leaving the practice substantially the same.
The Azande might, for example, simply abandon their belief
that witchcraft substance is found in the bodies of all
witches; perhaps they would say that the witches had learned
to expel it from their bodies by magical means, in order to
avoid detection.
But if the incoherence is central, it may be that the
practice cannot be substantially retained; it may be that
revisions sufficient to remove the incoherence would leave
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the practice so altered as to "be unrecognizable. This
would he the case, for example, if the Christian concept
of God could he shown decisively to he fundamentally in¬
coherent; any essential change in the concept of God would
make something very different of Christianity. And there
can he no advance assurance that such fundamental incoherences
will not he found; only analysis of each can reveal them.
Whether or not an inconsistent concept is central is not
itself the issue, however. "How much and what sort of
modification can a conceptual scheme tolerate and still
he the same?" is, perhaps, a pseudo-question. Any modifi¬
cation is some change in identity. And yet there is an
important distinction made; although what is fundamental
and what is peripheral may vary with the history of a
concept, and although change may he a matter of degree, we
nonetheless feel central characteristics identify conceptual
schemes. Much of Newtonian science has no immediate incon¬
sistency in practice, in such areas as low velocity and
optics. But when practical areas were extended into a new
realm of velocities, new problems did arise. The ultimate
resolution of this was radical, and did affect the identity
of science. Thus when Newtonian physics was replaced by
relativistic concepts of space-time and matter, we correctly
say that there was a basic change in the conceptual scheme
of physics.
Another confusion that stems from the mathematical model
of language is the claim that it makes no sense to criticize
whole practices. Defenders of the autonomous view of con-
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ceptual schemes suppose that any criteria for criticism
are contained entirely within the practice where they
operate; the argument is that to attack the whole practice
would he to undermine the very criteria on which the attack
is "based. Therefore, it is said, it is perfectly proper
to criticize particular features of a practice, using the
criteria of that practice, hut no practice can he called
into question as a whole.
Once the mathematical model is revealed and exorcized,
this argument can he seen to he circular. For it assumes
in advance that the only relevant criteria of criticism
are those which are wholly contained within the mode of
discourse; it assumes that no other criteria could possibly
he relevant, just as no argument from the premisses of one
deductive system could he relevant to any system hased on
different premisses.
But this cannot he so blithely assumed; the question
is precisely whether the particular argument in question
is, or is not, valid — irrespective of its origins. Now,
no one denies that there are some cases of such wholly
self-contained criteria; in chess the move that leads
directly to check-mate is the best move, according to the
criteria of chess. And here no outside criteria are rele¬
vant; none could show that some other move would he better
chess. However, it does not follow that all cases are
analogous to this one. When we cease to imagine that
modes of discourse are like different deductive systems, we
lose our assurance that whole practices cannot he validly
criticized; we no longer have an advance guarantee about
what kinds of logical argument can he valid.
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As we have seen, it may he that incoherence will he
revealed in the very most central and essential concepts
of a linguistic practice. If such a crucial concept is
revealed as incoherent, then that is a criticism of the
whole practice. That is to say, the practice is shown
to he unintelligible in its crucial aspects. Thus, whether
a mode of discourse is attacked in part or as a whole does
not depend so much on the source of the criticism as on its
Rules, reasoning and self-reference.
I have discussed the claim that there are different
criteria or cannons of rationality in different conceptual
schemes. Winch says,
Something can appear rational to someone
only in terms of his understanding of what
is and is not rational. If our concept
of rationality is a different one from his,
then it makes no sense to say that anything
either does or does not appear rational to
him in our sensed
A necessary prolegomenon to the philosophy
of religion ... is to show the diversity
of criteria c£rationality; to show that the
distinction between the real and the unreal
does not come to the same thing in every
context .5®
But as I have argued it makes no sense to speak of different
criteria of rationality. They may he very different forms
of speech and behaviour in different societies; hut these
target
A similar view is offered by D. Z. Phillips.
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are not the result of radically different criteria of
rationality - for they can "be made intelligible to us.
The behaviour of one group can be explained, in terms of
its reasons, to members of another; when this cannot be
done, then there is no point in saying that the behaviour
is rational at all. This, I believe, is the case with
regard to the Zande practices which I have examined: there
is no reason to say that the Azande are behaving rationally,
though according to different criteria than ours; it is
more to our point to say simply that they are mistaken.
Further, it is a consequence of this that we should not
speak of criteria or cannons of rationality at all. For
there are no criteria of rationality that are not at least
secondary to reasoning. What is fundamental is the recog¬
nition of good or bad reasons and arguments, and the agree¬
ment that we should go on in a certain way, for certain
reasons. Thus those who speak of criteria of rationality
are supposing that some formal rule lies behind the fact
that we all reason in the same way; they think the rule
must be logically prior to particular cases; they are
putting the (logical) cart before the (particular) horse.
It is often taken for granted that there is an impor¬
tant difference between so-called "first-order" language
and "second-order" language. First-order speech is that
which typically occurs within the mode of discourse, and
is practiced by its participants in their every day pur¬
suits; second-order speech, by contrast, it speech about
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first-order language. y Now there are two views on which
this distinction assumes great importance. The first is
the supposition that ordinary language is always "all right"
as it is. In that case, the first-order speech is guaran¬
teed to "be in order, i.e. coherence; while the second-
order speech enjoys no such assurance of invulnerability to
criticism. Thus the difference between the two orders
is significant. However, this position is untenable;
there is no guarantee that an ongoing linguistic practice
is free of incoherences just because it continues to func¬
tion. And so if my argument on this has been correct,
then the only other basis for the stress on first and second-
order language'is the implicitly held mathematical model of
language which I am now rejecting. That is, the assumption
which appears to operate here is that a distinction of this
sort is necessary in order to avoid the paradoxes to which
self-reference leads in formal systems.
But as it has been pointed out, self-reference in or¬
dinary language need not lead to paradox, precisely because
ordinary language is not a formal system.^ In fact, self-
reference is common in ordinary speech; we often remark,
"This discussion is very interesting; let's go on a while
after the bell", and the like. These locutions cause
59 The fundamental importance of this distinction be¬
tween first and second-order speech is, for example, assumed
by both Nielsen in his attack on fideism and by Hudson in
his defence of it. See Kai Nielsen, "Wittgensteinian
Fideism", Philosophy 42 (1967), pp. 191-109 and ¥. D. Hudson,
"On Two Points Against Wittgensteinian Fideism", Philosophy 43
(1968), pp. 269-273.
Karl Popper, "Self-Reference and Meaning in Ordinary
Language", Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Basic
Books, 1965), pp. 304-311.
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no confusion; they, are perfectly meaningful in their
context; no one sincerely claims not to understand what
a comment like this means. The problems which cause such
concern to the formal logician just do not arise here. And
if they do arise, as for example when I say, "I am now
lying", we chuckle and go about our business. Our language
is not thrown into chaos or rendered meaningless. As Witt-
genstein says, no one draws, conclusions from the "liar".
The possibility of such paradoxical sentences in no way
interferes with the day-to-day functions of language:
stating, questioning, persuading, disputing.
So the significance of the distinction between first
and second-order language dwindles to the vanishing points.
It cannot be used in the autonomy theory to rule out as
irrelevant large segments of philosophical discourse; re¬
marks about language cannot be simply dismissed without the-
bother of examining them closely. Rather, they must be
treated in just the same way as any other philosophically
significant speech, by careful attention to their logical
status and consequences. Once the quasi-mathematical
model of ordinary language is abandoned, the temptation
to imagine a fundamental difference between first and second-
order speech should subside. The very notion of language
as neatly ordered into layers which do not overlap is alien
to Wittgenstein's later work. In urging that we pay closer
attention to the actual use of language, he says,
6"1
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One might think: if philosophy speaks of
the use of the word 'philosophy', there must
he a second-order philosophy. But it is not
soi It is, rather, like the case of ortho¬
graphy, which deals with the word 'orthography'
among others without then "being second-order.62
This is a far more realistic picture of language and the
philosophy which treats it than a theory of conceptual
autonomy would allow.
Boundaries and limits to criticism.
There is one final mistake I want to discuss in the
Appendix as resulting from the quasi-mathematical view of
language. It should "be clear from what has gone before
that with the autonomy theory of conceptual schemes there
are numerous frameworks, with predetermined and impenetrable
boundaries. The relation of this belief to the mathema¬
tical model of language is clear: formal deductive systems
are easily distinguished from one another, and each is self-
contained. -That is perhaps the most fundamental tenet of
autonomy and relativism. And this is the basis of argument
that purports torule out as logically muddled, in advance,
every effort to discover any impropriety in any mode of
discourse.
Thus, the precise location of the boundaries between
conceptual schemes is of central importance for the argument
of the autonomy theory. These are the boundaries which
limit philosophical inquiry and cross-framework criticism;
any misunderstanding about their placement might lead to
62
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untold wasted effort if, for example, one were mistakenly
to attempt philosophical criticism where it is not possible.
It is said that science must not encroach on religious
language; and that British anthropologists cannot intelli¬
gibly criticize the logic of other societies. But it is
always assumed that there is no difficulty telling just
what is scientific language, or religious language. This
very important matter is, in fact, taken largely for granted.
Some defenders of autonomy have made some motions in
this direction, but have failed, so it would seem, to appre¬
ciate the significance of the point for their central thesis.
W. D. Hudson says,
By mapping the logical frontiers of religious
belief, I mean avoiding the confusions which
arise from failure to mark off its questions
and answers from those of other kinds. One
such confusion is that of which apologists
for or against religion are guilty when they
take belief in God to be the same kind of
logical thing as a scientific hypothesis ...
A great many dilemmas, connected with religious
belief ... can be resolved, when the charac¬
ter of religious discourse as sui generis is
clearly recognized.^
Here Hudson plainly realizes that it is necessary to under--
stand just what sort of business is about, what sorts of
questions it can properly deal with. But this involves not
only ruling out certain types of statements as improper for,
say, science: e.g. attacks on Genesis based on geological
63
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data. It also involves ruling out certain sorts of state¬
ments as improper for religion, too. It involves, that is,
showing the location of the conceptual boundary between
religion and science.
lor this boundary, after all, just is_ the fact that
some statements are proper in a religious context and others
are not, and likewise for science. Some arguments are
relevant to religious questions; others count for nothing
there; and "mapping the logical frontiers" of any mode of
discourse consists in showing what can properly be said in
and about it.
So we can see now that the idea of impenetrable logical
boundaries between disparate conceptual schemes begs the
question of immunity. The various statements treated by
logic do not come conveniently labelled "religious" or
"scientific" for our benefit; this classification is part
of the philosopher's task. Of course, the context often
makes clear what a type of statement is at hand; religious
statements are more apt to be found in sermons or creeds,
and scientific statements in chemistry texts or reports
on experiments.
But the context alone is not enough, for there is al¬
ways the possibility that a conceptual blunder has occurred;
and it is the philosopher's job to detect such misunderstan¬
dings. Such cases as the pseudo-dispute between the
theologian and the geologist about the way in which the
earth was formed occur when one or both parties fail to
understand correctly the logic of the discourse; so the
philosopher must be prepared to do more than simply look
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at the source; he must examine the logical function of
each statement in its turn.
This identification and description of the use of lang¬
uage in various areas is a major task of philosophy and
criticism. And any logical harriers are discovered through
such investigation; the boundaries do not preceide and limit
it. We do not learn that the geologist's attack on Genesis
is invalid because it crosses conceptual boundaries; on the
contrary, we learn where the boundaries lie by recognizing
that the attack is irrelevant. Nor is there, I believe,
any means of deciding on the validity of such analysis and
criticism wholesale; each must be studied in the closest
detail. The way sentences operate determines to what mode
of discourse they belong; and so each "mode" is only re¬
vealed as it is shown what sorts of sentences are appro¬
priate to it and which are not.
There is nothing very new or remarkable about this
observation; it merely reflects the situation in much of
contemporary analytic philosophy. Kyle's and Wittgenstein's
dissections of the language of mental acts are anong the
efforts to explicate the "logical geography", or "depth
grammar" of certain modes of discourse. The literature
in philosophy abounds with others. The point here is that
this runs counter to the underlying notion I'm criticizing,
that modes of discourse are marked off before the philosopher
comes to them, so that he is confined to describing what he
finds already in view.
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If, now, these conceptual "boundaries are neither more
nor less than descriptions of the sorts of arguments that
are appropriate in different cases, stress on these "bound¬
aries is trivial: to say that criticism and argument cannot
operate across conceptual "boundaries Just means that criti¬
cism and argument are inappropriate where they are inappro¬
priate. Nothing very interesting is "being said after all.
The autonomy thesis "becomes circular.
There is no profit in characterizing different state¬
ments as belonging to one or another conceptual scheme,
except to describe the results of an analysis of their
logical behaviour. We surely cannot avoid the task of
philosophical analysis merely by classifying statements as
belonging to different conceptual schemes. Let me take
an example and illustrate Just how this task proceeds.
An example of analysis and boundaries.
Christians believe that Jesus of Nazareth said and
did certain things, and died on the cross. His sayings
and his death have for them a different and deeper meaning
than the words and death of an ordinary man; but most
Christians believe that he did say and do these things in
the same sense as an ordinary man, as well as in another
sense. Indeed, no account can do Justice to traditional
Christianity which does not involve these beliefs of fact;
if it could somehow conclusively be shown that Jesus did
not say these things, or was not crucified, fundamental
revisions would be required in the average Christian's be¬
lief.
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Because these factual Beliefs are so important, some
Christians and apologists have, taken the line that no evi¬
dence could possibly count against the Biblical account of
Jesus' life, death, and resurrection, because for them the
Bible is the logically ultimate authority. They choose,
that is, to take nothing as counting against the Bible,
either in its religious statements or its historical ones.
Religious beliefs are offered as evidence for historical
beliefs; the authority of the Bible is set up as unassail¬
able — not only on religious questions, but also as to the
truth of statements about ordinary events in the past.
This, I suggest, is an example of a logical blunder, a
misjudgment of the boundaries of conceptual schemes,
Christians are here asked to accept statements about
the life of Christ on the basis of the Bible, not as a piece
of evidence — even the very best evidence — but as a cri¬
terion. Conflicting evidence is to be rejected out of hand,
because the Christian is committed to taking the Bible as
ultimate, and will count nothing as evidence against its
reports. Let us see whether we can make sense of this
idea. Suppose we accept last Sunday's New York Times as
the logically ultimate criterion of the truth about events
reported therein.
Remember that the Times is not to be regarded as evi¬
dence of what happened during that week, not even as very
good evidence; it is taken as the criterion of the truth.
We cannot consider any evidence that any error, distortion,
deliberate misrepresentation, etc., occurred; even if the
Times prints a retraction next week, this cannot count against
canonical edition.
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If the limes ,said that a certain John Smith was killed
falling into an excavation at the corner of Fourteenth and
Main, then we must not doubt that he was. If a hundred
respectable people solemnly swear they saw him a thousand
miles away, and in perfectly good health, at the time of the
reported accident, this must he explained away as a con¬
spiracy, or mass hallucination, or something. If there are
buildings on all four corners of Fourteenth and Main, and
the newest is twenty years old, and if thousands of people
remember passing those buildings, and working in them, this
is irrelevant; likewise we may not doubt that there could
have been an excavation on that corner, just because it
takes far longer than a week to construct a building. If
Smith himself appears and testifies that he was in no acci¬
dent, this proves nothing; we are not allowed even to sus¬
pect that the report of his death was exaggerated. What
is printed in the Times must be accepted as the truth, and
so nothing can be evidence against it. John Smith died as
we are told.
Naturally, these odd consequences apply not only to
Mr. Smith, but to all of us; whoever was mentioned in that
Sunday Times must consult it as the final authority as to
what he said and did; if he remembers it differently, his
memory must be discounted.
But of course not even the Sunday Times reports every¬
thing that occurs during the week; so there is plenty of
room for the operation of our normal concept of the past.
Whatever was not reported in the paper may be learned about
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in the usual ways: asking those who were present, examin¬
ing documents, looking for physical evidence, etc. Also,
events since Sunday are not included in the crucial edition,
and so they may he treated in the normal manner. We have
two different ways of handling statements ahout the past;
which one we apply in a given case depends entirely on
whether or not the event in question was reported in last
Sunday's Times.
Clearly all this makes a mockery of the concept of the
past. Nothing could he more preposterous than saying that
a man's own testimony cannot establish that he is alive.
When we imagine that a recent or contemporary document
might he taken as a logically ultimate criterion, we see
that the supposition makes no sense, though its absurdity
was not so apparent in the case of the Bible. We see now
that talk of "logically ultimate criteria" is simply out of
place here. What counts as a telling ground is not some¬
thing to he decided; it is built into the language of the
past. We cannot simply choose what to regard as a telling
ground and what to ignore; for if we do we fall into this
sort of absurdity.
If the above argument is correct, it should cast light
on the language of past events. It shows something about
how the truth about past events is ascertained, and what
kinds of things are good reasons for beliefs about the
past. It demonstrates that books, including the Bible,
can be reasons or evidence for such beliefs; but that
it makes no sense to say that any one is a logically ul-
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timate criterion. - To hold that nothing can count against
the historical statements in the Bible is to make a concep¬
tual blunder, as a result of overlooking some features of
the language of past events. What is a good ground for
beliefs about historical events is not a matter of free
choice. As Wittgenstein said in a similar connection,
"This doubt isn't one of the doubts in our game /"of speaking
about the past/. (But not as if we chose this game!)" ^
So the logical boundaries of concepts are revealed
by means of philosophical analysis; they are not prede¬
termined and labelled in advance as religious, scientific,
moral, or whatever. The arguments for autonomy confuse
this in arguing that criticism cannot cross conceptual
boundaries: the conceptual boundaries just are the lines
which show the relevance and validity of different kinds
of criticism. It is perhaps useful or convenient to say
that religious language is not appropriately assailed on
scientific grounds; but we should remember that this is
the conclusion of a logical analysis of particular argu¬
ments; it is not a piece of a_ priori knowledge that rules
out such inquiry. We have no advance assurance that
any sort of philosophical argument will or will not be
valid; we can only take arguments as they come, and let
the conceptual chips fall where they may. And where they
"fall", I've argued, is a result of criticism and reason,
not more description.
This is perhaps the most serious consequence of the
autonomy theory of conceptual schemes: it blocks the path
of inquiry and thus the growth of knowledge. Rather than
64 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, # 3^7.
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contributing to the- advance of philosophy, it is an ob¬
stacle to progress. For the autonomy theory fosters the
notion that limits can be set to philosophy before it has
even begun to work. I have tried to show that it id not
so easy to avoid the task of philosophy; and more speci¬
fically I have throughout my thesis tried to express en¬
couragement for critical philosophy in the form of meta¬
physical construction.
Concluding remarks.
My aim in this thesis has been to argue for the via¬
bility of metaphysical pluralism. This was not to be a
metaphysical argument establishing a pluralism of different
conceptual views of the world. Rather, I wanted to ex¬
plain the historical existence of the multiplicity of
metaphysical frameworks as being justified in the critical
synthesis between absolutism and relativism. By rejecting
the dogma of ahistorical absolutism and by rejecting the
sceptical despair of relativism, I tried to overcome the
misconceptions of either extreme epistemology and describe
the business of metaphysical system building. This busi¬
ness was called "reconstruction"; I described it as an
action within and a reaction against a given context of
language, concepts and practices. In such a way I cut
through the absolute-relativistic dilemma: for since the
problem situation provides a non-arbitrary standard for
comparison, historical relativism is avoided; and since
the evaluational problem situation develops historically,
the standard of comparison is not absolute.
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The problem situation presented with conflicting frame¬
works is non-arbitrary; the problems and issues are genuine.
And it is this situation which provides a measure against
which alternatives can be preferentially compared and evalu¬
ated. Alternative frameworks are competitors only because
they are introduced to solve some of the same problems, and
it is in reference to these common problems that an evalua¬
tion can be made — this is the acceptable element of ab¬
solutism in my thesis-argument for metaphysical pluralism.
That such situations or contexts provide an objective or
rational comparison of alternative frameworks, and yet are
uniquely the result of historical determinations, is the
acceptable element of relativism in my thesis-argument for
metaphysical pluralism.
Although constantly talking about metaphysical systems,
the thesis-argument developed in this study has been funda¬
mentally an epistemological theory. I have explained how
metaphysical knowledge is obtained and how metaphysical
frameworks are capable of rational criticism and improve¬
ment. This analysis itself can be generalized into a
metaphysical position, although I have not done this.
Without speculating on the nature of any such metaphysical
knowledge, it has been my sincere hope in undertaking this
study to further appreciate the historical dimension of
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